The Legal Life of Physical Evidence: An Analysis of Forensic Science in Courtroom Decision Making

Abstract

The growing dependency of forensic science in adjudication of criminal cases has made the physical evidence a determining element in the decision making process in the court. However, in spite of its increasingly influential role, physical evidence is frequently treated as scientifically neutral artefact instead of normatively governed lawful construct, in terms of rules of evidence. The present paper contributes to the discussion that physical evidence has its own legal life starting with the moment of its acquisition and ending with a court consideration. The research explores the longstanding gap between scientific reliability and legal admissibility by a doctrinal analysis that shows that empirical accuracy is not enough to guarantee evidentiary acceptance in court. The article is a critical analysis of the role of evidentiary doctrines of caution, relevance, authenticity, chain of custody and procedural fairness in determining the legal value of forensic evidence. It also examines how the judicial systems approach expert testimony and forensic reports and how this discretionary aspect of the judicial system as an evidentiary gate keeper is manifested. Following the path of the physical evidence in the course of the investigative and adjudicatory process, the study discloses organizational discrepancies in the incorporation of the field of forensic science into the legal system.The main input of this paper is the rethinking of physical evidence as a mediated form of evidence in law, and not necessarily scientific evidence. It finds loopholes in the current evidence law literature that cannot explain the entire legal lifecycle of forensic material. The paper finds that in the absence of a coherent paradigm to match the scientific paradigms to the legal standards, probative value of forensic evidence still risks abuse, misuse, and rejection, thus compromising the impartiality and integrity of criminal trials.