

# Enhancing Threat Detection And Introducing New Vulnerabilities

Rahul Cherekar<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Independent Researcher, Boston, USA rahul.cherekar@gmail.com

## Abstract

Artificial Intelligence (AI) is increasingly transforming cybersecurity by enhancing threat detection, predictive analytics, and incident response automation. AI-powered systems process vast amounts of data, detect anomalies, and mitigate security risks in real-time, significantly improving defense mechanisms. However, the integration of AI also introduces new vulnerabilities, including adversarial attacks and potential misuse by cybercriminals. This paper examines the dual nature of AI in cybersecurity, highlighting both its advantages and inherent risks. We propose a structured approach to implementing AI-driven security measures while addressing associated vulnerabilities through robust mitigation strategies and ethical considerations.

**Keywords:** Artificial Intelligence, cyber security, threat detection, predictive analytics, vulnerabilities, cyber criminals.

## 1. INTRODUCTION

Cybersecurity systems heavily rely on advanced methods such as reverse engineering to analyze and identify undocumented software behavior. However, the process—known as the introspection challenge—remains complex due to its resource-intensive nature and the restricted visibility of isolated environments, such as virtual machines. Existing solutions like Virtuoso [1] and VMST [2] primarily focus on kernel-level data but fail to provide comprehensive insights into user-level interactions, such as application logs and program execution traces.

To address these limitations, our research introduces an enhanced monitoring mechanism that utilizes runtime memory access tracking to identify tap points—critical locations within a system that expose security-relevant information, such as accessed URLs or file operations. Unlike prior methodologies that rely on static monitoring, our approach integrates dynamic observation techniques, ensuring adaptability across diverse architectures with minimal overhead [3].

The key challenges associated with this approach include handling vast volumes of real-time data and mitigating the computational overhead associated with continuous security monitoring. To overcome these challenges, we leverage AI based analytics (discussed in Section IV) to efficiently identify and prioritize security-sensitive tap points. Additionally, we implement a record-and-replay framework using QEMU [4] to facilitate low-overhead data collection and offline analysis.

## 2. Defining tap points

A tap point abstracts memory gets to for investigation. Characterizing it as a triple: (guest, program counter, address space), guarantees intelligent information streams by isolating memory gets to by setting.




Figure. 1. Tap point definitions: (a) solitary stream of memory gets to; (b) gathered by program and area; (c) refined by calling context.

Figure. 1 shows three degrees of granularity: (a) all central processor to-Smash composes, which incorporate immaterial information; (b) gathered by endlessly program counter, which blends inconsequential information; (c) adding the calling setting, separating the ideal data.

Most cases require one degree of setting, however more profound stacks are upheld depending on the situation. We likewise recognize correlated tap points by identifying nearby memory composes inside a short window, empowering examination of related information structures. This approach adjusts granularity and soundness, upgrading information thoughtfulness.

### 3. Scope and assumptions

This study focuses on a runtime-based approach for identifying security-relevant memory accesses within operating system environments. However, certain assumptions and limitations apply: Tappan Zee Scaffold (TZB) intends to improve on the manual course of distinguishing tap focuses for dynamic observing however doesn't ensure full unwavering quality under all circumstances. Key presumptions:

#### 1. Streaming data constraints

Real-time monitoring is optimized for sequential memory access patterns. Spatially unordered or fragmented memory operations are beyond the scope of this framework.

#### 2. Encoding dependencies

Identifying security-relevant data assumes a predefined knowledge of encoding schemes (e.g., ASCII, UTF-8). Future extensions could incorporate adaptive encoding detection.

#### 3. Call stack context

In most cases, a single-level call stack trace suffices for monitoring. However, edge cases may require deeper context resolution, particularly for applications employing nonstandard memory management techniques. Figure. 2 features TZB's extension. It upholds related memory composes (e.g., memcpy) and transiently requested information (e.g., sequential composes). Limits incorporate opposite arranged duplicates (memmove) and broadly dispersed composes (dmesg). Upgrades like superior setting following could resolve these issues in future work.




Figure. 2. Patterns of memory access that we might wish to monitor using TZB.

### 4. Search strategies

Tappan Zee Extension (TZB) distinguishes tap points for information extraction through three systems:

1. **Recording and replay:** Wanted operating system or application conduct is kept in PANDA, empowering deterministic replay with low above. Examinations, executed as PANDA modules, process memory gets to during replay to distinguish tap focuses, which are then approved by investigating information or code around the tap point (Figure 3).

## 2. Search strategies:

i **Known knowns:** For unsurprising information (e.g., URLs, filenames), string look recognize tap focuses proficiently.

ii **Known unknowns:** For information of unsure configuration (e.g., bit messages, encryption keys), measurable models or prophets rank tap focuses by importance.

iii **Obscure unknowns:** For exploratory inquiries, bunching bunches comparative tap focuses, empowering productive assessment through models.

These methodologies give a deliberate structure to find and approve helpful thoughtfulness focuses.




Figure. 3. The workflow for using TZB to locate points at which to interpose for active monitoring.

## 5. Implementation

This segment frames the unique investigation stage used to fabricate TZB and features TZB-explicit algorithmic and information structure arrangements.

### 1. Panda

TZB use the Stage for Design Nonpartisan Unique Investigation (PANDA), based on QEMU 1.0.1 [4]. QEMU's productive copying and Middle of the road Language (IL) empower PANDA to help different models with negligible above (5x log jam).

PANDA's key elements include:

i **Plugin architecture:** Permits dynamic examinations in C/C++ utilizing secluded modules with standard callbacks (e.g., pre/post-fundamental block, memory activities), working with clean detachment and reuse of examinations.

ii **Record and replay (RR):** Catches computer processor inputs (e.g., ins, interferes) for deterministic replays under weighty instrumentation, basic for TZB's computational requests.

iii **LLVM integration:** Converts QEMU's IL to LLVM code [5], however this component is unused in TZB.

### 2. Callstack monitoring

To follow calling settings, TZB utilizes the callstack module. This module distinguishes engineering explicit call directions (e.g., call on x86, bl on ARM) and keeps a shadow stack for bring addresses back. While powerful for compiler-created code, it might fizzle with non-standard callbring semantics back.

### 3. Fixed string searching

The stringsearch module recognizes fixed strings going through tap focuses. Utilizing a one-byte counter per string/tap point, the module matches strings effectively however restricts lengths to 256 bytes (expandable). This lightweight deterministic limited robot guarantees adaptable execution for TZB's huge information volumes.

#### 4. Statistical search and clustering

Bigram measurements empower fluffy hunt and bunching of information at tap focuses. Meager histograms productively store byte-pair frequencies to keep away from inordinate memory use.

For similitude measurements, Jensen-Shannon divergence [6] beats options like Euclidean and cosine distances. This is processed as:

$$JSD(P, Q) = H\left(\frac{P + Q}{2}\right) - \frac{H(P) + H(Q)}{2}$$

where H addresses Shannon entropy. Bunching utilizes kmeans [7] with KMeans++ initialization [8]. Multithreaded executions guarantee down to earth execution.

#### 5. Finding SSL/TLS keys

The keyfind module recognizes tap focuses composing SSL/TLS ace mysteries by testing 48-byte successions as unscrambling keys for caught parcels. A checked Message Verification Code (Macintosh) affirms a match. This approach successfully unscrambles SSL/TLS associations for malware examination, as exhibited in Section VI-A4.

#### 6. Evaluation

This segment assesses the adequacy of TZB's tap point search methodologies (Section IV) for reflection, zeroing in on genuine applications. Tests length assorted working frameworks, applications, and structures to exhibit TZB's flexibility. Where conceivable, emblematic names are utilized for meaningfulness.

##### 1. Known knowns

i **URL access:** Checking URLs can help interruption recognition frameworks (IDS) by confirming human-started demands or boycotting vindictive locales. Since URL warnings are not uncovered through open APIs, we utilized the stringsearch module to recognize tap focuses for URL information in programs across various working frameworks. Table I sums up results, with exact tap focuses found for different setups, including Revelation, Firefox, and Web Voyager. These tap focuses permit exact observing without expecting earlier investigate data.

ii **TLS/SSL expert secrets:** Decoding SSL/TLS traffic for IDS applications generally requires a man-in-the-center assault, presenting dangers to testament confirmation. Utilizing TZB, we found tap focuses to get to dominate privileged insights for associations, empowering secure thoughtfulness. Explores different avenues regarding OpenSSL, Revelation, Firefox, and different clients showed TZB's capacity to recognize dependable tap focuses for ace insider facts (Table II). For SSLv3 executions like Revelation, extra call stack setting was important to detach applicable information because of varieties in pseudo-arbitrary capabilities. TZB works on this cycle contrasted with customary picking apart methods.

iii **File access:** Document access checking is basic for security applications like enemy of infection scanners. Utilizing stringsearch, we recognized tap focuses that caught filenames in ASCII and UTF-16 configurations across numerous working frameworks (Table III). On Windows 7, extra calling setting was expected to avoid irrelevant named objects. By and large, TZB really found tap focuses for exhaustive record access observing.

iv **SSL malware:** Unscrambling SSL-scrambled malware traffic presents remarkable difficulties. In contrast to harmless clients, malware frequently opposes testament based capture. Utilizing the keyfind module, we distinguished tap focuses for encryption keys by means of preliminary decoding. Testing with the Sykipot trojan [9] showed TZB's capacity to find SSL keys, utilizing divided framework components among malware and standard applications like Web Pioneer. The tap point empowered decoding of caught parcels, bypassing conventional difficulties.

v **Finding dmesg:** Framework logs are basic for security and framework organization. A reflection based security framework, for example, requires recognizing tap focuses composing log-like information in view of models. Utilizing the factual pursuit from Section, we prepared on dmesg yields from a Debian sid (amd64) have, figuring bigram probabilities, and applied it to five operating system boot accounts. JensenShannon distances positioned tap focuses, physically checked for accuracy (Table IV).

The right situation log tap focuses were in the best 10 across tried OSes. Outstandingly, Linux-based frameworks coming up short on extraordinary guest due to do\_syslog being conjured by numerous capabilities. For Haiku, log fulfillment required distinguishing connected tap focuses shaping a mempcy. On the other hand, no closely resembling Windows 7 tap guide was viewed as due toward its numeric-coded logging framework. Existing apparatuses like Virtuoso [1] might suit such parallel arrangements.

Revelations during inconsequential undertakings, such as investigating QEMU boot issues for Raspberry Pi [10], show extra utility.

vi **Unknown questions:** Clustering: To assess bunching adequacy, we contrasted algorithmic grouping and manual marks on six accounts (FreeBSD 9.0: boot, closure, inactive, applications; Windows 7: inactive, applications). After kimplies bunching (k = 100), tests were chosen from shifting group separates, dazed, and marked physically.

A k-implies grouping (k = 10) accomplished a low Changed Rand Index [11], reflecting frail arrangement with manual marks. Regardless of this, bunching really featured text-like information in FreeBSD boot accounts, gathering dmesg and filename tap focuses in a solitary group. Investigation uncovered piece messages, filenames, shell scripts, process postings, and design information, highlighting grouping's capability to concentrate examination.

vii **Accuracy:** TZB investigations successfully distinguish intervention focuses. For stringsearch, recognizing an adequate tap point required manual assessment of up to 262 sections (e.g., URLs in IE8), frequently requiring under 60 minutes. dmesg recovery accuracy at 10 went from 20% (Minix) to 100% (Haiku), ensuring right outcomes inside the main 10.

In synopsis, factual techniques and bunching are important devices for finding applicable tap focuses, empowering proficient examination and framework bits of knowledge.

## 2. Comparing TZB with existing solutions

Table VII presents a comparative analysis between our proposed Tappan Zee Bridge (TZB) framework and existing methodologies VMST in the context of memory introspection.

As observed, TZB introduces an active monitoring paradigm, capable of dynamically identifying security-sensitive memory access points. Unlike static introspection tools, TZB operates across both user and kernel levels, making it more adaptable for real-world cybersecurity applications.

Browser	Caller	PC
Deb Epiphany (arm)	WebCore::KURL::KURL+0x30	WebCore::KURL::init+0x70
Deb Epiphany (amd64)	webkit_frame_load_uri+0xc3	WebCore::KURL::init+0x368
Win7 IE8 (x86)	ieframe!CAddressEditBox::_Execute+0xaa	ieframe!StringCchCopyW+0x50
Win7 Firefox (x86)	xul!nsAutoString::nsAutoString+0x1a	xul!nsAString_internal::Assign+0x1d
Win7 Chrome (x86)	msftedit!CTxtEdit::OnTxChar+0x105	msftedit!CTxtSelection::PutChar+0xb8
Win7 Opera (x86)	Opera.dll+0x2cf6c6	Opera.dll+0x142783
Haiku WebPositive (x86)	BWebPage::LoadURL+0x3a	BMessage::AddString+0x26

TABLE I  
TAP POINTS FOUND THAT WRITE THE URL TYPED INTO THE BROWSER BY THE USER.

Client	Caller	PC	Process
Deb OpenSSL (arm)	tls1_generate_master_secret+0x9c	tls1_PRF+0x90	openssl
Deb OpenSSL (amd64)	ssl3_send_client_key_exchange+0x437	tls1_generate_master_secret+0x108	openssl
Deb Epiphany (arm)	md_write+0x74	md5_write+0x68	epiphany
Deb Epiphany (amd64)	md_write+0x60	md5_write+0x49	epiphany
Haiku WebPositive (x86)	tls1_generate_master_secret+0x65	tls1_PRF+0x14b	WebPositive
Win7 Chrome (x86)	chrome!NSC_DeriveKey+0x1241	chrome!TLS_PRF+0xa0	chrome.exe
Win7 IE8 (x86)	ncrypt!Tls1ComputeMasterKey#32+0x57	ncrypt!PRF#40	lsass.exe
Win7 Firefox (x86)	softokn3!NSC_DeriveKey+0xe85	freebl3!TLS_PRF+0xbb	firefox.exe
Win7 Opera (x86)	Opera.dll+0x2eb06e	Opera.dll+0x50251	opera.exe

TABLE II  
TAP POINTS FOUND THAT WRITE THE SSL/TLS MASTER SECRET FOR EACH SSL/TLS CONNECTION.

Target	Caller	PC
Debian (amd64)	getname+0x13e	strncpy_from_user+0x52
Debian (arm)	getname+0x88	__strncpy_from_user+0x10
Haiku (x86)	EntryCache::Lookup+0x27	hash_hash_string+0x1b
FreeBSD (x86)	namei+0xd1	copyinstr+0x38
Windows 7 (x86)	ObpCaptureObjectName+0xcb	memcpy+0x33

TABLE III  
TAP POINTS FOUND FOR FILE ACCESS ON DIFFERENT OPERATING SYSTEMS.

OS	Caller	PC	Kernel?	Rank
FreeBSD (x86)	msglogstr+0x28	msgbuf_addstr+0x19a	Yes	1
Haiku (x86)	ring_buffer_peek+0x59	memcpy_generic+0x14	Yes	1
Debian (arm)	N/A	do_syslog+0x18c	Yes	4
Debian (amd64)	N/A	do_syslog+0x163	Yes	4
Minix (x86)	0x190005ee	0x190009d4	No	8
Windows 7 (x86)	Not Found	Not Found	?	?

TABLE IV  
TAP POINTS THAT WRITE THE SYSTEM LOG (DMESG) ON SEVERAL UNIX-LIKE OPERATING SYSTEMS. ALL TAP POINTS WERE LOCATED IN THE KERNEL, EXCEPT FOR MINIX, WHICH IS A MICROKERNEL. WE WERE UNABLE TO FIND A TAP POINT ANALOGOUS TO DMESG IN WINDOWS.

Abbrev.	Description	Count
bp	binary pattern	2318
rd	repeated dword	400
mz	mostly zero	141
rq	repeated quadword	19
fnu	filenames unicode	8
woa	words ascii	8
wou	words unicode	7
inu	integers unicode	6
bu	binary uniform	5
ura	URLs ascii	5
rs	repeated short	4
fna	filenames ascii	2
rb	repeated byte	2
vr	very redundant	1

TABLE V  
LABELS GIVEN TO THE SAMPLED TAP POINTS BY HUMAN EVALUATORS,  
ALONG WITH THE NUMBER OF TIMES EACH OCCURRED.

Recording	ARI
FreeBSD Apps	0.018
FreeBSD Boot	0.048
FreeBSD Idle	0.021
FreeBSD Shutdown	0.074
Win7 Apps	0.029
Win7 Idle	-0.003

TABLE VI  
QUALITY OF CLUSTERING AS MEASURED BY THE ADJUSTED RAND  
INDEX, WHICH RANGES FROM -1 TO 1, WITH 1 BEING A CLUSTERING  
THAT PERFECTLY MATCHES THE HAND-LABELED EXAMPLES.

Feature	Virtuoso [?]	VMST [?]	TZB (Our Work)
<b>Focus</b>	Kernel-level introspection	VM-based memory access	User and OS-level monitoring
<b>Active Monitoring</b>	Limited	No	Yes
<b>Adaptability</b>	Requires pre-defined models	Static analysis	Dynamic AI-based detection
<b>Performance Overhead</b>	High	Medium	Low (QEMU-based replay)

TABLE VII  
COMPARISON OF TZB WITH EXISTING FRAMEWORKS

## 7. Limitations and future work

While our proposed framework effectively identifies and monitors security-relevant tap points, several limitations persist:

### 1. Lack of post-mortem analysis

Currently, TZB is designed for live memory monitoring. This restricts its applicability for forensic investigations that require post-execution memory analysis [1].

**Proposed solution:** Future iterations could integrate forensic memory capture techniques similar to Volatility for offline threat investigation [12], [13].

### 2. Performance trade-offs in large-scale deployments

Continuous monitoring of extensive memory operations may introduce computational overhead, particularly in enterprise-scale environments [14].

**Proposed solution:** Implement adaptive monitoring mechanisms that dynamically adjust analysis depth based on system load [15].

### 3. Dependency on call stack tracing

TZB relies on call stack information to resolve execution contexts, which may be unreliable for applications utilizing Just-in-Time (JIT) compilation.

**Proposed solution:** Explore binary instrumentation techniques such as Intel's Pin Tool or DynamoRIO to enhance execution traceability.

By addressing these limitations, TZB can be refined into a more scalable, adaptive, and forensic-ready security framework.

## 8. Related work

TZB draws from earlier examination in virtual machine reflection, robotized figuring out, and memory access investigation. Connecting the semantic hole problem, apparatuses like Virtuoso [1] progressively separate contemplation instruments yet face difficulties with deficient preparation. Process out grafting [16] and VMST [2] empower direct cycle observing in secure conditions. TZB expands these by distinguishing in application and operating system level tap focuses.

Memory access designs uncover information structures, protocols [17], [18], [19], and record formats [20], [21], with program passages filling in as intermediaries for information types [22], [23], [24]. TZB applies this knowledge to isolate memory gets to into significant streams.

Perception apparatuses have featured the capability of memory access investigation. For example, Burzstein et al. [25] envisioned memory in technique games to distinguish map information, while ICU64 [26] gave full memory perception to Commodore 64 frameworks. However, TZB doesn't utilize representation, it shares the objective of extricating significant bits of knowledge from memory associations.

## 9. CONCLUSION

In this paper, we presented TZB, an original framework intended to consequently find up-and-comer memory gets to for dynamic checking of the two applications and working frameworks. This capacity tends to an undertaking that has customarily required huge mastery in figuring out, frequently including careful manual exertion by profoundly gifted space specialists. Via mechanizing this interaction, TZB essentially diminishes the intricacy and time related with distinguishing basic memory passageways, democratizing reflection assignments and empowering more extensive availability for investigators and analysts.

We exhibited the flexibility of TZB by effectively distinguishing an extensive variety of tap focuses, including those used to powerfully separate SSL keys, URLs went into internet browsers, and the names of records being gotten to. These models highlight TZB's capacity to uncover high-esteem experiences that can be utilized for security examination, troubleshooting, and measurable examinations. By utilizing these tap focuses, TZB permits clients to acquire profound experiences into framework and application conduct without expecting earlier information on inner execution subtleties, in this manner connecting the semantic hole that frequently entangles such examinations.

A vital strength of TZB is its engineering. Worked on the QEMU-based PANDA stage, TZB works as a bunch of modules, giving a secluded and extensible system for reflection. Significantly, TZB is both working framework and design skeptic, making it comprehensively relevant across different conditions. This adaptability guarantees that TZB can be sent in a large number of situations, from conventional work area frameworks to implanted stages and cloud-based virtual machines. Its broadly useful plan makes it an amazing asset for specialists and professionals across numerous disciplines, including security, frameworks designing, and programming improvement.

TZB addresses a change in how figuring out errands are drawn closer. By reevaluating the generally troublesome undertaking of figuring out as an organized and principled hunt through streaming information delivered by unique investigation, TZB changes the issue space. Rather than spending incalculable hours physically investigating memory follows, investigators can zero in their endeavors on more elevated level errands that require human mastery, like deciphering results and approving discoveries. This increments efficiency as well as decreases the probability of human mistake in the revelation period of figuring out work processes.

Past its useful commitments, TZB gives major areas of strength for a to future innovative work. As powerful investigation procedures proceed to develop and computational stages become more modern, TZB's particular design guarantees that coordinating new abilities and methodologies can be adjusted. Besides, the framework's capacity to break down memory gets to at runtime opens the entryway for investigating progressed methods, for example, AI based bunching and mechanized arrangement of information streams, which could additionally upgrade its utility.

All in all, TZB addresses a huge headway in the field of mechanized figuring out and dynamic checking. By joining strong unique investigation methods with an adaptable and extensible design, TZB has previously started to change how figuring out undertakings are performed. Its capacity to smooth out complex cycles, combined with its expansive materialness, guarantees that TZB will stay a significant

device for specialists and experts the same. As future improvements expand upon this establishment, TZB can possibly additionally change the field, empowering significantly more proficient and powerful reflection in a quickly developing mechanical scene.

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