International Journal of Environmental Sciences
ISSN: 2229-7359
Vol. 11 No. 23s, 2025
https://theaspd.com/index.php

Strategic Motivations and Humanitarian Objectives: Analyzing the Allocation of U.S. Development-Oriented Military Deployments

Hussain[1]
[1]Founder of Zahen India, Indore, India. Mail ID: husain.ali18@yahoo.com

Abstract

This paper investigates the strategic and human- itarian motivations behind U.S. development-oriented military deployments, focusing on the programs Beyond the Horizon, New Horizons, and Continuing Promise from 2002 to 2012. By analyz- ing deployment decisions within Central and South America, we evaluate how economic needs and U.S. interests influence these deployments. Our analysis suggests that U.S. deployments are guided by a combination of strategic interests and humanitarian needs. Specifically, poorer countries with higher imports from the U.S. are more likely to receive deployments, reflecting both need-based and self-interested motivations. Additionally, states aligned with U.S. foreign policy are more frequently selected, supporting the hypothesis that strategic alliances play a sig- nificant role. The marginal effects analysis reveals that while wealthier states generally have a lower probability of receiving deployments, this effect is moderated by their level of economic engagement with the U.S. The findings underscore the dual role of these deployments as both humanitarian aid and strategic tools. Future research should focus on the effectiveness of these deployments in improving human development outcomes and examine subnational allocation patterns to better understand the interplay of need and political support in deployment decisions.

I. INTRODUCTION

Major powers have long used the deployment of military personnel as a means of power projection. While the concept of power projection is central to much of the literature on conflict studies, only in recent years have scholars begun to examine directly the determinants and effects of military deployments [1]–[9]. Of particular interest, these studies have shown that US military deployments have a range of economic effects, both on economic relations between the US and the host-state [1], [10] and on the economic and infrastructure of the host-state itself [2], [3]. These findings are similar to those of previous studies that have found that states' alliance and economic relationships reinforce one another [11]–[13]. However, where these studies advance most dramatically upon previous research is in their focus on the domestic implications of foreign military deployments, such as increasing economic growth, health outcomes, and infrastructural development within the host-state [2], [3].

The finding that US military deployments can have a range of positive effects on the host-state runs counter to many long-standing critiques of American foreign policy, and is at odds with how most people typically think of military deployments. The most prominent deployments tend to be associated with ongoing military operations, such as those in Afghanistan or Iraq. Other large, long-term deployments, such as those in Germany, Korea, and Japan, often only make headlines when they are the source of political conflict.

For example, various authors have discussed a host of ills that come with large, long-standing military deployments, such as crime, sex trafficking, drug trafficking, riots, and more Nelson1987, Baker2004,johnson2004be.g.. The notion that military deployments may have systematic positive exter- nalities, such as spurring economic and human development, is a relatively novel insight. However, while this may be an intriguing possibility, research that points to this link suffers from a number of limitations, such as relatively vague causal mechanisms which in part derive from considering all troop deployments equally regardless of their mission or activities. Accordingly, the relationship between US military deployments and the host-state's domestic economy requires further analysis before a direct causal link can be established.

As a first step in this process, we depart from the pre- vailing practice of treating all US military deployments as homogenous. Instead, we focus specifically the determinants of development-oriented deployments. Since the 1980s, the US has deployed thousands of military personnel to Latin American states on an annual basis with the aim of promoting development-oriented outcomes. These troops typically deploy for the purposes of building schools, clinics, and providing medical and veterinary care to populations within the host- state. Such deployments directly contribute to infrastructural, economic, and health outcomes in the host-state. By focusing on one specific type of mission, we can better establish the causal mechanisms that determine which states will re- ceive one of these deployments. Herein we use new data on development-oriented U.S. military deployments and inter- views with US military personnel to better understand the de- terminants of US development-oriented military deployments to Latin American countries.

This line of research has a broad range of implications. We know that the deployment of military forces by major powers, and by the United States specifically, occurs for various reasons. However, there is tremendous variation in the purpose of these deployments. For example, troops deployed to support the invasion of a foreign state do not serve the same function as those deployed to provide emergency relief after natural disasters. The United States in particular has deployed its military personnel across the globe for a variety of missions, and in recent years it has used its security forces to engage in aspects of foreign policy that traditionally have not been associated with security, such as development promotion [14]– [16]. While focusing on developmental outcomes may not seem like a question of security, previous work has found that populations that have fewer grievances are less vulnerable to recruitment efforts by groups hostile to the United States [15], [17]–[20]. Moreover, deployments that engage in the provision of development aid provide a form of foreign aid to the host state, which can then be exchanged for policy concessions favorable to the United States. Therefore, the reasons that the United States has for providing a development-oriented deployment to a state may more closely mirror the decision process through which foreign aid is allocated than the reasons for deploying forces to protect the United States or its allies. This paper proceeds as follows. First, we provide a brief overview of US Southern Command's (SOUTHCOM) annual programs that provide humanitarian and civic-assistance de- ployments to Latin American countries. Second, we provide a fuller review of the literature on both the effects of military deployments and foreign aid allocation, and elaborate on the specific theoretical and methodological shortcomings of previous studies. Third, we draw on the foreign aid litera- ture and interviews with US military personnel to provide a theoretical framework for understanding which countries receive development-oriented deployments. Lastly, we present our research design and our models analyzing this question, along with a discussion of our results.

II. BACKGROUND

Since the 1980s United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM)—the combatant command that overseas American military activities in Latin America and the Caribbean—has organized a variety of development-oriented deployments in Central and South America. The service com- ponent commands for the Army, Air Force, and Navy each conduct a series of military exercises each year through their Beyond the Horizon (Army), New Horizons (Air Force), and Continuing Promise (Navy) programs. These exercises began in the 1980s the New Horizons program and its annual human- itarian and civic assistance exercises conducted between Air Force South personnel and the governments of various Latin American countries. These exercises have since continued to expand with the creation of Army South's Beyond the Horizon program in 2008 and the Navy's Continuing Promise program in 2007. Since 1996, 17 US states, through their National Guard units, have been "paired" with 26 countries within SOUTHCOM's Area of Responsibility (AOR). The AOR includes all countries south of Mexico within Latin America and the Caribbean [21]. Every year, under the auspices of SOUTHCOM, US military personnel collaborate with host- state governments, their militaries, and other allied militaries (e.g. Canada) to plan a round of exercises they will conduct [22]. In each round of exercises, US military personnel deploy anywhere from three to five countries within SOUTHCOM'S AOR. Each country may host US military personnel numbering from 100–1,000 troops over the 3–4 month duration of the exercises.

The explicit aim of these missions is to provide training opportunities for "US and partner nation personnel and demon- strate US values to the region" [22]. More specifically, the types of services that the US troops provide include medical, dental, and veterinary care ranging from preventative medicine to public health, immunization, medical education, nutritional care, and civil engineering projects. SOUTHCOM's website emphasizes the immediate benefit of these services, such as providing hundreds of thousands of prescription glasses to local citizens, as well as sustained benefit of these services that come from different types of training the troops pro- vide, such as medical training. The webpage for Beyond the Horizon/New Horizons 2015 notes that "training events enhanced the medical readiness training of US forces and provide sustained health benefits to the population" [21]. The troops provide services and training throughout the host-state, from urban centers to remote rural areas of the country. According to the US Department of Defense (DoD), troops are deployed to "some of the poorest, most remote stretches of the countries" [23]. In a DoD article, the deputy chief of the security cooperation office at the US Embassy in Panama noted, "they are building something for a community that otherwise might be on the bottom of the priority list in getting those resources from the government of Panama" [23]. If this is indeed the case, then it means that these exercises are, at the very least, saving the governments resources they would otherwise have to expend in construction and repairs of these facilities.

Additionally, SOUTHCOM claims that the relationships fostered during these exercises will be beneficial in the event a situation arises that requires regional cooperation. During their missions, US military personnel establish relationships with host-state military personnel, government personnel, and the local communities to which they

provide services. Officials who have participated in these exercises have noted that these joint ventures not only build trust, but also enhance interoperability by exposing military personnel from multiple countries to medical, engineering, and construction practices to which they might not otherwise gain exposure through training alone. One interviewee noted specifically that US military personnel highlighted this fact: "Nobody should take this away that the US has gone down and provided knowledge and expertise we learned a lot from them. Many times we as Americans go to these countries, and for a variety of reasons, think that we know it all. But really, in reality, especially when you talk about construction, we learned a lot from them. It's their country, it's their material, and they know how to work with it" [24].

In spite of the unique nature of these deployments, we have very little understanding of how they function. Their primary purpose is to promote improvements in economic and human development, and to promote good will between the United States and the host-state. However, there are elements of the decision-making process that are clearly political. In one interview with an officer who oversaw planning for an annual round of Beyond the Horizon deployments, we asked about how countries were selected for deployments. Theoretically, all 31 countries within SOUTHCOM's AOR are eligible to receive deployments, and the programs do prioritze by need. However, the officer noted that SOUTHCOM leadership does prioritizes 10 countries in particular. The interview subject could not tell us which countries receive priority or why, nor could he tell us which countries that are highly unlikely to receive deployments or why [25]. The clear implication here is that there are factors other than need driving deployment decisions. To develop a better understanding of what these factors might be, we turn to the foreign aid literature to provide a framework for understanding how political economic factors might shape deployment decisions.

III. TROOP DEPLOYMENTS AS FOREIGN AID

In this article we examine the determinants of development- oriented U.S. military deployments. To understand where the US sends these deployments, we treat the deployments as a form of foreign aid provision. In this section, we highlight briefly some of the core insights from the foreign aid literature to help us understand the factors that drive donor decisions in allocating foreign aid. Next, we draw on interviews and qualitative information to clarify how military deployments fit into a foreign aid framework. Lastly, we generate a series of testable hypotheses concerning the factors that should determine where these development-oriented deployments are sent.

A. The Determinants of Foreign Aid

Research on the determinants of foreign economic aid can be broken down into two broad categories—economic and political factors. In general, various factors from both categories affect donor states' aid allocation decisions. Below we briefly review some of the key insights from previous work from the aid literature.

Economic aid is primarily associated with the promotion of development and poverty reduction. Scholars have argued that the development and institutionalization of foreign aid programs in Western countries can trace their roots to the rise of the social welfare state and to the United States' efforts to promote recovery and growth in Europe following World War II [26], [27]. Given this focus it is unsurprising that one major factor driving aid is how wealthy the recipient state is. Indeed, research on foreign aid has consistently found that states allocate aid to poorer countries MKP1998, AlesinaDollar2000, bdm07, Gibler2008, Kevlihan2014. Countries with low income levels, low income per capita, or high infant mortality rates, tend to receive more aid than countries with better levels for these indicators. Aid funds can go towards promoting development and growth in the recipient country, and can also provide reipcient-state citizens with access to food, healthcare, and educational opportunities that they might not otherwise have.

Studies have also shown that states can promote their own economic interests with foreign aid. Beyond promoting economic growth in the recipient state, donor states often care about advancing their own commercial interests by giving economic aid to other countries. For example, studies have found that trade—and the recipient state's volume of imports from the donor state, more specifically—correlate positively with aid receipts [28]–[30]. MilnerTingley2010 find that US legislators representing districts that export more capital- intensive goods tend to be more supportive of increasing economic aid. Drawing on the Heckscher–Ohlin framework, the authors argue that aid represents a transfer of capital that can alter the terms of trade for individuals living in the recipient state, allowing them to purchase more capital- intensive goods from the US.

It is worthwhile to note that even the purely "altruistic" aid distributed based on need can be beneficial for the security interests of the United States. Previous research has found that populations that are economically and politically better off have less grievances and are therefore less vulnerable to the recruitment efforts of groups hostile to the United States [15], [17]–[20].

The first way to think about foreign aid allocation is as an aid-for-policy deal in which aid is given to states in exchange for policy concessions [29], [31]–[33]. In these cases, the leader of the recipient state will be willing to engage in policy concessions that may not be what their population would want them to do (but are what the donor state prefers them to do) in order to gain the material benefits of the increase in aid. The logic behind this is that the leader in the recipient state can then use the aid to provide private goods to satisfy their selectorate, while also receiving benefits for him/herself [32], [33]. Troop deployments, which provide increased security and potentially economic advantages to the host state, can thus be deployed to states that are strategically important to the sender state in exchange for policy concessions such as cooperation in fighting terror or improving their human rights record [34].

B. Development-Oriented Deployments as Foreign Aid

Substantial evidence indicates that the US uses foreign aid to promote its interests abroad. US alliance ties, military deployments, the recipient state's level of development, its level of democratization, and trade with the United States all contribute to whether or not the state receives aid. [28]– [30], [35]–[37]. Accordingly, the aid that the US distributes can serve a wide variety of purposes, such as promoting US commercial interests [35], [38], for humanitarian reasons [39], or as a way to obtain policy concessions from the e.rge..cipient [40]. Importantly, as we note above, self-interested motivations can exist alongside more altruistic humanitarian goals heinrich2013foreign.

Herein we draw on previous research on foreign economic aid to understand which states receive development-oriented US military deployments. Effectively, we treat these deploy- ments as delivery mechanisms for development, humanitarian, and development aid. Conceptualizing troop deployments in this way is important for two principal reasons. First, in the case of development-oriented deployments such as Beyond the Horizon/New Horizons, the humanitarian aspect is evident. Statements by SOUTHCOM repeatedly emphasize the positive (and long-lasting) effects that these types of deployments will have on development. One of our interviewees stressed that the first consideration in choosing which country to send one of these deployments to is whether there is a need for this type of aid [25]. Moreover, the goals of these deployments are ostensibly in line with those of projects we would typically associate with economic development aid delivered through government or private-sector channels even though these necessarily involve military personnel. If these deployments are indeed planned on the basis of need, as SOUTHCOM descriptions suggest, then existing research should give us a theoretical basis on which to judge the factors that ought to be driving the allocation of US military resources for development missions.

Second, existing research also gives us a basis from which we can evaluate the influence of political factors that may be driving allocation decisions. SOUTHCOM's own website also clearly states that there is an expectation that the United States will benefit from this activity, stating that "the relationships forged during these exercises can be called upon in the event of a regional situation that requires a cooperative response" [21]. One of our interview subjects also emphasized that beyond need, a deployment location must align with strategic objectives of the US within the region [25]. In other words, much like traditional foreign aid, these deployments also seem to involve an exchange of aid for policy concessions.

We limit our analysis to countries within SOUTHCOM's area of responsibility. However, not all of these states have re- ceived development-oriented deployments. It shows the coun- tries within SOUTHCOM's area of responsibility. Countries are shaded according to the number of times US military forces have deployed to that state as a part of one of the BTH, NH, or CP missions from 2002–2012. Blue shading represents states that have never hosted such deployments. Countries in red have received at least one development- oriented deployment. Darker shading indicates the country has participated in more rounds of deployments than lighter shading. The most notable feature of this map is that not every country has received a deployment. Guatemala and Peru having the highest number of deployments having participated in these exercises in four separate years between 2002 and 2012. However, as the blue shading indicates, most countries have never received a deployment.

The foreign aid literature has found that humanitarian concerns matter to the population, at least to some degree. Therefore, by extension, they also matter to the leader when making decisions on where to allocate foreign aid [29], [39], [41], [42]. Most commonly, previous studies have found a link between poorer, less-developed countries and the likelihood of receiving aid. Given that these deployments have a strong developmental and humanitarian component, we should expect that the countries to which they are deployed will be the ones with the greatest amount of "need." Interviews with US military personnel suggest that need is also a part of the process in determining which countries receive deployments, and which specific projects they assign. During the planning stages, US military personnel work with members of the host- state's central government, as well as members of local and regional governments to develop a list of projects the troops will complete. Once the initial list is in

place US personnel travel to proposed project locations to determine whether there is need, rejecting projects that seem redundant or unnecessary [25]. We should therefore expect less developed states within the region to be more likely to receive such deployments:

Less developed states will be more likely to host a US development-oriented deployment.

We know that states take into account other factors that go beyond need in determining the allocation of foreign aid. In particular, evidence from the existing literature suggests that states exchange foreign aid for policy concessions and support in a wide range of areas [33], [35], [38], [43], [44]. More specifically, leaders within the donor country can use foreign aid to advance the interests of their constituents, as well as to advance broader foreign policy aims. The leader in the donor country gets the advantage of providing the concessions to his/her selectorate as a public good, while the funds that the leader in the host-state receives can then be used to keep members of their winning coalition happy as well. These funds can be used to offset the costs of concessions if those policy concessions made are not necessarily what the general population would want foreign policy to look like [33]. MilnerTingley2010 find that in line with predictions arising from trade theory, legislators who represent districts with greater capital endowments are more likely to support foreign aid. These capital-intensive districts are more likely to have interests in export-oriented industries, which in turn benefit more from aid to potential recipient countries that can be used to lower tariffs and help finance the purchase of American goods.

Given that the deployments we focus on constitute a transfer of resources from the US to the recipient state, it is possible that they are used to obtain concessions from the recipient state, or to promote US interests in some other way. Foreign aid that is given through direct services, such as building schools or hospitals, or the provision of health care can serve this same purpose by either freeing up resources that the leader can then distribute to the winning coalition, or by allowing the leader to determine where these projects go to. These deployments also involve direct spending by US military personnel on goods within the host-state—often for construction materials and supplies [25], [45]. Previous works have shown that states that are more salient to the donor state are more likely to receive aid in exchange for policy concessions. This is in line with information obtained from US military personnel. Officials we interviewed stated that while all countries within SOUTHCOM's AOR are technically eligible to receive deployments, deployments were generally limited to the top 10 countries that SOUTHCOM officials prioritized [25].

Theory and interviews suggest that there is a strategic component to the decisions governing which states receive deployments. If development-oriented troop deployments are indeed used as a bargaining tool, we should expect more deployments to states that are salient to the United States. Given that previous research has highlighted the importance of commercial interests and export promotion specifically [35], [38], and given the clear influx of US dollars resulting from these deployments, we focus on US exports to the recipient state as an indicator of economically salient relationships.

We also consider the mutual constraints of need and self- interest. Interviews with US military officials suggest that while need is certainly a governing consideration, strategic factors are also important, and both must be taken into account. That is, we expect both need and self-interest to factor into US decisions over which countries receive deployments, and so we expect them to condition one another. One interview participant noted, "There has to be a need, and it must align with strategic objectives for a particular country or region" [25]. The implication of this logic suggests that in a case of two countries with equal need, if one country is more salient to US interests, then it will receive preference for a deployment over the other country.

Previous research has also shown that states tend to allo- cate foreign aid according to broader political relationships between states. As noted above, interview participants indi- cate that strategic considerations do matter when deciding deployment locations. Trade constitutes just one of these types of relationships. Even in the case of humanitarian-oriented aid, we argue that development-oriented deployments will be more likely to go to states whose foreign policy matches up with that of the United States. While we could argue that the U.S. is more likely to give development aid to states that have different foreign policy positions, as a way to get them to align with the United States, humanitarian aid can be difficult to use as a positive incentive. The reason for this is that once humanitarian programs are in place, it can be hard to make a credible threat to remove them, as people's livelihood can come to depend on them [46]. Thus, we expect that these humanitarian deployments will be more of a reward to states that have aligned with the United States' position in the international system.

IV. RESEARCH DESIGN

Our first set of models predict which countries receive development–oriented deployments through Beyond the Hori- zon, New Horizons, or Continuing Promise. Our unit of analysis in this first set of models is the country–year with observations running from 2002–2012. The dependent variable in these models is a dichotomous

indicator coded "1" if a country receives a deployment in a given year and "0" if the country did not.

As we discuss above, there may be a mixture of motives that drive the US to make these deployments. We consider a range of indicators designed to capture four concepts: need, US interests, host-state preferences, and relations with the US. We use a measure of GDP per capita as an indicator of need, and consequently expect poorer states to be more likely to receive deployments than wealthier states. We also include infant mortality rates as another indicator of need, as it more directly captures the need for social welfare programs and medical aid. We also include a variable measuring the percentage of the population living in rural areas. Larger rural populations may be more difficult for governments to reach, and may therefore have greater need of assistance in healthcare and infrastructural development. Lastly, we include a variable of the number of people enrolled in primary education as a percentage of the total primary education-eligible population. These indicators all come from the World Bank's World Development Indicators [47].

We include a number of variables to control for US interests. First, we include a variable to control for US economic interests in Latin American countries. We include a variable measuring each country's imports from the US. Previous re- search has indicated that US policymakers use aid to promote US exports, in particular [35], [38]. We obtained these trade variables from the US Census Bureau [48]. Information on development-oriented deployments from SOUTHCOM repeat- edly emphasizes the role of need in the selection of states, so it is possible that the ability to promote more selfish interests are somewhat limited. To address this possibility we interaction imports from the US with GDP per capita.

It is also possible that the US uses these deployments to reward states for similar domestic or foreign policies. We include a measure of states' democracy, using the 21–point Polity indicator of regime type (v.2014) [49]. We expect the US to be more likely to send deployments to more democratic states as opposed to less democratic states. We also include a measure of UN voting similarity, using Affinity scores from Bailey2015. Some states within Central and South America have historically had more conflictual relations with the US, which we expect to be captured in part by UN voting patterns. We also include a dichotomous indicator that captures a country's contributions to the US Iraq War coalition. This variable is coded as "1" if a country sent troops to contribute to the coalition and "0" otherwise [50]. Lastly, we control for whether or not a country is a member of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA). ALBA was created, in part, to oppose US dominance of Latin America and to provide an alternative to a US-led economic regime for Latin American states. This variable is coded "1" to indicate that a country is a member of ALBA and "0" otherwise. We expect this variable to correlate negatively with the probability that a country receives a deployment. Because deployments are planned 18– 20 months ahead of the actual deployment [25], we lag the independent variables by two years.

V. MODELS AND ESTIMATION

Herein we review the results of our models. We begin with a discussion of the country–year models.

TABLE I PREDICTING DEPLOYMENT FOR COUNTRY–YEAR, 2002–2012.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
F2.intervention				
ln(GDP Per Capita)	-0.484**	-0.485**	0.086	2.959**
	(0.242)	(0.248)	(0.478)	(1.151)
ln(Imports from US)	0.318**	0.318**	0.420*	3.918***
	(0.133)	(0.136)	(0.239)	(1.211)
ln(GDP Per Capita) × ln(Imports from US)				-0.442***
				(0.147)
Infant Mortality Rate	0.004	0.004	0.012	0.019
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.026)	(0.014)

Rural Population			0.004	
			(0.01	
			1)	
Educational Enrollment			-0.015	
			(0.01	
			5)	
Polity	0.102	0.102	-0.015	0.110
	(0.072)	(0.072	(0.09	(0.076)
		)	1)	
ALBA Member	-0.013	-0.014	0.000	0.142
	(0.345)	(0.354	(.)	(0.364)
		)		
Iraq Coalition	0.214	0.214	0.378	0.103
	(0.462)	(0.461	(0.58	(0.484)
		)	0)	
UN Voting		-0.011	-0.172	0.079
		(0.651	(0.96	(0.718)
		)	3)	
Constant	-0.787	-0.791	-4.481	-29.061***
	(1.925)		(1.901)	
	(2.930)		(9.287)	
Prob > χ^2	0.319	0.403	0.244	0.014
Observations	276	276	111	276

A. Country–Year Models

Table I shows the results of our four country-year models. Model 1 provides a basic specification using GDP per capita, imports from the US, infant mortality rates, Polity, ALBA membership, and Iraq Coalition contributions. Model 2 adds the UN voting variable, Model 3 adds the rural population and educational enrollment variables, and Model 4 adds the interaction term. We remove the rural population and education variables from Model 4 because they so dramatically reduce the sample size.

In models 1 and 3 we find a negative and significant coefficient on the GDP per capita variable, indicating that wealthier countries are less likely to receive a development- oriented deployment. This is in line with Hypothesis 1 which suggests that need should be partly driving the decision over which countries receive deployments.

We also find a consistent positive coefficient on the US exports variable. This finding is in line with our hypothesis on the self-interested motivations that may be driving deployment decisions. Plainly, countries that buy more goods from the US are more likely to receive a deployment.

It shows the marginal effects of imports from the US as conditioned by GDP per capita (panel A), and the marginal effect of GDP per capita as conditioned by imports from the US (panel B). In panel A we find a positive effect for imports from the US at low income levels. Rather, states that import more goods from the US have a higher probability of receiving a deployment, but only when they are relatively poor states. As national income increases this positive effect diminishes in magnitude, eventually become statistically insignificant. Similarly we can see that national income does not have a statistically significant effect at low levels of US imports, but for states that consume a higher volume of US goods, increasing national income lowers the probability that a state receives a deployment. Overall we take this to suggest that the US has a preference for less developed states, but primarily those states that consume larger quantities of US goods. Higher income lowers the probability of receiving a deployment, but only for those states that already purchase more US goods. Overall these findings confirm the idea that strategic interests and need both matter in determining who receives deployments.

None of the other variables used in the model attain statis- tical significance in any of the model specifications. Some of this could be due to the lack of observations on some of the key variables included in model 3. However, other variables that typically yield significance, such as Polity and UN voting, do not yield significance even in models with more observations. However, when we use a one-year lag rather than a two-year lag we do observe significance in the expected directions on some of these additional variables. UN voting similarity, the percentage of the population living in rural areas, and infant mortality rate, all yield positive and statistically significant

coefficients in at least one model. However, these results are generally not consistent across model specifications. We lost approximately 20 observations using the two-year, reflecting the loss of 2014 from our estimation sample. This indicates the results on these other variables are somewhat sensitive to model specification and temporal variation in the sample. Using year fixed effects leads to a substantial reduction in our sample size, but our results do hold up for the GDP per capita and US imports variables, though the other variables continue to be highly sensitive to model specification.

In the following section we turn to predicting which subna- tional units receive US military deployments.

VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

In this paper we find that less developed states within the target region of Central and South America are indeed more likely to receive a U.S. development-oriented deployment, reflecting the allocation of aid based on need-based criteria. At the same time, political factors also play a role in the allocation of this form of aid. In particular, commercial interests play a role in the allocation of development-oriented deployments, with states that import more from the U.S. (as well as states that support the U.S.'s foreign policy) being more likely to receive a deployment. These two effects also seem to work together, as the marginal effect of imports is greater for states with lower GDPs. This implies that the U.S. favors granting deployments to countries with greater need that also import more from the U.S. This criterion thus satisfies both the need and self-interest aspects of foreign aid.

A logical next step is to repeat this analysis is to study the actual effectiveness of these deployments in improving human development, as they are intended to do. We have carried out a pilot analysis at the subnational level in Peru and are in the process of gathering subnational deployment and development data on all states in the region that have received Beyond the Horizons, New Horizons, or Continuing Promise Deployments. This will allow us to understand the subnational effect of U.S. troop deployments on development while varying the national setting of the deployments.

Another natural extension of these conclusions is to think about how it is that subnational units are selected for deploy- ments. Our interviews with US military personnel indicate that this decision is a joint one between the U.S. government and the host state government. The question remains as to what characteristics make a unit more likely to be selected for a deployment. Our theory suggests that both the U.S. and the host state will likely prioritize subnational units with greater need. At the same time, an initial analysis in which we use human development indicators to predict deployments to Peru's subnational regions shows that it is not necessarily the regions with the lowest levels of human development that are receiving these deployments.

In future work we will argue, following the work of BD- Metal2003, that leaders will attempt to use the deployments as a form of reward for districts where they have political support. While an argument could certainly be made for leaders preferring to send deployments to districts where they lack support as a way to gain more support in those areas, this would be a risky move, as the opposition could also take credit for the benefits that stem from the deployments.

These deployments clearly come with some benefits to the local population. Some are direct in the sense that the popu- lation gets to benefit from the actual clinics, schools, etc that are being built there. Beyond that, there are indirect economic benefits that the subnational unit can accrue. For example, when the US military engages in construction projects, they bring along their own tools, but purchase all of their materials locally. This means that local suppliers can benefit from this additional business. In addition, the troops are allowed to patronize local businesses, such as restaurants, something that is potentially beneficial for the local economy [45]. It will thus be important to gather political data at the subnational level. Once we have done this, we believe that we will find that host state leaders will choose to send the American troops to the areas that are salient to the executive.

REFERENCES

[1] G. Biglaiser and K. DeRouen, "Following the flag: Troop deployment and us foreign direct investment," International Studies Quarterly, vol. 51, no. 4, pp. 835–854, 2007.

[2] T. Kane, "Development and us troop deployments," Foreign Policy Analysis, vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 255–273, 2012.

[3] G. Jones and T. Kane, "Us troops and foreign economic growth," Defence and Peace Economics, vol. 23, no. 3, pp. 225–249, 2012.

[4] C. Martinez Machain and T. C. Morgan, "The Effect of US Troop Deployment on Host States' Foreign Policy," Armed Forces and Society, vol. 39, no. 1, pp. 102–123, 2013.

[5] M. A. Allen and M. E. Flynn, "Putting our best boots forward: US military deployments and host-country crime," Conflict Management and Peace Science, vol. 30, no. 3, pp. 263–285, Jun. 2013. [Online].
Available: http://cmp.sagepub.com/content/30/3/263.short

[6] M. A. Allen, J. VanDusky-Allen, and M. E. Flynn, "The Localized and Spatial Effects of US Troop Deployments on Host-State Defense Spending," Foreign Policy Analysis, pp. n/a–n/a, oct 2014. [Online].
Available: http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/fpa.12078

[7] M. A. Allen, M. E. Flynn, and J. VanDusky-Allen, "Regions of Hierarchy and Security: US Troop Deployments, Spatial Relations, and

Defense Burdens," International Interactions, vol. 188, no. 4, pp. 1–27, may 2016. [Online]. Available: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10. 1080/03050629.2016.1191482.
[8] A. Braithwaite, "Transnational Terrorism as an Unintended Consequence of a Military Footprint," Security Studies, vol. 24, no. 2, pp. 349–375, jun 2015. [Online]. Available: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10. 1080/09636412.2015.1038192
[9] M. A. Allen, M. E. Flynn, and C. Martinez Machain, "Determinants of u.s. troop deployment," American Political Science Association Meeting, Philadelphia, PA, 2016.
[10] G. Biglaiser and K. DeRouen Jr, "The interdependence of us troop deployments and trade in the developing world," Foreign Policy Analysis, vol. 5, no. 3, pp. 247–263, 2009.
[11] J. Gowa and E. D. Mansfield, "Power Politics and International Trade,"
American Political Science Review, vol. 87, no. 2, pp. 408–420, 1993.
[12] ——, "Alliances, Imperfect Markets, and Major-Power Trade," Interna- tional Organization, vol. 58, no. 4, pp. 775–805, 2004.
[13] B. O. Fordham, "Power or Plenty? Economic Interests, Security Concerns, and American Intervention," International Studies Quarterly, vol. 52, no. 4, pp. 737–758, dec 2008. [Online]. Available: http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2008.00524.x
[14] J. Howell and J. Lind, "Changing donor policy and practice in civil society in the post-9/11 aid context," Third world quarterly, vol. 30, no. 7, pp. 1279–1296, 2009.
[15] T. Heinrich, C. Martinez Machain, and J. Oestman, "Does counterterror- ism militarize foreign aid? evidence from sub-saharan africa," Working Paper, 2016.
[16] K. Aning, "Security, the war on terror, and official development assis- tance," Critical Studies on Terrorism, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 7–26, 2010.
[17] J. M. Scott and C. A. Steele, "Sponsoring democracy: The united states and democracy aid to the developing world, 1988–20011," International Studies Quarterly, vol. 55, no. 1, pp. 47–69, 2011.
[18] J. K. Young and M. G. Findley, "Can peace be purchased? a sectoral- level analysis of aida ̂s influence on transnational terrorism," Public Choice, vol. 149, no. 3-4, pp. 365–381, 2011.
[19] E. Bueno de Mesquita, "The quality of terror," American Journal of Political Science, vol. 49, no. 3, pp. 515–530, 2005.
[20] S. E. Finkel, A. Pe ́rez-Lin ̃a ́n, and M. A. Seligson, "The effects of us foreign assistance on democracy building, 1990-2003," World Politics,
pp. 404–438, 2007.
[21] United States Southern Command. (2015) Beyond the horizon—new horizons 2015. [Online]. Available: http://www.southcom.mil/newsroom/pages/beyond-the-horizon-new-horizons-2015-.aspx
[22] ——. (2015) State partnership program in latin america and the caribbean. [Online]. Available: http://www.southcom.mil/newsroom/Pages/State-Partnership-Program-Latin-America-and-the-Caribbean. aspx
[23] D. Miles, "Embassy official: Beyond the horizon supports u.s. outreach," DoD News, 2013. [Online]. Available: http://archive.defense.gov/news/ newsarticle.aspx?id=120276
[24] LTC, "Interview with lieutenant colonel, 2016-03-08," 2016.
[25] CPT, "Interview with captain, 2016-03-08," 2016.
[26] J.-P. The ́rien, "Debating Foreign Aid: Right versus Left," Third World Quarterly, vol. 23, no. 3, pp. 449–466, 2002.
[27] J.-P. The ́rien and A. Noe ̈l, "Political parties and foreign aid," American Political Science Review, vol. 94, no. 1, pp. 151–162, 2000.
[28] J. Meernik, E. L. Krueger, and S. C. Poe, "Testing models of us foreign policy: foreign aid during and after the cold war," The Journal of Politics, vol. 60, no. 1, pp. 63–85, 1998.
[29] A. Alesina and D. Dollar, "Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?"
Journal of Economic Growth, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 33–63, Mar. 2000.
[30] B. Bueno de Mesquita and A. Smith, "Foreign aid and policy conces- sions," Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 51, no. 2, pp. 251–284, 2007.
[31] G. Palmer and T. Morgan, A theory of foreign policy. Princeton University Press, 2011.
[32] A. S. R. M. M. J. D. Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce; Smith, The Logic of Political Survival. MIT Press, 2005.
[33] B. Bueno de Mesquita and A. Smith, "Foreign aid and policy conces- sions," Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 51, no. 2, pp. 251–284, 2007.
[34] S. Bell, C. Clay, and C. Martinez Machain, "The effect of us troop deployments on human rights," Journal of Conflict Resolution, forthcoming.
[35] R. K. Fleck and C. Kilby, "How do political changes influence u.s. bilat- eral aid allocations? evidence from panel data," Review of Development Economics, vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 210–223, 2006.
[36] ——, "Changing aid regimes? u.s. foreign aid from the cold war to the war on terror," Journal of Development Economics, vol. 91, pp. 185–197, 2010.
[37] H. V. Milner and D. Tingley, "Who supports global economic engage- ment? the sources of preferences in american foreign economic policy," International Organization, vol. 65, no. Winter, pp. 37–68, 2011.
[38] H. V. Milner and D. H. Tingley, "The political economy of u.s. foreign aid: American legislators and the domestic politics of aid," Economics and Politics, vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 200–232, 2010.
[39] A. C. Drury, R. S. Olson, and D. A. V. Belle, "The politics of humanitarian aid: Us foreign disaster assistance, 1964–1995," Journal of Politics, vol. 67, no. 2, pp. 454–473, 2005.
[40] B. Bueno de Mesquita, A. Smith, R. M. Siverson, and J. D. Morrow, The Logic of Political Survival. MIT Press, 2003.
[41] D. H. Lumsdaine, Moral vision in international politics: the foreign aid regime, 1949-1989. Princeton University Press, 1993.
[42] D. A. Van Belle, J.-S. bastien Rioux, and D. M. Potter, Media, bureau- cracies, and foreign aid: A comparative analysis of United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, France and Japan. Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.
[43] B. Lai and D. S. Morey, "Impact of regime type on the influence of us foreign aid," Foreign Policy Analysis, vol. 2, no. 4, pp. 385–404, 2006.
[44] M. Faye and P. Niehaus, "Political aid cycles," American Economic Review, vol. 102, no. 7, pp. 3516–3530, 2012.
[45] SFC, "Interview with sergeant first class, 2016-02-26," 2016.
[46] P. N. Lyman and S. B. Wittels, "No good deed goes unpunished: the unintended consequences of washington's hiv/aids programs,"

Foreign Affairs, pp. 74–84, 2010.
[47] World Bank, "World Development Indicators," World Bank, Tech. Rep., 2015.
[48] US Census Bureau, "Us trade in goods by country," Census.gov - Foreign Trade, 2015.
[49] M. G. Marshall, K. Jaggers, and T. R. Gurr, "Polity iv project: political regime characteristics and transitions, 1800–2010," 2011. [Online]. Available: http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm
[50] S. A. Carney, Allied Participation in Operation Iraqi Freedom. United States Army Center of Military History, 2011.