South Sudan Constitutional Development: Go Slow To Go Fast

Abstract

Constitutional reform in post-conflict states often fails when it seeks immediate, idealized governance structures that ignore prevailing political and cultural realities that refuse to acknowledge the possibility of tolerated and/or purposeful imperfection enhances long term success. This study evaluates Incremental Constitutionalism, an incremental, feasibility-based model for South Sudan that prioritizes institutional resilience over rapid transformation. Using comparative analysis of historical constitutional evolutions and resource governance models, it identifies pathways for balancing short-term stability with long-term federalist ambitions. By centralizing control over finite resources such as oil and minerals while devolving authority over renewable assets like land and livestock, the framework fosters diversified economic growth and local investment opportunities. Preliminary assessments suggest this approach mitigates political risk, encourages sustainable development, and strengthens public trust in governance—outcomes rarely achieved under traditional reform strategies. This strategy is categorized as Go Slow to Go Fast.