

The Impact Of Lebanese Shiite Religious Authorities On The Two-Year War In Lebanon 1975-1976

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Abstract

The Shiite religious authority played an important role in confronting the instigators of the two-year war in Lebanon during the period 1975-1976. It had its religious and political apparatus represented by the Supreme Islamic Shiite Council, and its religious leaders represented by Sayyed Musa al-Sadr, President of the aforementioned Council, Sayyed Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din, Vice President of the Council, and the excellent Jaafari Mufti Abdul Amir Qabalan. Each of them worked within his duties to mitigate the severity of the aforementioned war and preserve the Lebanese social fabric from collapse. Moreover, they worked to hold meetings with the Lebanese political class in order to support it and request that it take the necessary measures to maintain security in light of the escalation of the civil war, on the one hand, and to inform Arab and international public opinion of the causes of the civil war and the necessity of supporting Lebanon in its ordeal, on the other hand. Official visits were made to Arab and foreign countries sympathetic to the injustice of the Lebanese people, and requests from their leaders to coordinate with the Lebanese political leadership to stop the civil war and preserve the unity of the Lebanese people, on the third hand. The Lebanese Shiite religious authority was open to all Lebanese sects and opened channels Contacting and coordinating with all other Lebanese religious authorities regarding the steps that must be taken to stop the war and prevent its expansion.

Keywords: Lebanon, religious authority, civil war.

INTRODUCTION

Lebanese history has recently received wide attention from Arab and foreign researchers, and almost all the basic aspects of Lebanese history have been studied. However, despite this, some sensitive aspects remain that require more effort and follow-up and need to be highlighted due to their importance in changing the course of political life. Among these aspects is the subject of the Lebanese Shiite religious authority and its impact on the two-year war in Lebanon 1975-1976, which contributed effectively to planting the seeds of religious tolerance and healing the sectarian rift by spreading moderate and conscious religious discourse by making mosques and mosques on religious holidays and occasions platforms to call on the warring Lebanese groups to prevail the language of reason and wisdom over the language of weapons and violence, and to block the way for countries lurking for Lebanon's security from exploiting the aforementioned war and interfering in its internal affairs. Thus, the authority - the subject of the study - has left a positive impact that contributed to reducing the intensity of the aforementioned war, and we will get to know that impact clearly through an in-depth study of the subject entitled The Impact of the Lebanese Shiite Religious Authority on the War The two years in Lebanon 1975-1976, through two demands, the first of which addressed the establishment of the Lebanese Shiite religious authority and its early scholars, as Jabal Amel was the first foothold for the Shiite leaders who succeeded in gaining followers inside and outside the country, and the first and second martyrs were a prominent example of the first features of the Lebanese Shiite religious authority. As for the second demand, it was designated under the title The impact of the Lebanese Shiite religious authority in the two-year war in Lebanon 1975-1976, as it dealt with the positive impact of that authority during the mentioned period, which played multiple roles to prevent the containment of the civil war and prevent its expansion, using the method that suits the requirements of the stage and the developments of the aforementioned war.

The first requirement: establishing the Lebanese Shiite religious authority

The Shiite presence in Lebanon since the days of the Abbasids and Mamluks was modest and not bad despite the harassment that the Shiites were exposed to. However, with the arrival of the Ottomans, who were angry with the Shiites, that presence diminished and the Ottomans considered it a threat to society, after they linked from the beginning between the Shiites and the Iranian Safavids, the traditional enemies of their state at that time. Therefore, many Shiites in the Levant resorted to camouflaging their beliefs and rituals so that they would not be persecuted because of them, such as the Al-Zahrawi family in Aleppo, the Al-Murtada family in Damascus, and the Abu Alwan family in Baalbek. This led to the interruption of Shiite religious education and the sects of scholars were cut off, with the exception of the scholars of Jabal Amel.¹

Historically, the scholars of Jabal Amel have been the social element with the most far-reaching external vision. They were also the owners of the greatest literary production and educational influence, as they were the most knowledgeable and the most informed. It is known that the scholars of Jabal Amel established religious schools during the Safavid era in Iran. As a result of this disparity in knowledge, most cultural activities took place within the religious world, neglecting other dimensions such as socio-economic hierarchies, urban-rural and tribal-regional differences. The scholars cannot be defined as a clearly defined socio-economic group, as they took upon themselves professional work within society, as they played key roles in the social and cultural life of Jabal Amel. However, they were also affected by economic variables, as individuals belonging to diverse socio-economic classes and not as a cohesive socio-economic element.²

There was a kind of connection and interaction between the Shiite religious authority in Lebanon and its counterpart in Iraq, and this matter can only be known by returning to the historical roots of the establishment of the Lebanese authority and how it is connected to the Iraqi authority. In the year 1046 AD, the Baghdad jurist Al-Sharif Al-Murtada sent Sheikh Abdul Aziz bin Tahrir Al-Qadi bin Al-Barraj to Tripoli, and Sheikh Abu Al-Fath Muhammad bin Ali bin Othman Al-Karaki to Tyre and Sidon to undertake the task of spreading Shiism in Lebanon and conveying the letters of Al-Sharif Al-Murtada to the Shiites of Lebanon, which were known as the Tripolitanian letters and the Sidonian letters.³

Shams al-Din Abdullah Muhammad bin Makki, known as the First Martyr, is considered the first of the great scholars in Jabal Amel, who began a scientific journey to the Hijaz, Iraq, and Palestine. He resided in Jezzine, but he often visited Damascus, where he stayed for long periods of time, spreading his knowledge.⁴ Sheikh Muhammad bin Makki Al-Jazini did not remain just a jurist who studied with scholars from Hillah and elsewhere, then returned to his village to practice his role as a scholar there, or a teacher for some of its students. Rather, he began to act as a legitimate field commander for all the people of Jabal Amel and took upon himself the task of distributing scholars and representatives to the villages of Jabal Amel, and overseeing their legal, living and political lives. This work of his was considered a foundational work in the history of the Shiite reference institution, as he was the first jurist to carry out the work of the reference and paved the way for the rest of the references. More importantly, some considered him the first Shiite jurist in Jabal Amel, as he had broad powers that went beyond religious supervision to greater tasks, i.e. absolute authority in all aspects of life. He was the first Shiite jurist to collect the fiths and zakat through his representatives whom he sent to the villages of Lebanon and Syria, so it was said that he was the first Shiite jurist to use the term *deputy of the Imam*. He was able to establish a school of jurisprudence called the Jezzine School, which later became the vanguard of Shiite cultural activity there, and this school contributed to the graduation of a number of jurists. And thinkers⁵.

The ruling authority at that time did not like the broad scientific renaissance that the first martyr had achieved and the many followers he had gained, so he was liquidated by execution by sword in the year 1384 AD, leaving behind scientific achievements that became a reference frequented by scholars and students of knowledge in various parts of Jabal Amel.⁶

With the death of the first martyr, a new page in the history of Jabal Amel began. The religious leadership disappeared from Jezzine, and Shiite feudalism became dominant in the south. The influence of some Shiite families began to emerge until they played a role in the conflict with the Mamluk princes. They also became one of the Shiite feudal powers in the south, remaining dominant until 1501. Their role did not end until the Ottoman conquest of the Levant in 1516. As for the students and agents of the first martyr, they gained greater importance after the death of their teacher Muhammad ibn Makki. They were credited with preserving his scholarly line and continuing it after him. Among them were Jamal al-Din Ahmad ibn al-Najjar, who collected the research of his sheikh, the first martyr, and his theories in jurisprudence, as well as his three sons: Sheikh Jamal al-Din Hassan, his brother Diaa al-Din Abu al-Qasim Ali, and Sheikh Radhi al-Din Muhammad, and his daughter, the jurist Fatima, known as Sitt al-Mashaikh. Her martyred father ordered women to follow her example and refer to her in matters of jurisprudence.⁷

He took over the leadership of the religious authority after the first martyr, Nur al-Din al-Karaki, nicknamed al-Muhaqqiq, who studied in the Sunni and Ja'fari schools of jurisprudence. He chose to reside in Najaf, but Shah Ismail Safavid invited him to visit Iran, so he responded and contributed to the establishment of the Twelver Shia doctrine there. He appointed many of his followers to the position of Sadr, which is the highest position in the administration of religious affairs. Thus, he was able to support his scientific position in the face of his opponents. Al-Karaki took over the position of Sheikh al-Islam in Isfahan during the time of Shah Ismail Safavid. When Shah Tahmasb died in 1523 AD, Al-Karaki took over the position of deputy imam and began to spread Ja'fari thought, as he established scientific schools and appointed an imam in every country to teach people their religious rulings. He took it upon himself to teach the senior state officials, but he did not continue for long, as his religious activity stopped in 1527 AD.⁸

In 1529 AD, the leadership of the Shiite religious authority was assumed by Zain al-Din bin Ali al-Jubei, nicknamed the Second Martyr. He contributed to the revival of a cultural movement, which stimulated intellectual life. Students from various cities and regions came to him, and scholars gathered around him. The martyr assumed his responsibility in guiding people and managing religious affairs, so he built a new mosque and carried out some charitable works.⁹ The second martyr was keen to gain recognition of his leadership by most of the Lebanese sects. To achieve this, he traveled to Istanbul and achieved his goal. Then he was appointed as a teacher in Baalbek and taught the four Sunni schools of thought to his Sunni students and the Jaafari school of thought to his Shiite students. After he gained many followers from the various Lebanese sects, some opponents sought to slander him by inciting the Ottoman authorities against him. He was summoned to Istanbul and was martyred in 1557 AD in mysterious circumstances.¹⁰ Then he was replaced by Sheikh Baha al-Din al-Amili, nicknamed Sheikh al-Baha'i, who was born in Baalbek in 1547. He did not complete the age of thirteen until he traveled to Tehran to study religious sciences. He was not only a jurist, but he also studied mathematics and astronomy. In 1575 AD, he was appointed Sheikh of Islam in Herat, and in 1587 he held the same position in Tehran, which was the highest official religious position in the country. After his return to Jabal Amel, he disguised himself in the clothes of the poor and practiced his religious activities in secret to protect himself from enemies. He died in 1621 AD.¹¹ After him came Sheikh Muhammad bin al-Hasan al-Hurr al-Amili, whose life was divided between the Safavid and Ottoman authorities. He was born in 1624 AD in the village of Mashghara in Jabal Amel in a family of religious scholars whose lineage goes back to al-Hurr bin Yazid. Muhammad bin al-Hasan studied with the sheikhs of his family and spent forty years of his life in Jabal Amel before going to the holy places in Iraq and then to Tus, where he settled. He was appointed Sheikh of Islam in Mashhad.¹² Al-Hurr focused his work on hadith, as he followed the Akhbari trend. He wrote several books, including "Wasa'il al-Shi'a ila Tahsil Masa'il al-Shari'a," which is a collection of hadiths on legal issues, and is considered one of the references on this subject. He also wrote "Amal al-Amal fi Ulama Jabal Amel," the first volume of which

was devoted to the Amelite scholars, and he expanded in the second to include other Shiite scholars. He died in 1692.¹³

After Sheikh Muhammad bin al-Hasan al-Hurr al-Amili, the leadership of the religious authority was taken over during the period extending from 1785 to 1881 by a large number of scholars, estimated at one hundred and thirty scholars, most of whom traveled to Iran to spread the Shiite doctrine there.¹⁴ Some of these scholars had a prominent role in establishing religious seminaries in Lebanon. In 1846, the religious authority Sheikh Abdullah Nehme was able to establish the Jbaa seminary, which produced prominent religious figures. In 1880, Sheikh Musa Sharara established the Bint Jbeil seminary, which played an important role in educating religious preachers, calling for unity of speech, and urging preachers to expand their religious education outside the country.¹⁵

The Shiite scholars continued to alternate in the leadership of the Shiite religious authority. As soon as a reference died, his place was filled by his other colleagues.¹⁶

The second requirement: The impact of the Lebanese religious authority on the two-year war in Lebanon 1975-1976

The Shiite religious authority was not far from the scene of the Lebanese civil war, but rather it was watching it with great pain since its outbreak, harnessing all means to contribute to getting Lebanon out of this dangerous slide. At the beginning of the war, Sayyed Musa al-Sadr directed¹⁷ An important and sad appeal to all those who caused and bystanders to the outbreak of the civil war, which stated: "To that enlightened mind that is never cut off from the friendly heart, to the thought committed to conscience, to the conscious conscience of Lebanon, to the creativity that God has bestowed upon the people of Lebanon, to the roots that the All-Knowing, All-Aware has ignited in the souls of intellectuals, experts and thinkers, where are you? Have you forgotten your responsibilities? Have you denied the nature with which God created you? Has anyone prevented you from thinking about a solution? Have you been prevented from presenting your opinions? Have you presented your proposals and the nation rejected them? Have officials ignored you and citizens neglected you, so you considered ignorance and neglect an excuse for retirement? Have you left the dear homeland that we have no other? This homeland, unique in its kind, this land that reflects the sky, this geography that represents history, have you indulged in your mind - God forbid - and conceded to those who have transformed the homeland of permanent initiatives into a sterile one over thirty years or more? Have you fled from the bullets and snipers and left the nation alone in its ordeal "strange"¹⁸

On April 26, the Supreme Islamic Shiite Council warned Lebanese citizens against being affected by the horrific and painful phenomena, so that the facts become clear to everyone, responsibilities are determined, and so that they act with more awareness and caution until God grants the country security and stability and until the roots of the problem are addressed with the determination of the loyal and with the support of all citizens. The reason for this warning was the emergence of armed elements who attacked citizens and religious institutions in the suburbs of Beirut. These groups did not reveal their identity, sometimes attributing themselves to the Movement of the Deprived and other times attributing themselves to the Supreme Shiite Council, which led the latter to issue a statement that read, "While we condemn these criminal acts and hold the authorities responsible for eliminating them, we declare that the Council and the Movement of the Deprived do not have any armed group or any military organization, and that friends and loyalists must confront these acts and expose the falsity of the claims of these groups."¹⁹

On April 27, 1975, the leader of the Shiite authority, Sayyed Musa al-Sadr, met with President Suleiman Franjieh to discuss the internal Lebanese situation. Al-Sadr confirmed that the crisis was on the way to being resolved, saying: "I am pleased at this moment to say that I am optimistic: indeed, I consider that the ongoing crisis is now on the verge of an end." Al-Sadr emphasized that there is no contradiction between the Lebanese issue, politically and socially, and the

Palestinian revolution and its requirements, and that President Franjeh is keen on the safety and protection of the revolution. He also noted in the Palestinian revolution, in the person of Yasser Arafat, its complete readiness to respect Lebanon as a homeland and its citizens, and to preserve its land and sovereignty. He concluded his talk to journalists about the significance of the visit, saying: "In addition to the visit being to check on the health of President Suleiman Franjeh and to congratulate him on the success of the surgery he underwent and his return to his work, the visit was the culmination and conclusion of the tour that you know, which we began with a group of prominent Lebanese men to investigate the underlying causes of the crises that recur from time to time, and to try to find solutions for them through vision, research, and proposals." On the officials, and we do this role as citizens"²⁰.

On May 8, 1975, Al-Sadr analyzed the reasons for Lebanon's descent into this dangerous predicament, saying, "The social factor in Lebanon is due to the political tension at the present time, and due to the sectarian system since independence. This crisis did not appear in its explicit form. The social problem was the reason for the formation of fertile ground for the crisis. It emerged in chaos and unorganized, sometimes even defiant, armament. It also emerged in the people's lack of response to the authorities and their lack of enthusiasm to save the situation, to the point that some of them stood gloating. But it must be said that the lines of internal and external political problems were drawn on this crisis-ridden picture. We cannot wait for our tense enemy, an expert in creating sedition, to watch and not avenge his military, political, international, and even internal defeats. We do not acquit ourselves of the arena of local politics and the escalating internal conflict. It is difficult for me to say that many officials in the authorities and outside them see the crisis of the situation as a cover for their failure in the field of construction and development, or educating the people, or in the various services that the people demand, or they believe that this acute tension postpones the explosion or wastes the official on "At least, I would like to make it clear to you that the Palestinian issue in its dimensions is the issue of Lebanon, indeed it is the issue of Lebanon in the first degree, because the dangers resulting from the existence of a racist state next to the homeland of Lebanon make the entity of Israel a constant danger to Lebanon, and because Jerusalem in its meaning constitutes a fundamental pillar of the religion of Muslims and Christians who make up the Lebanese people, and accepting its Judaization is a collapse of the meaning of faith for them, and because the structure of government in Lebanon and its structure in Israel contradict each other and cannot coexist, and because the Lebanese people have proven more than once, in all their categories, their complete readiness to adopt the Palestinian issue, and because the Lebanese president announced this before the international community, not to mention the national cohesion between the two peoples over a quarter of a century and at an intensive rate, all of this makes the Palestinian issue the issue of Lebanon, and then the survival of Lebanon, its strength, its civilized image, the capabilities of its people, the convictions of its sons, its geographical position, and everything that benefits it, are a great asset, indeed the first asset for the people of Palestine, for the Palestinian revolution, and the Palestinian victory in Palestine and in all Arab countries."²¹ It can be said that Lebanon's adoption of the defense of the Palestinian cause was a trap that all Lebanese politicians fell into. They bore the burden of a problem greater than Lebanon's capabilities, potential, and circumstances, while the Arabs watched.

It is clear that in this statement, Mr. Al-Sadr responded explicitly to all the Lebanese politicians who say that the reason for Lebanon's descent into sectarian strife is the presence of the Palestinian resistance on Lebanese soil. He explained to them that we must reform our general situation in all areas before we internationalize the Lebanese civil war. Moreover, the enemy of Palestine today will become the enemy of Lebanon tomorrow, which requires that we give a legitimate character to the Palestinian resistance in Lebanon.

On May 11, 1975, Mr. Al-Sadr put forward a set of points, believing that they might help stop the civil war. He called it a "working paper," which included the following ideas:²²

1- The Shiite Islamic sect renews its belief in a unified Lebanon, a democratic parliamentary republic based on respect for public freedoms, foremost among which are freedom of opinion and belief, social justice, and equality of rights and duties among citizens, and on a free economic system planned with comprehensive scientific development planning for various energies, activities, and needs.

3 - The sect, as stated in the working paper, categorically rejects any form of discrimination under the guise of political decentralization, whatever its form.

4- The political, social and economic privileges of the Maronite sect are at the heart of the Lebanese formula. Under the pretext of fear for the future for some, the factor of anxiety about fate remains a pretext for preserving sectarian privileges, while the factor of injustice remains for others a door to conflict, such that the two factors remain two loopholes in the entity through which conspiracies are carried out against the country's safety, independence and territorial integrity. The most important items of reform for this reason, we emphasize the abolition of political sectarianism in all areas of public life.

5- The popular referendum should be adopted in crucial issues, such as forming the Economic and Social Council or the Senate or both, amending the parliamentary elections law on the basis of making all of Lebanon a single electoral district and adopting the electoral card.

6- Regarding the application of separation of powers, the working paper mentioned the principle of separating the representation from the ministry, such that acceptance of the ministry is equivalent to the resignation of the representative from the representation - defining the powers of the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister and the ministers in an understandable manner.

7 - In education, the working paper referred to a comprehensive and radical reform of education at various levels with the aim of unification, modernization, and achieving the effectiveness required by scientific and technological development in a way that enables Lebanon to keep pace with the developments of the era.

8- The working paper also called for the development of a comprehensive demographic policy for the Lebanese people and for social development to be directed towards equal opportunities for all.

The working paper prepared by Mr. Al-Sadr was met with support from the believers and supporters of Al-Sadr's authority and his political role in Lebanon. On May 19, 1975, the Future Youth Assembly in the town of Khiam sent a telegram to Imam Sayyed Musa Al-Sadr as follows: "Belief in the sanctity of the message you carry, the message of truth, justice and equality, and appreciation for your struggle for humanity in this country, and embodying our attachment to the movement you lead, the movement of the deprived and oppressed, we declare at the beginning of your new term that we place ourselves at your disposal as soldiers of the sublime principles and ideals."²³ .

On May 25, 1975, Sayyed al-Sadr attended a conference called by Sheikh Hassan Khaled, the leader of the Sunni religious authority, and attended by all the leaders of the religious authorities in Lebanon, in addition to political figures, to discuss unified steps to stop the war that threatens civil peace. Al-Sadr delivered a speech at the conference in which he said, "After ministerial consultations, we were surprised by the formation of this government," referring to a government. He added, "The government is an executive body for the will of the people and an apparatus for achieving the desires and hopes of the people. Lebanon's civilizational advantage is the coexistence of its various sects and denominations. When we hear in South Africa, Ireland, and around the world about sectarian or racial discrimination, we can present Lebanon's paper to the world and say: We have proven that cooperation between sects is possible, even defense and death for the sake of the homeland is possible. This advantage of Lebanon was formed in democracy. The basic reason for Lebanon's existence, its distinction, and its civilizational message lies in: democracy. However, if some Lebanese want to impose themselves on the Lebanese, and

I do not say a sect imposes itself on sects, but rather I say a group that wants to impose itself on This imposition is rejected by all Lebanese, especially Christians, and the method of imposition is met with rejection. This method of seeking to form a government threatens democracy, freedom, coexistence, the entity of Lebanon, its sovereignty, its distinction, its independence, its future and its growth. We, based on our strong commitment, reject everything that might threaten the prosperity of Lebanon. We do not speak only in the name of Muslims, but in the name of everyone who wants to grow in their energies and is keen on their dignity. Consultation is important for everyone and preserves the dignity of everyone. Not consulting means ignoring and diminishing the energies of others. The army is required to protect the homeland and fight the enemies, and they want to involve the army in thorny internal issues.²⁴

Sayyed Musa al-Sadr used to take advantage of the meetings of religious leaders on occasions to discuss with them the latest developments in the civil war. In one of the mourning councils held by the Druze for the passing of one of their religious figures on May 25, 1975, Sayyed al-Sadr attended to offer his condolences and, as usual, addressed those present, saying, "Your country is on the path to the abyss day after day, every day moving towards collapse. There is no cure except for us to be great and to move towards other goals so that our problems are solved and our difficulties are alleviated. God wanted Lebanon to be great and not to die. He wanted it to be active, alive and effective and not to fall upon us by adopting the problems of the nation as a whole. Only then will the results of our problems be revealed, and if we become small, Lebanon alone cannot take care of its children. Lebanon must be great or it must not be, and there is no middle ground. Now I wish to sanctify and support an Arab cause, which is the Palestinian cause, and to die for it."²⁵

It seems that Sayyed Musa al-Sadr wanted to send a message to all religious and political leaders that the solution to the Lebanese crisis lies in disbanding the armed militias. Everyone fears this and refuses to implement it for fear of its dire consequences, as supporters are brainwashed with slogans and fatwas, and everyone is intimidated by everyone else.

Mr. Al-Sadr continued his measured steps, moving between churches, calling for the rejection of violence, denouncing terrorism and terrorists, and strongly protesting the establishment of armed militias, asking: Is it reasonable that a Lebanese citizen would point a weapon at his brother's chest? He crowned these efforts with a sit-in and hunger strike in the Al-Amiliyah Mosque in Beirut, which he began on the twenty-seventh of May 1975. He issued a statement that included several conditions for ending the hunger strike, he and those who sat in with him, and the most important of these conditions: ending the bloodshed, and accepting the cessation of the war by all parties.²⁶

The student gathering was received by the Movement of the Deprived.²⁷ Al-Sadr expressed his great satisfaction and presented a letter of support to the latter on May 29, 1975, which stated, "The student sector of the Movement of the Deprived, which is committed to adopting the Palestinian revolution and protecting it on Lebanese soil, stands with all Lebanese and the honorable people to demand a reliable national government that protects the Palestinian revolution and works to meet the demands of the deprived from all sects, so that the government is not a tool for consecrating interests. The new government is also required to ensure social justice for all."²⁸

On June 15, 1975, Mr. Al-Sadr delivered a speech in which he stated that Lebanon is a homeland for all Lebanese, and we do not accept its fragmentation or division. Its sects must be united and cohesive, and the political authority must adhere to the principle of equal opportunity in order to achieve social justice for all sects.²⁹

On June 27, 1975, Al-Sadr headed to the aforementioned place and announced his comprehensive sit-in, stressing that the sit-in would release the citizens from the weapons used against the Lebanese under all their names. He called for stopping the Lebanese bloodshed, resorting to the language of reason and logic, and forming a national government that would

meet the demands of the deprived in this country.³⁰ On the second day, he gave a speech to a large crowd of protesters, in which he said, “We will impose non-violence.”³¹ “This is our method and this is our line. To those who come here to be with us armed, we say: Leave us. I will not draw a sword. Our sword is the words of God. Our strength is our good intentions. Whoever wants to draw a weapon should go to someone else.” On the third day of the sit-in, a group of Christian clerics visited him. He received a phone call from the Maronite Patriarch Khreish, who assured him that his fasting and sit-in were “a blessed step.” In the city of Tyre, a group of Christian and Muslim women began fasting and said that they would stop fasting only upon instructions from Imam al-Sadr. On the fourth day, for the second time, a large delegation of women from the poor Shiite neighborhoods in the southern suburbs of Beirut appeared and said that they would stay with the Imam until he finished his fast. He spoke to them about the role of women and their struggle in Islam since the dawn of Islamic history and told them that he had resorted to the sit-in to save the innocent who were dying as victims of barbarism and ignorance.³²

Based on the above, it can be said that Sayyed al-Sadr's proposals prompted non-Shiite Lebanese groups to interact and engage with him, and this in itself achieved the success of Sayyed's mission to present his vision regarding the war.

On July 1, 1975, after the internal and external repercussions of the strike and after the submission to its demands, Mr. Musa al-Sadr announced the suspension of the strike, which had lasted five days. After that, he received visits from Arab figures. On that day, Yasser Arafat, the head of the Palestine Liberation Organization, and the Syrian Foreign Minister, Abdul Halim Khaddam, who had become a mediator and negotiator for Syria in Lebanon, visited him. On the other hand, the Salvation Government was formed³³ “Which was one of the demands of the sit-in, so Mr. ended his fast after the Prime Minister-designate appealed to him to end his fast and sit-in. Promises were also made that this government would succeed where previous governments had failed, and that calm would return. Imam Musa al-Sadr thanked his visitors in a sermon in which he said, “The truth is that I am honored by your coming today despite the dangers that threaten your life and the life of everyone who attends, because our place is surrounded by cowardly snipers who hide and confront the innocent. We all believe in jihad and war, but heavy and light weapons have become in the hands of ferocious beasts. Weapons are with the minority of people and with the rulers as well... If we want to use force, each one of us has power. In any case, our brothers decided to descend on Beirut with weapons from Baalbek and the villages, and we refused. Stop burning the country because we live in a dear and generous country... All I say is that we want to save the country so that we can confirm that the majority of the people want to live in peace.”³⁴

Sayyed Musa al-Sadr's move to strike and sit-in can be considered a political maneuver that is necessary and of great significance in such circumstances. It is a peaceful message sent by Sayyed al-Sadr to those fighting over positions in Lebanon. It also left Lebanese politicians in a state of confusion, as how could it not be when they notice that the leader of a religious authority with political and religious influence is using mosques as a place for sit-ins? This explains the race of politicians inside and outside Lebanon to make official contacts and visits to Sayyed al-Sadr to suspend the sit-in.

In light of the external dangers surrounding Lebanon, most notably the Israeli threat to invade Lebanon and the ongoing internal war between the Lebanese sects, Al-Sadr used a new method embodied in the military mobilization of the Shiite resistance. On July 7, 1975, he announced the formation of a military wing for the deprived Shiites, which he called the Amal Movement.³⁵ “The Lebanese resistance called for it a long time ago and announced it a year and seven months ago, specifically on the day of Ashura. I asked the residents of the south and Baalbek to mobilize militarily, but those calls and appeals did not find a listening ear from the politicians of Lebanon who left southern Lebanon as prey to the repeated and escalating Israeli attacks. I actually saw

that the Lebanese citizen was confused before two options, either death or displacement, which made me work to encourage a group of young people who believe in God Almighty and the nation to train, and all of that was in the sight and hearing of the senior authorities and the armed forces in Lebanon. Whatever the case, the main goal of this movement is to support the oppressed.”³⁶ .

It seems that Mr. Musa al-Sadr has abandoned the peaceful approach and has become involved in the anarchy of civil war, as he has become the leader of an armed movement. The matter began to move from the rational, peaceful approach to the approach of the language of conflict and fighting, and the language of reason was absent in the shadow of the dominance of the language of violence.

After the criticisms that the movement was exposed to, Sayyed Musa al-Sadr tried to refute all those criticisms by saying that the movement’s door is open to all the Lebanese people, saying, “The emergence and growth of our movement in this particular part of the region requires additional tasks from us, whether in terms of clarifying the relationship between the members of the sects and denominations or between Arabism and Islam. There are two cases: The first case: The task of clarifying the relationship between the members of the sects and denominations. Lebanon is facing a complex sectarian situation that requires us to make exceptional efforts to overcome it and consolidate the unity of the country on the basis of freedom, dignity, justice, competence and equality. The deprived are one sect: the deprived Christian and the deprived Muslim. Every deprived person is our goal. The principles of the movement belong to everyone, and its struggle is for the good of all. It differentiates between religious commitment and sectarian fanaticism that hinders the process of progress of the nation. The authentic religious approach of the movement is the one that guarantees the removal of the abhorrent sectarian and factional fanaticism. Hence, the movement did not specify in its charter for the affiliated member a sect or sect”³⁷ .

The party cadre was distinguished by its diversity between religious cadres and organizational cadres. The organizational cadre derived its ability from its social and religious position. The organizational cadre consisted of professors and dignitaries, while the religious scholars, through their religious position, added a religious legitimacy to politics. This cadre, especially the first generation, benefited from its association with Imam al-Sadr and its direct relationship with him, which gave his movement a positive impetus that suited its activity to a time period in which the family and clan were at the beginning of losing their internal cohesion. Al-Sadr tried to diversify his activity for his sect only, by combining the dissemination of the movement’s principles with religious preaching and linking them to the sect’s troubled reality and the necessity of working to overcome its crisis. The calls did not come from a vacuum, but the clerics, despite their scarcity, benefited from the historical stock of the sect’s members that remained latent. They worked to re-emphasize it and link it to the political reality. Accordingly, the state of religious preaching was formed, which took its spheres from organizational sessions in the movement’s offices, mosques, Husseinias, and homes.³⁸ .

The military training of the fighters in the Amal Movement took place in special camps far away in Baalbek, and at the hands of trainers and officers from the Fatah Movement.³⁹ The young men were receiving training in various types of light and heavy weapons, street warfare, and methods of revolutionary struggle, in addition to military training in which they received intellectual and ideological lessons. The qualitative transformations in the spirit and morals of the young men were clear after leaving the camp.⁴⁰ .

As the civil war entered its sixth month, Sayyed Musa al-Sadr continued his efforts to stop it. On September 2, 1975, Sayyed al-Sadr attended a luncheon banquet hosted by the Greek Orthodox Archbishop of North America. He spoke to the attendees about the developments of the Lebanese civil war, saying, “I take advantage of this occasion to say that we are celebrating a Lebanese bishop living in America, performing heroic deeds, defending the right, uniting two

dioceses, speaking boldly and frankly, in the home of a Lebanese intellectual who influences American public opinion. This prominent ambition in the behavior of the Lebanese, if put in its place, will solve all our problems. If the Lebanese live their ambition, they will be happy and their country will be happy. However, if we strip them of their ambition, we will wear them out with internal problems, dwarf them and kill them.” He added, wondering, “I do not know why they said that Lebanon should avoid the major problems in the Arab world and not get involved in the Palestinian issue. I say that if we avoid confronting the problems in the region, as we have avoided confronting our internal problems, we will have moved away from the path of the Lebanese people.” “For every great and important thing, we were afraid to confront every big issue, so we were afflicted with our small problems. Therefore, Arab Muslims must be one nation and stand with the unity of Lebanon. Being Arabs, they absorb the Eastern civilization and transfer it to Europe, and being Christians, they transfer the Western civilization to the East. They are the dialogue, its tool and its messengers. They are messengers to create dialogue and integration between Islam and Christianity, between the East and the West, between the Arabs and Europe. They are trustees of Jerusalem, for it is their Qiblah, so their message is in the unity of this homeland.”⁴¹ On the third day of the same month, Imam Sayyed Musa al-Sadr continued his contacts and efforts to calm the situation in various regions, especially in the Bekaa region. In the morning, he visited MP Pierre Helou at his home, and there were a number of political figures there. Those present presented the current situation in the country. It was decided in this meeting that the Imam would address an appeal to the Lebanese in the next two days, explaining to them the dangers facing Lebanon. Then, at the headquarters of the Supreme Shiite Islamic Council, he received a large popular gathering from various Lebanese regions representing the families of prisoners who were unjustly detained, according to what they said. Al-Sadr assured them that he would stand with every oppressed person and at the same time would respect the judiciary.⁴²

On September 9, 1975, the Vice President of the Supreme Shiite Islamic Council, Abdul Amir Qabalan, was accused of...⁴³ The perpetrators of the Lebanese civil war, describing them as “Nazis,” stressing that the goal of the armed groups is to sabotage and destroy Lebanon, and every Lebanese person must realize that the stability and unification of Lebanon depends on eliminating all armed manifestations outside the law. Qabalan also called on President Rashid Karami to put an end to these aforementioned groups.⁴⁴ The real problem between Muslims and Christians in Lebanon is that they meet in geographic space and place, but they intersect in ideas and beliefs, with a degree of disparity between faith and disbelief.

As the civil war reached advanced stages and there was fear of a collapse of the security situation in Lebanon, Sayyed Musa al-Sadr held a press conference at the headquarters of the Supreme Islamic Shiite Council on September 12, 1975, in which he explained to all religious authorities that he was preparing to expedite a comprehensive national reconciliation in the country to preserve what remained of Lebanon’s entity, saying, “Deprivation is no longer limited to people, but rather it has harshly struck values, ideals, principles, and all morals. Today, the homeland, with its existence, its people, its reputation, and its heritage, is deprived, and its children, to whom it gave everything, are complaining, but they were deprived of everything. Religion, which is the solid pillar of human liberation, glory, and the unity of its children, is seen today imprisoned in the caves of sectarianism. Humans have fled from it to live in it as monsters. Religion was the greatest deprivation, and the oppressors extended their hands to freedom, tampering with its sanctity and turning it into chaos. Here was another deprivation, and to love, they distorted it with surrender, so there was a new deprivation, even the concept of knowledge was transformed.” To the skill in using weapons and in the precision of aiming at the head of a passerby, and dignity was seen trembling under the sun, crying from deprivation, and independence itself was the greatest deprivation, so he no longer saw the face of the blessing that he had dreamed of.” He concluded his speech by reminding the Lebanese politicians that the

heads of Arab states, headed by Muammar Gaddafi ⁴⁵ And Houari Boumediene⁴⁶ In solidarity with the unity of Lebanon and ending its crisis, he asked: Isn't this constructive front enough to stand in the destructive front?⁴⁷ .

By following Al-Sadr's moving speeches, it becomes clear to us that Mr. Musa Al-Sadr is tired of the length of the civil war. How could he not be, when he sees the sons of one country falling one after another in the fires of civil war, and the warring parties not heeding his calls to stop the bloodshed in Lebanon, and the Arab countries being more keen than Lebanese politicians to stop it.

Continuing his efforts, Mr. Musa al-Sadr met with President Kamal Jumblatt and a number of religious figures on October 15, 1975, with the aim of finding a way out of the impasse of the ongoing civil war. He commented on this visit, saying, "In my personal impressions, this visit will yield positive results. I even hope that it will put the Lebanese crisis on the path to resolution, based on the Vatican's spiritual position and its positive and understanding stances on the Arab issue, the nature of peoples, and the issues of justice and peace. The recent ordeal has made us lose everything, even the slogans proposed by some groups. They tried to preserve the sovereignty of the nation, and the recent situation in the south reveals the absolute absence of sovereignty there. They considered that the jihad that should be in the south is taking place in Beirut and only among brothers. Slogans have become mixed and concepts have become intertwined." Al-Sadr and Jumblatt presented the subject of the upcoming spiritual summit meeting that will be held before Patriarch Khreish travels to the Vatican. Jumblatt confirmed that If the course of the spiritual summit meetings is in the religious aspects, then it supports the working paper that will be presented by the heads of the Islamic sects. However, if the course of the meetings is in the political aspects and political reform, then the interim program for political reform and national forces will be extremely important.⁴⁸

Imam al-Sadr continued to call for the restoration of the status of the unifying state for its people, and adherence to coexistence, civil peace, communication and dialogue. Military and political realities did not change these positions. In parallel with his orientations against the civil war, he remained committed to the slogan of defending and protecting the south, and training with weapons in order to resist Israel, after he launched his famous slogan "Weapons are the ornament of men." This voice became more influential with the popular rallying around his proposals, and the growing strength of the Amal Movement, along with small Islamic groups spread throughout the popular neighborhoods of Beirut and the suburbs. Al-Sadr employed his movement on two fronts: mitigating the impact of the civil war and drawing attention to the Israeli threat to Lebanon, considering it the main cause of the war. The Imam's overwhelming concern was to take people towards that threat, educate his audience to resist it, and establish the idea of hostility towards Israel as absolute evil, criminalizing any dealing with it, and describing it as forbidden.⁴⁹ .

Before the end of 1975, Sayyed al-Sadr concluded his positions on the civil war with two important positions. The first was to direct a comprehensive appeal to all Lebanese, reminding them of the dangers of the continuation of the aforementioned war on both the internal and external levels. The second was to deliver a religious sermon at the Imam al-Sadiq Club, in which he warned of the Israeli threat. As for the first position, it was on December 12, 1975, in which he said, "Oh Lebanese, from the depths of the deluge of raging strife that is ravaging the eyes and insights, from Lebanon, where the tongues of flame have begun to turn the rest of humanity into coal and ashes or into a spark, any friend in the world cannot save us except with our help, just as no force in the world can stab us except with our help. So let us first turn to ourselves in order to get out of the crisis. Secondly, and this is more important, the leaders have proven their inability to save us except with the people's help, and the painful reality has proven this and confirms it every day. So let us move during our blessed days to our positions in the eternal human procession to reform ourselves and draw inspiration from the occasions." Come, let us

have mercy on the country and its children, let us have mercy on the innocent and the future, let us ensure the fate of the fearful, let us wipe the wounds of the injured, and let us look to the distant horizon.⁵⁰ The second position was on the twenty-first of December, when Sayyed Musa al-Sadr warned of three dangers and the necessity of confronting them no matter the cost, which are the partition, the danger of Israeli attacks on the country, and the danger of trying to liquidate the Palestinian resistance. Al-Sadr considered that the religious, national, and historical duty requires standing against these three dangers because the one who is plotting them is Israel, and that the danger of that does not leave anyone in Lebanon safe.⁵¹

After following the activities and positions of Sayyed Musa al-Sadr since the outbreak of the civil war in April until December, we can say that he was able to put the religious turban in its right place. He was able, in a record time, to combine religious and political work and devoted all of that to reducing the intensity of the Lebanese civil war. He benefited to a large degree from his religious position, which gained him popular support in the Lebanese arena, on the one hand. On the other hand, on the external side, Sayyed al-Sadr's movements attracted the attention of the Arab countries, and many calculations were taken into account for him, to the point that Arab ministers worked as a mediator between him and the Lebanese government, considering him an opponent of many of the actions of the aforementioned government.

Since January 1, 1976, Sayyed Musa al-Sadr began addressing the people of reason and wisdom in Lebanon to intervene to end the bitter war, through a direct appeal that said: "Oh, people of Lebanese reason, to develop a plan to get the country out of its ordeal. What is required is to create a future that does not end as the past did, a future that includes citizens, not classes, a future in which citizens are equal in rights and duties, a future in which the country is able to stand up to global challenges and Israeli aggressions, whether military, cultural, economic, or civilizational. A future that preserves and develops the global message of the country and makes the Lebanese sects windows of civilization to the world, not conflicting states, and enables every group to give to the country, not take from it and grow at its expense. A future in which every sect feels that it is dear and gives and does not feel that it is oppressed, classified, and stable. A future in which every citizen, without exception, is satisfied with the country, considering that he is a loser if he loses the country, even if the world gives him." All in all, in the future the homeland will be a forum for Islamic-Christian dialogue and a base for the Euro-Arab meeting. Now, O Lebanese mind committed to conscience, I urge you, rather the homeland calls on you, hoping that it is not too late. What is also required, O loving mind, is that you develop an action plan to implement solutions so that Lebanon is the victor, not Muslims or Christians, not individuals or parties, neither the right nor the left, but the people alone. What is required is that you think or announce your thinking about how to convince people? How to gain the acceptance of the parties? What do we say to the extremists, to those affected and to those who lost their loved ones? What do we prepare for the martyrs who fell and for the tragic pains that filled the hearts? What do we say to the world to those whose trust we have lost, to those whose hopes we have built, to those whose initiatives we have rejected, to those whose interests we have harmed and to their citizens? What is required, then, is a plan that includes thought, means of implementation, and method of production. So, let's work in this space, O mind, O conscience, O human being, and those who struggled for us so that we may guide them to our paths, and indeed, Allah is with the doers of good.⁵² On the twenty-fifth of the same month, the distinguished Jaafari Mufti, Abdul Amir Qabalan, made an inspection visit to the refugees in the camps as a result of the civil war, and he was assured of their safety and the provision of their needs. He also condemned the acts carried out by parties outside the law, such as looting and plundering, stressing that these brutal and barbaric acts are individual actions, and that any party that supports them, including the parties, the Shiite religious authority declares them infidels and declares its innocence from them.⁵³

We note the similarity of Mr. Al-Sadr's speech with the excellent statement of the Jaafari Mufti in disavowing those who incite conflicts aiming to threaten civil peace at the same time that the Shiite authority is making intensive efforts to extinguish the civil war, and these positions are to its credit.

On January 30, 1976, the Grand Mufti of the Jaafari School, Sheikh Abdul Amir Qabalan, called on the Lebanese to turn the page on the past and cooperate to rebuild the country. Sheikh Qabalan said in a statement, "The policy of sterility and rigidity is responsible for the explosion of the crisis and its complexity. The period that the Lebanese have lived through since Independence Day until today is a period of loss and displacement during which the ordinary citizen did not feel his loyal belonging to his country because he was not given the justifications for belonging and affiliation. Then each group was forced to search for a means to protect it and safeguard its interests and gains, and a gap opened between the citizen and the official and between the citizens themselves. Today, after the disaster occurred, the family was scattered, hopes were lost, and the citizen reached a dead end, the country has exploded and is living on a sea of blood, remains, and destruction. This is the natural result of not practicing governance correctly, stemming from the loyalty of the official to his country and his people. In the face of this unfortunate and deplorable reality, and in the face of this turbulent sea and the prevailing chaos, the Lebanese need a stance of firmness, will, determination, and the joining of all hands." And forgetting the past and returning to authenticity, position and patriotism so that we can begin building a new homeland, dominated by love, united by loyalty and whose motto is Lebanon for all its sons. This requires effort, loyalty and loyal people, so that the desired goal is achieved and normal life returns as it was under a just system in which no one is wronged."⁵⁴ .

It is clear to us that the problem in Lebanon was bigger than can be solved by speeches and appeals. The privileged are defending their privileges according to the Lebanese constitution and laws in the majority formula, and the marginalized and deprived are fighting to obtain their rights. Between the privileged and those who dominate them and the advocates of rights, the Lebanese citizen and the nation were lost in the two-year war. The end result is a conflict of self-interested factional interests that have been internationalized and exploited to become part of a regional and international conflict.

On February 2, 1976, Mr. Musa al-Sadr received the Syrian Foreign Minister, Abdul Halim Khaddam ⁵⁵ The two sides discussed the security situation and the speed with which every attempt to breach the ceasefire is dealt with, as well as the political agreement, the opinion and the final touches being put to the ministers regarding its formulation, and the expected visit of President Suleiman Franjeh and Prime Minister Rashid Karami to Damascus. Imam al-Sadr expressed his satisfaction with the development of the security situation towards stability and relations and with the positive political positions on the agreement between the Lebanese parties.⁵⁶ Nine days after this meeting, the Grand Mufti of Jaafari, Abdul Amir Qabalan, attacked the instigators of sectarian conflicts and the ruling authority together through a statement that read: "It is well known and prevalent that the Lebanese people do not know the meaning of hatred and war and refuse to accept them, but today, after their childish and arbitrary war that lacks all qualities and meanings, and after the mountain labored and gave birth to a mouse, and after the difficulty of labor and the absence of the old interview from our land, the desire for security and the restoration of dignity was fulfilled, and the desire for hatred and theft almost disappeared after homes were destroyed and honor was violated. Even if the leadership approves of theft and looting, it is invalid, and the people live in sadness and grief, but in the end they will rise up against their exploiters and investors and will become harsh in features and an ever-angry heart, avenging their brother, friend and neighbor. The citizen looks at the official without fear and dozens of pictures appear before him of innocent people distorted as a result of torture in the cellars of arms brokers and thieves of the country, and the deprived are steadfast, calm and angry, forced into the fighting and dragged "He was forced to defend himself, knowing that he

was heading towards death or towards normal life. Blood flowed from the wounds of thousands of people, and grief enveloped the country. It was a defeat for all citizens, and it was one of the biggest surprises. Perhaps the biggest mistake that the exploiters made was the timing of the battle, in time and place, and that the majority of citizens were not satisfied with a war that dragged the country into the abyss and did not accept criticism that did not go beyond their feet. The settlement that became not worth a drop of blood shed by a human being, and the majority rejects the fighting that took place because it is without goals, and denies all the outbidding from any party. As long as the rule is not according to what God revealed, it does not care about the identity of the ruler.”⁵⁷.

On February 12, 1976, Mr. Musa al-Sadr made a set of demands that he believed could help extinguish the fires of the civil war, namely:⁵⁸

- 1- Preserving the coexistence of Lebanese sects and rejecting division in any form.
- 2- Preserving Lebanese-Palestinian coexistence and safeguarding the Palestinian revolution.
- 3- Opening channels of dialogue to resolve conflicts and achieve political and social reforms instead of the language of violence and weapons.
- 4- Fighting the idea of one Lebanese sect's victory over another.
- 5 - The necessity of giving all Lebanese people the freedom to defend themselves.
- 6- Fighting the oppressive Zionist entity that seeks to divide the homeland and making sacrifices for that purpose.
- 7- Demanding the authorities to abandon their policy of neglect and indifference towards the south and the deprived areas.
- 8 - Demanding the state to abolish sectarianism in senior positions and civil jobs.
- 9 - Activating defensive and development demands.
- 10 - Preserving southern Lebanon from the domination of the Zionist entity.
- 11 - Clarifying the true intentions of some party leaders in proposing the South as an alternative homeland for the Palestinians, with the support of some Arab leaders.

On February 20, 1976, Sayyed Musa al-Sadr appealed to President Suleiman Franjieh to intervene to stop the bloodshed among the sons of one nation, saying, “We are facing an ordeal that pales in comparison to the bloody ordeal we have overcome. Heavy weapons and machinery are now in the hands of citizens, and military personnel and experts in the art of combat have entered the ranks of the fighters. Hatred has increased, and the joint bodies that used to alleviate some of the pain of previous ordeals have fallen silent. The fire of sedition has begun to spread to most Lebanese regions, burning everything green and dry and drowning people in its hell. Hundreds of experts in war have entered Lebanon from here and there, as well as advanced and deadly weapons, not to mention conspiracies. The deterioration of the situation and its complications have allowed many of the innocent masses to accept the accusations targeting honest fighters. What is more difficult than that is that the situation has made some groups openly call for partition, misleading public opinion and convincing it completely that it is the salvation. In doing so, they want to offer the lives of dozens as victims to Israel or to create new Israelis more dangerous than mother Israel. Thus, there are two options and no third.” “For them to restore security to Lebanon, the first option: The President of the Republic must resign in order to stop the massacres and calm the moods, and the military and political leaders and the people as well must ensure the continuation of legitimacy, and the parliament must be elected. The president is the one who can resolve the crisis, guarantee the formula, preserve the future and the position, and protect the rights of the sisterly Maronite community, and thus save his homeland, its unity, and its people, as well as save his future and the future of his tribe. As for the second solution: We appeal to our Maronite brothers in particular, before others, their spiritual, political, and military leaders, their fighters and non-fighters, to precede others to rescue the homeland and take the initiative to end the ordeal and remove the specter of destruction and division from the homeland that they have always sung about and committed to defending. We

appeal to them in the name of generations and institutions, in the name of the future and the hopes of citizens, and in the name of millions of immigrants and the friendly world that awaits them to resolve the situation with the president's resignation to protect the homeland."⁵⁹.

It is clear to us that the problem lies with the most privileged sect, and Mr. Musa al-Sadr wants to compensate for these privileges through the Palestinian presence. This will lead to the swallowing of Lebanon and half of the hierarchy established by the 1943 Constitution. This is something that is not permissible and cannot be abandoned by the Maronites, who entered the war to remove the Palestinians. Anyone who sympathizes with them is considered an enemy and a conspirator against the unity of Lebanon.

In continuation of his position supporting civil peace, Sayyed Musa al-Sadr stressed on March 31st that what is required now is to focus on preventing the enemies of Lebanon from interfering in its internal affairs and occupying it later, especially Israel, by working to bring the viewpoints of the Syrian leadership and the leadership of the Palestinian resistance closer together, which will strengthen the strength of the Palestinian resistance and protect Lebanon from becoming prey in the hands of the enemies.⁶⁰ And that the authorities have abandoned their responsibility to preserve people's lives, which requires every citizen to protect himself.⁶¹ This in itself is a legitimate justification for the Lebanese people that the authority that does not move a finger regarding the ongoing civil war cannot protect the people.

On April 29, 1976, the Movement of the Deprived boycotted the meetings of the national parties and blocs for reasons it explained in a statement that read: "Since the beginning of the bloody events, the movement has clearly defined its position on the armed conflict and limited it to, except for self-defense, three goals: protecting the homeland, especially the south; preventing partition and preserving the unity of the country, land and people; and safeguarding the Palestinian resistance. It has repeatedly affirmed its continuation of the democratic struggle for just political and social demands and for fighting deprivation. From this standpoint, it participated, as an integral part of the Lebanese national movement and the forces of change, in the meetings of the national parties and forces throughout the events. However, it was finally surprised, unfortunately, when the project of local or civil administration was proposed. The meetings continued to study it and refer it to a specialized committee, and the advice of the leadership of the Movement of the Deprived was not listened to, despite the movement's belief that the basis of the proposed project constitutes a threat to the unity of the homeland and cannot be discussed at all, but rather must be rejected immediately. The meetings, sympathetic statements, and media guidance continued." "The decision and approval were postponed in order to study the situation in light of the sudden call to elect the President of the Republic, although the issue is much more important than the issue of the presidency and its dimensions. It is now an honor for the Movement of the Deprived to confirm to the citizens in general that it is continuing the national struggle within a clear and authentic national line, despite its abstention from attending these meetings until the required charter, programs, and system are established. It calls on all factions of the national movement and forces of change to take into account the harsh conditions, dangers, and global conspiracies and to act in a manner commensurate with their danger, dimensions, and the depth of their plans."⁶².

On May 8, 1976, Mr. Musa al-Sadr received Prime Minister Rashid Karami and al-Sadr reviewed the outcomes of the meeting in a statement that read: "The clarity of the dimensions of the international conspiracy that Lebanon is exposed to worries us all because it threatens the Lebanese existence, the integrity of the Palestinian revolution and the security of Syria. This great conspiracy cannot be confronted except through firm, clear and organized cooperation between Syria, the Palestinian resistance and the Lebanese national will. It is unfortunate that some dimensions of the head of the conspiracy have affected this cooperation in one way or another, which made me request the holding of this joint conference, which I can consider a meeting of frankness between brothers. I am certain that the meeting will be the dawn of happy hope and

peace in Lebanon and an impregnable rock in standing in the face of colonial conspiracies.”⁶³ On the twenty-third of the same month, Mr. Musa al-Sadr confirmed that my true support is my turban, my prayer niche, my pulpit, and the pure, faithful souls who went away in peace and were not known to anyone.⁶⁴

On July 18, 1976, Sayyed Musa al-Sadr praised the Syrian position in support of the Lebanese cause through a statement he made to journalists, in which he said, “The sincere efforts that I and my comrades have been making since the beginning of the generous Syrian initiative to save Lebanon, those efforts and their follow-up, were our guiding principle in visiting sisterly Syria and meeting the hero of the war and hope of peace, President Hafez al-Assad and his comrades, especially after the recent political and military developments. The visit began with the statement that sisterly Syria will continue, as it has been, to follow up on the work and put all the capabilities to save as long as the Lebanese people want it and express it through their spiritual, political and military leaders as well. This initiative depends on preventing armed conflict in any form and from any side, because its consequences cannot be estimated and its results controlled, from dividing the country, God forbid, to unknown foreign interventions. It also depends on implementing the desires of the Lebanese people and their insistence on development, growth and comprehensive political reform.” He concluded his statement by saying, “After returning, in the name of the tortured in Lebanon and in the name of the innocents who fall in these battles, I hope and appeal to all citizens and armed men.” The clans in particular and the armed forces in particular should pay attention to the delicate circumstances and the seriousness of the situation and leave room for the expected political solution which our brothers and dear Syria cannot delay at all, and that the expected solution may include a comprehensive plan and I am optimistic about the nearness of the solution.”⁶⁵

And Sayyed Musa al-Sadr remained committed to the idea of a sectarian contract between the main sects in the country. He warned of major plots being hatched against Lebanon, and he pointed to this in a sermon he delivered in August 1976, in which he said, “There are parties that have tried to push the Palestinian resistance to become a movement whose goal is to overthrow the Arab regimes, first and foremost Lebanon. This choice, in our opinion, is a regional movement that makes the road far-fetched, especially since changing the Arab regimes, due to the importance of the Arab location and its wealth, does not happen until many of the world’s regimes change. In our opinion, this is a suspicious line at this stage, which does not serve the cause of liberation, but rather serves the interests of the major powers, led by the Zionist entity. The goal of the resistance is to liberate the Holy Land, and it is necessary to mobilize all energies in this path, and to define relations with people and countries in light of their position on the liberation issue. Distracting the resistance with any work other than liberation is a disruption of its role and a delay in its tasks.” Sayyed was careful not to give a definitive answer to his bets. He distinguished between honorable Palestinians and extremists, between those who understood Lebanon’s borders and those who played with fire.⁶⁶

CONCLUSION

After studying the impact of the Lebanese Shiite religious authority in the two-year war in Lebanon 1975-1976, it became clear to us that the religious authority in general and the Lebanese Shiite religious authority in particular had an effective and interactive role in changing the course of the historical event and making political decisions. The Lebanese Shiite religious authority, at first, and under the leadership of its religious leaders, was a purely religious institution whose goal was to educate its followers about matters of their religion and their world. Its early leaders traveled to distant countries with the aim of understanding religion and interpreting legal issues. However, this did not prevent it from interfering in political matters when necessary. The two-year war in Lebanon was a suitable opportunity for the aforementioned authority to apply its religious discourse on the field level, especially since it possessed more

followers and supporters than other religious authorities. It was able to prove to the enemy before the friend its keenness to ward off sectarian strife in Lebanon since the beginning of its explosion. It used its various tools to achieve this goal, sometimes It used mosques and religious occasions to broadcast its religious and awareness-raising discourse, and at other times it used the diplomatic method represented by meetings with the senior Lebanese political elites and urging them to nip the aforementioned war in the bud from its beginning on the one hand, and the visits made by the aforementioned authority to Arab and international countries in order to win Arab and international opinion for the Lebanese issue first and foremost and to ask the leaders of those countries to play the role of mediator to end the two-year war that has been expanding day after day, and at a third time the aforementioned authority used the method of sit-ins in mosques, which is the most expressive step of the categorical rejection and widespread protest against the Lebanese factions fighting on the Lebanese scene.

The characteristic that distinguished the aforementioned authority was the boldness of its political discourse. It did not flatter a particular political figure, but rather publicly called on some political elites to resign for failing in the tasks assigned to them. It always called for the interests of the nation to prevail over personal and political interests. This characteristic distinguished it from other authorities that sometimes courted political leaders.

The Lebanese Shiite religious authority was not content with confronting the two-year war, but was also concerned with warning political leaders and warring factions of the consequences of the aforementioned war expanding and being exploited by countries lying in wait for an opportunity to interfere in Lebanese affairs and sow division among Lebanese sects in order to fragment the social fabric of the Lebanese people.

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- ⁹ Ali Sadiq Gholami, The Second Martyr Zayn al-Din al-Jubei al-Amili, translated by Kamal al-Sayyid, 1st ed., Ansariyan Publishing House, Qom, 1995, p. 40.
- ¹⁰ Sabrina Mirvan, the previous source, pp. 35-36.
- ¹¹ Jaafar Al-Muhajir, The General Migration to Iran in the Safavid Era, 1st ed., Dar Al-Taba'a Publishing House, Beirut, 1989, p. 129.
- ¹² Jawad Ahmed Al-Bahadeli, Al-Hurr Al-Amili and his approach to detailing the Shiite means, 1st ed., Najaf Al-Ashraf, 2011, p. 36.
- ¹³ Ali Ibrahim Darwish, Jabal Amel between 1516-1697: Political and Cultural Life, Dar Al-Hadi for Printing and Publishing, Beirut, 1993, p. 216.

¹⁴Ali Marwa, *Shiism between Jabal Amel and Iran*, Riyad Al-Rayyes Publishing, London, 1987, pp. 63-80.

¹⁵Faisal Al-Kazemi, the previous source, p. 152.

¹⁶Muhammad Hussein Marwa, *Encyclopedia of Shiite Scholars in Lebanon from the Fifth to the Fourteenth Century AH (1003-1979)*, presented by Ali Hazem, Dar Al-Walaa Publishing House, Beirut, 2014, p. 166.

¹⁷Musa al-Sadr (1928-1978) was born in the holy city of Qom in Iran. He grew up in a deeply religious family. He received his primary and intermediate education in Qom schools, completing his primary education at Al-Hayat School, his intermediate education at Baqeriyeh School, and his secondary education at Sanai School. In 1953, he entered the Faculty of Law at the University of Tehran. After his father's death, he went to Iraq in 1954 and continued his religious studies at the religious seminary in Najaf. He visited Lebanon in 1955, and in 1976, he was elected President of the Supreme Islamic Shiite Council and played an honorable role in defending the rights of the Shiite sect in Lebanon. He founded the Movement of the Deprived during the two-year war in Lebanon. He led a series of protests against the mismanagement of the Lebanese government. He disappeared from the political scene in 1978 after an official visit to Libya. For more details about the political and social activity of Sayyed Musa al-Sadr, see: Hani Ubaid Zubari al-Sakini, *Imam Musa al-Sadr and his Political Role Cultural and Social Development in Lebanon (1960-1978)*, unpublished MA thesis, Faculty of Arts, University of Basra, 2009; Salah Abu Judeh, *Jesuit, Lebanon's National Identity, Its Origins and Sectarian Problems*, 1st ed., Dar Al-Mashreq Publishing House, Beirut, 2008, pp. 243-246.

¹⁸Adnan Fahs, *Imam Musa al-Sadr (Biography and Thought 1969-1975)*, 1st ed., Dar Labfakr al-Arabi Publishing House, Beirut, 1996, pp. 56-57.

¹⁹ An-Nahar Newspaper, Issue No. 12461, April 26, 1975, p. 1.

²⁰ An-Nahar Newspaper, Issue No. 12462, April 27, 1975, pp. 1, 3.

²¹ An-Nahar Newspaper, Issue No. 12471, May 8, 1975, p. 3.

²²Adnan Fahs, *The Lebanese War (Causes and Results)*, 1st ed., Dar Al-Hussam for Printing and Publishing, Beirut, 1991, pp. 40-41.

²³An-Nahar Newspaper, Issue No. 12482, May 19, 1975, p. 3.

²⁴ An-Nahar Newspaper, Issue No. 12488, May 25, 1975, p. 8.

²⁵An-Nahar Newspaper, Issue No. 12489, May 26, 1975, p. 3.

²⁶Muhammad Surur Zain Al-Abidin, *The Shiites in Lebanon (Amal Movement as a Model)*, Vol. 2, 1st ed., Dar Al-Jabiyah for Printing and Publishing, London, 2012, p. 116.

²⁷ The Movement of the Deprived: The movement was founded by Imam Musa al-Sadr on May 5, 1975. He announced its birth during a large festival, and its members swore to wage jihad in support of the oppressed. Its program of work included true faith in God Almighty, preserving human dignity, rejecting social injustice and the political sectarian system, fighting oppression and extremism, adhering to national sovereignty, and fighting Lebanon's enemies internally and externally. The movement's activity was not limited to the political aspect, but extended to the social aspect, such as holding religious events, especially commemorating Ashura and celebrating holidays. Musa al-Sadr, *The Movement of the Deprived (Birth - Circumstances of Origin - Exiles)*, 3rd ed., Umm for Documentation and Research, Beirut, 1991.

²⁸ An-Nahar Newspaper, Issue No. 12492, May 29, 1975, p. 3.

²⁹Adnan Fahs, *Imam Musa al-Sadr (Biography and Thought 1969-1975)*, previous source, p. 111.

³⁰Ghassan Hamdani, *From the Masterpieces of Sayings of Imam Al-Sadr*, 1st ed., Beirut, 2003, p. 111.

³¹ Nonviolence: The principle of nonviolence or nonviolent resistance stipulates the rejection of the use of physical violence to achieve social or political change. It is a method by which people who reject passivity and submission and who see that struggle is necessary can wage their struggle without violence. Examples of nonviolent action include: protest and persuasion through sit-ins and marches, nonviolent intervention during sieges and invasions of places for peaceful protest, and the policy of nonviolence against the policy of apartheid to confront the racist policy followed against the Indian community in South Africa. This

philosophy became the method of Indian struggle in South Africa and later the method of the Indian people's struggle for liberation from British colonialism. Gandhi's philosophy constituted a great moral value above all else, as it relied on adherence to noble values, foremost of which is not using violence, even against those who use the most heinous means to degrade human humanity. This philosophy inspired millions of his followers and supporters. Therefore, his fans called him (saint), and religiously, Islam has set standards and criteria to activate this principle, including the consecration of consultation, dialogue, the consecration of moral systems, belief in pluralism, and the activation of the role of peaceful coexistence. Nonviolence is not limited to dealing with humans, but Islam urges the adoption of a policy of nonviolence with animals and the environment. Imam Sayyid Muhammad al-Husayni al-Shirazi, *Nonviolence in Islam*, 1st ed., Dar al-Ulum for Printing and Publishing, Beirut, 2002; Kazim Hilan Mohsen, *Gandhi and the Policy of Satyakraha (Nonviolence) in South Africa 1893-1914*, Basra Literature Magazine, Issue 70, College of Education for Human Sciences, University of Basra, 2014, p. 178.

³²Al-Nahar Newspaper, Issue No. 12500, June 27, 1975, p. 4.

³³ The Salvation Government: The National Salvation Government was appointed as follows: Rashid Karami (Sunni) as Prime Minister, Minister of National Defense, Finance and Information; Camille Chamoun (Maronite): Minister of Interior, Post, Telegraph and Telephone, Water and Electricity Resources; Adel Osseiran (Shiite): Minister of Justice, Public Works, Economy and Trade; Prince Majid Arslan (Druze): Minister of Health, Agriculture, Housing and Cooperatives; Philip Takla (Catholic): Minister of Foreign Affairs, Education and Planning; Ghassan Tueni, Armenian Orthodox: Deputy Prime Minister, Social Affairs, Labor, Industry, Oil and Tourism. Jean Malhama, *Governments of Lebanon: 65 Governments in 60 Years 1943-2003*, 1st ed., Beirut, 2003, p. 245.

³⁴ Fouad Ajami, *The Hidden Imam Musa al-Sadr and the Shiites of Lebanon*, 1st ed., Daler Al-Andalus for Printing and Publishing, Beirut, 1978, pp. 230-231.

³⁵The word (Amal) is an abbreviation for the phrase (Second Resistance Brigades), which represented the military wing of the Movement of the Deprived, which was founded by the head of the Supreme Shiite Council in Lebanon, Imam Musa al-Sadr, in 1974 AD, after the intensification of discontent among the Shiite sect due to the poverty and deprivation they continued to live in most of their areas in Lebanon, especially the area of southern Beirut, to which large numbers of them migrated from southern Lebanon, following repeated Israeli attacks. The sites of Shiite gatherings in the southern suburb of Beirut became known as the belt of misery. Among its most important goals are: true faith in God and total faith in the complete freedom of the citizen, declaring war without mercy against all types of injustice and providing opportunities for all citizens, adhering to national sovereignty, defending the homeland and fighting European ambitions to which Lebanon is exposed, faith in Arab interests, and working to liberate Arab lands. Hassan Bakhit, *Forces of Political Conflict in Lebanon*, unpublished master's thesis, Faculty of Political Science, Omdurman Islamic University. Algeria, 2017, p. 41.

³⁶Amin Mustafa, *The Resistance in Lebanon 1948-2000*, 1st ed., Dar Al-Hadi for Printing and Publishing, Beirut, 2003, p. 283; Fawaz Traboulsi, *Social Classes and Political Power in Lebanon*, 1st ed., Dar Al-Saqi for Printing and Publishing, Beirut, 2016, p. 51.

³⁷Abbas Amin Harb Al-Amili, *The Ameli Jurist Sayyid Musa Al-Sadr (An Objective Study of Imam Al-Sadr in the Interpretation of the Qur'an - Coexistence between Sects - Guardianship of the Jurist - Ashura - Social Work)*, 1st ed., Dar Al-Kateb Al-Arabi Publishing House, Beirut, 2010, pp. 285-286.

³⁸Ghassan Fawzi Taha, *The Shiites of Lebanon: The Clan, the Party, and the State (Baalbek-Hermel as a Model)*, 1st ed., Governmental Knowledge Institute for Publishing, Beirut, 2016, p. 298.

³⁹Fatah Movement: It is a revolutionary movement founded on January 1, 1965, headed by Yasser Arafat, and is considered one of the largest Palestinian revolutionary factions. Several military wings branched out from it, including the Black Panther Group, the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, the Fatah Falcons Group, the Martyr Ahmed Abu Al-Rish Brigades, and the Martyr Abdul Qader Al-Hasani Brigades. The movement was launched from a national liberation background seeking to resist the Zionist occupation and to

emphasize that Palestine is an integral part of the Arab homeland and has the right to sovereignty over its lands. Its revolutionary and jihadist activity against the Zionists continued until the end of the seventies, after which it changed its revolutionary path to the diplomatic path and signed the Oslo Accords in 1993, deleting some of the clauses it was demanding, especially the issue of eliminating the Zionist entity. In 1996, it entered the elections and obtained a parliamentary majority. After the death of Yasser Arafat in 2004, the movement was headed by Mahmoud Abbas, who concluded an agreement in 2005 with the Zionist entity, which resulted in the end of the revolutionary work of the movement in West Bank. For more details, see: Mahmoud Al-Nattour Abu Al-Tayeb, *The Fatah Movement Between Resistance and Assassinations (1965-1982)*, Vol. 1, 1st ed., Al-Ahlia Publishing and Distribution, Amman, 2014; Mahmoud Al-Nattour, *The Fatah Movement Between Resistance and Assassinations (1983-2004)*, Vol. 2, 1st ed., Al-Ahlia Publishing House, Amman, 2014.

⁴⁰Mustafa Shamran, Lebanon, Shahid Shamran Publishing Foundation, 1st ed., Beirut, 1983, p. 168.

⁴¹ An-Nahar Newspaper, Issue No. 12588, September 2, 1975, p. 12.

⁴² As-Safir Newspaper, Issue No. 12590, September 4, 1975, p. 2.

⁴³Abdul Amir Qabalan (1936-2021): A Lebanese Shiite jurist, Abdul Amir Muhammad Musa Qabalan was born in 1936 in Mays al-Jabal. He studied religious sciences in Najaf al-Ashraf at the hands of a group of its scholars, headed by Sayyid Abu al-Qasim al-Khoei. Before the establishment of the Supreme Shiite Islamic Council, the Jaafari Fatwa House was concerned with all religious matters related to the Shiites, which were later carried out by the aforementioned council. Sayyid Hussein al-Husseini was the first excellent Jaafari Mufti in Lebanon. After his death, Imam Sayyid Musa al-Sadr appointed Sheikh Abdul Amir Qabalan as a new Mufti to replace him. In 1994, he assumed the presidency of the Supreme Shiite Islamic Council. See: Jamal Omar, *Lebanon and the Iranian Footprint*, 2nd ed., n.d., 2010, p. 162; <https://nrtrtv.com>

⁴⁴ An-Nahar Newspaper, Issue No. 12597, September 10, 1975, p. 4.

⁴⁵Muammar Gaddafi (1942-2011): Born in 1942 in the village of Jahannam in the Sirte region, he completed primary school in 1956. He studied history at the University of Benghazi, but soon left it to join the Military Academy in 1963. He had been singing the praises of Arab nationalism since his early youth and was passionate about reading newspapers and magazines that dealt with the news of Arab nationalism. He witnessed important events that shook the Arab world, including the Arab war with Israel in 1948, the Egyptian Revolution in 1952, and the Suez Crisis in 1956. He led a successful coup to overthrow the monarchy in 1969, and declared a new rule, and issued strict measures, including legislation = Law No. (71) of 1971, which stipulated the issuance of the death penalty for anyone leading an activity opposing the revolutionary government, and banned opposition political parties. In 1979, he dissolved the Revolutionary Command Council and assumed the position of Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. In Libya, in 1991, he issued the legal document that gave him broad powers to manage the government. In 2003, he took a package of administrative reforms in line with the changes that swept a number of Arab countries. He was firm in his foreign policy, especially towards Israel, as he rejected Israel's decision to partition Palestine. In 2011, he was exposed to an internal revolution supported by the United States of America, as a result of which he was killed. Ahmed Abdel Salam Fadel, Bakr Abdul Majeed Mohammed, *Muammar Gaddafi and his role in Libyan politics until 2011*, Tikrit University Journal for Humanities, Volume 23, Issue 4, College of Education, Anbar University, 2016, pp. 150-176.

⁴⁶Houari Boumediene (1932-1987): He is Mohamed Ben Ibrahim Ben Kharrouba, born on August 23, 1932 in the village of Beni Adi. He studied at the Quranic school, entered the French school and learned French. At the age of fourteen, he joined the Algerian People's Party, then left his family and joined the Kettani School in Constantine. He completed his studies and was called up for military service in the French army at the age of eighteen. He fled the army and sought refuge in Egypt in 1951. He studied at Al-Azhar Mosque in Cairo until he completed his religious education and joined the National Liberation Front. He rose through the ranks until he became commander of the Fifth District, then commander of

the Border Army and Minister of Defense in the government of President Ahmed Ben Bella. He then overthrew him on June 19, 1965, to assume the presidency of the republic. He died on December 27, 1987. For more details, see: Sabah Nouri Hadi Al-Abidi, Houari Boumediene and his political and military role in the history of Algeria (1932-1987). Unpublished Master's Thesis, University of Diyala, College of Education, 2005, pp. 1-5

⁴⁷ An-Nahar Newspaper, Issue No. 12595, September 12, 1975, p. 3.

⁴⁸ An-Nahar Newspaper, Issue No. 12661, October 15, 1975, pp. 1, 8.

⁴⁹ Hassan Fadlallah, Hezbollah and the State in Lebanon (Vision and Path), 3rd ed., Al-Matbouat Publishing Company, Beirut, 2015, p. 83.

⁵⁰ Muhammad al-Gharawi, Days with Imam Sayyid Musa al-Sadr, 1st ed., Al-Rasoul Al-Akram Publishing House, Beirut, 2005, pp. 242, 247.

⁵¹ Imam Sayyed Musa al-Sadr, Religions in the Service of Mankind, 1st ed., Imam Musa al-Sadr Publishing Center, 1st ed., Beirut, 2019, p. 102.

⁵² Adnan Fahs, Imam Musa al-Sadr (Biography and Thought 1969-1975), previous source, pp. 58-59; An-Nahar Newspaper, Issue 12710, January 7, 1976, p. 1.

⁵³ An-Nahar Newspaper, Issue No. 12728, January 25, 1976, p. 2.

⁵⁴ An-Nahar Newspaper, Issue No. 12733, January 30, 1976, p. 8.

⁽⁵⁵⁾ Abdul Halim Khaddam (1932-2020): Born in 1932 in Baniyas, he graduated from the Faculty of Law in Damascus. His first political activity was his membership in the Syrian People's Party. He held several positions. In 1966, he was appointed governor of Quneitra, the capital of the Golan Heights. He was then appointed governor of Hama, then governor of Damascus, and then Minister of Economy, Trade and Foreign Affairs. After the death of Hafez al-Assad, he held the position of acting prime minister. Through his diplomatic role, he contributed to stopping the Lebanese civil war and played an important role in preparing for the tripartite agreement in 1985 and the Taif Agreement in 1989. In 2005, he announced his defection from the Syrian Ba'ath Party and called for the overthrow of the Ba'ath regime in Syria and the establishment of a modern democratic state based on citizenship. In 2006, he founded the National Salvation Front. After his arrest, the Military Criminal Court sentenced him to public labor in 2008 on charges of providing fabricated information. On the assassination of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, who died in 2020 of a heart attack. Ruwa Wahid Abdul Mohsen Al-Saadi, Abdul Halim Khaddam and his political role in Syria (1932-1989), unpublished master's thesis, College of Education for Humanities, Dhi Qar University, 2017, pp. 10-20.

⁵⁶ An-Nahar Newspaper, Issue No. 12736, February 2, 1976, p. 2.

⁵⁷ An-Nahar Newspaper, Issue No. 12746, February 12, 1976, p. 3.

⁵⁸ Abbas Amin Harb Al-Amili, the previous source, pp. 255-256

⁵⁹ An-Nahar Newspaper, Issue No. 12754, February 20, 1976, p. 6.

⁶⁰ Musa al-Sadr, Islam and Society, 1st ed., Imam Musa al-Sadr Center for Research and Studies for Publishing, Beirut, 2019, p. 125.

⁶¹ Noon Center for Authorship and Translation, The Short Words of Imam Sayyed Musa al-Sadr, 1st ed., Beirut, 2017, p. 115.

⁶² An-Nahar Newspaper, Issue No. 12819, April 29, 1976, p. 6.

⁶³ An-Nahar Newspaper, Issue No. 12827, May 8, 1976, p. 2,

⁶⁴ Noon Center for Authorship and Translation, previous source, p. 301.

⁶⁵ An-Nahar Newspaper, Issue No. 12780, July 18, 1976, pp. 1, 6.

⁶⁶ Fouad Ajami, previous sourcep. 239.