

# Lazar Kaganovich Political Role In The Soviet Union, 1922–1934

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## Abstract

*Lazar Kaganovich is a prominent Soviet figure who played a significant political role in the Soviet Union. This study examines his political role from 1922 to 1934, focusing on his activities within the Soviet Communist Party, particularly in the Organization and Guidance Department, his subsequent leadership of the Ukrainian Communist Party, and his final role after his return to Moscow. Kaganovich represents a model of party cadres who allied with Stalin in establishing central control and strengthening communist influence within the Soviet republics, particularly through the implementation of the Ukrainianization policy in Ukraine and the purge of those who opposed Stalin's policies from the Ukrainian Communist Party. The study focuses on the methods he employed in organization, repression, and building political loyalty, as well as his close ties to Stalin within the mechanisms of Soviet power.*

**Keywords:** Kaganovich - Soviet Union

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## INTRODUCTION

Soviet history represents a very important period in the development of modern political systems. It is a decisive stage that witnessed the transition from the Leninist stage to the Stalinist stage, and the consolidation of the foundations of the Stalinist system. During this period, figures emerged who had an influence. Deeply involved in the course of the emerging Soviet state, among these figures is Lazar Moiseevich Kaganovich <sup>1</sup> He was one of the most prominent leaders who played pivotal roles in shaping Soviet policies during the second and third decades of the twentieth century. We chose this particular period because it witnessed Kaganovich's rise within the ranks of the Communist Party, during which he held important leadership positions that contributed to shaping the economic and administrative policies of the fledgling Soviet state. This study aims to shed light on Kaganovich's political rise within the Soviet Communist Party hierarchy and to assess his role in consolidating Stalinist power and marginalizing opponents. This study relied on the method of historical analysis by referring to primary sources, and modern academic studies and research that dealt with this historical period. The research dealt with three main stages of Lazar Kaganovich's political life: the first stage 1922-1925, in which he was appointed head of the Organization and Guidance Department in the Soviet Communist Party; the second stage 1925-1928, in which he assumed the leadership of the Communist Party in Ukraine; and the third stage 1929-1934, which was his return to Moscow and his holding of high positions, and he became one of the most prominent people close to Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin. <sup>2</sup> This research comes within the framework of filling part of the gap in Arab studies on Soviet history, attempting to present a balanced vision based on objective analysis of historical events and facts. The researcher hopes that this study will constitute a qualitative addition to Arab research that has dealt with Soviet history, especially with regard to studying the influential political figures who contributed to shaping the features of that time period..

**First: Kaganovich headed the Organization and Guidance Department of the General Secretariat 1922-1925** In 1922, the Soviet Union witnessed a bitter struggle for leadership of the Soviet Communist Party after Lenin's illness. The party's policy also witnessed a radical change, as the Soviet Communist Party invested its eleventh congress, held in March 1922, to strengthen the one-party state. Stalin was elected as the party's general secretary, and he sought to control the party and end the opposition within it. <sup>3</sup> Therefore, he worked to attract supporters to him in the party to eliminate the opposition movement against him. <sup>4</sup>.

Kaganovich, for his part, was fully aware of what Stalin was thinking, so he worked to confirm his absolute loyalty to Stalin by carrying out his orders as quickly as possible and to the smallest detail to gain his approval. Stalin summoned him in April 1922, gave him an apartment near the Ministry of Defense building, and assigned him the task of reviewing lists of names of members of the Soviet Communist Party, from all over the Soviet Union, and expressing his opinion about them.<sup>5</sup> Kaganovich was able to gain the trust of the leaders of the Soviet Communist Party, including Valerian Kubyshev. Valerian Kuibyshev<sup>6</sup> In January 1923, he recommended Kaganovich for a position in the party's General Secretariat, after having seen his seriousness and discipline during their time working together in the Communist Party of Turkmenistan. Kaganovich's courage, toughness, and high self-confidence impressed Kubyshev, which prompted him to submit his recommendation to Lenin, who in turn decided to nominate him for the position of head of the Organization and Guidance Department in the General Secretariat.<sup>7</sup> The position for which Kaganovich was nominated was an important and sensitive one in the Soviet Communist Party, as this department was responsible for managing the human resources of the entire party, including appointing members to various positions, supervising their activities, and ensuring their adherence to party policies, taking into account that whoever holds this position performs a pivotal role within the party, as it is responsible for coordinating between the various organizational levels of the party to ensure unity of leadership and implementation of decisions, as well as settling the countless disputes that arise between party officials and party agencies.<sup>8</sup> Kaganovich was initially reluctant to accept the position, knowing its importance and sensitivity. He was fully aware that taking the position meant that he would become part of the maneuvers of the Leninist group in the party to maintain complete control over the party, and that he would clash with opponents of Lenin's policy. However, he received assurances from Stalin himself, and his pledge of support within the party, in addition to his assurance that many of the party leaders saw him as the qualified and suitable person to take on this position, which made him finally agree to take on the position.<sup>9</sup>

Stalin's strong desire to have Kaganovich take over did not come about out of nowhere. Stalin knew for certain that he was the right man for a prominent position in the Kremlin, because he was an organizer with an unparalleled skill among his peers in the Soviet Communist Party. Any reform that needed decisiveness, Stalin would address by sending Kaganovich to decide it himself.<sup>10</sup> It did not escape Kaganovich's mind that his work as head of the Organization and Guidance Department in the General Secretariat meant implementing what the Central Committee of the Communist Party wanted, in accordance with its new directions after Stalin took over the Party Secretariat, which were to identify the weaknesses in the party resulting from weak party officials. He had to reconsider appointments to sensitive positions in the party and mobilize the available cadres that he could through addressing the weaknesses in the party. He had to conduct a careful study to select employees suitable for the required work. In other words, he had to accurately maintain the employee records, which had not been maintained to the required level before he took over the position, so that he could select employees more accurately.<sup>11</sup>

Kaganovich realized that his importance to Stalin would be measured by the people he appointed to the party, and that he must choose them with extreme care, by carefully analyzing the background of the names, and he must choose only those who supported Stalin absolutely, and give them sensitive jobs. He hoped that Stalin would feel this dedication, and thus obtain a good position in the government that Stalin would form in the event of the death of Lenin, who was suffering from illness at the time. Therefore, he devoted himself to work and worked hard at it, and he worked for eighteen hours a day.<sup>12</sup> Kaganovich's work in his new position was based on his belief that the previous recruitment processes in the Soviet Communist Party were not effective, and that they depended on quantity rather than quality. The number of those appointed in 1920 reached between 100-150 members per day, and that during the period from April 1920 to February 1921, more than 40 thousand members were appointed to the party. He was fully aware that the party's mobilization process had exceeded its usefulness, and that he had to take measures according to an effective strategy in the process of selecting new members for the party.<sup>13</sup>

Kaganovich's standing in the Soviet Union rose after he took over as head of the Organization and Guidance Department of the General Secretariat of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which paved the way in 1923 for his selection as a candidate member of the Central Committee of the party. This put him in a position to influence nationalities policy rather than having it imposed on him. It also brought him closer to many elite members of the party, especially Stalin. He stated in his memoirs: "In 1923, I was fortunate enough to work in close proximity to the Central Committee of our party, and I learned a great deal from its members about its great ideals and principles in the struggle for the Leninist party. I learned the art of organization from the members of the Politburo and the Organizational Bureau, especially in daily contact with the secretaries of the Central Committee and its General Secretary, Comrade Stalin."<sup>14</sup>

The Soviet Union entered a new phase after Lenin's death on January 21, 1924. The communists defeated their enemies and enacted a new constitution, according to which the three socialist republics of Ukraine, Belarus, and the Caucasus joined the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republics. Thus, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was formed, governed by the Supreme Soviet Congress.<sup>15</sup> and in turn elects the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet Union.<sup>16</sup> Which in turn appoints the ministers, numbering 12 ministers, five of whom represent the united government.<sup>17</sup> At this stage, three figures competed for the leadership of the Soviet Union: Trotsky, the Minister of War, and Zinoviev, the head of the Third International.<sup>18</sup> In 1924, Stalin was the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. Kaganovich decided to side with the latter, who controlled the reins of power in the state and the party. Kaganovich himself took on the task of registering the industrial workers who flocked to register in the Soviet Communist Party from all the Soviet republics, who numbered 200 thousand workers. He also took on the responsibility of accepting new members into the party and educating them politically. In the same year, he published a book entitled "How the Russian Communist Party is Organized," which was widely published in the following years in all the republics of the Soviet Union. This work defined the basic principles of organizing the Communist Party that new members had to know.<sup>19</sup> When the Soviet Union witnessed in August 1924 an uprising of Georgian peasants against Soviet rule, Kaganovich emphasized the importance of Lenin's last writings before his death, on the necessity of reconciling the peasants, and providing principles for a government policy in this direction.<sup>20</sup> Lenin had recommended to the cadres of the Soviet Communist Party many things that they must adhere to in implementing after his death, including preserving the purity of the party, not tampering with it, preserving its unity, and protecting the dictatorship of the working class, the proletariat. Proletarian and strengthen it, preserve the alliance of workers and peasants, support and expand the Union of Soviet Republics, preserve and believe in the principles of Communist Internationalism.<sup>21</sup> Kaganovich's influence in the Soviet Communist Party increased in 1925, after he secured a place for himself in the General Secretariat of the Soviet Communist Party, which during this period of Soviet history dominated the life of the Communist Party, as well as becoming the platform in which the future Stalinist leadership was formed. In order to impose its control over the Soviet republics, it decided to send some party officials to the republics and Soviet regions to implement its central policy.<sup>22</sup> Kaganovich reaped the fruits of his close relationship with Stalin. He summoned him to his office on March 20, 1925, and informed him that the officials of the Ukrainian Communist Party had asked him to find a solution to the Ukrainianization problem, because it was not successful. He informed him of the need to take responsibility for the Ukrainianization policy, and advised him not to allow any compromise at the expense of the Ukrainianization policy.<sup>23</sup>

**Second: Kaganovich's chairmanship of the Ukrainian Communist Party Bureau and his role in Ukrainianization policy 1925-1928** Kaganovich gained the confidence of the Politburo of the Soviet Communist Party, which issued a decision on March 26, 1925, appointing him as General Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party, replacing Immanuel Kevering. Emmanuil Kvirin<sup>24</sup> Then, the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the Ukrainian Communist Party elected him, at the session held from April 5-7 of the same year, as a member of the Organizational Bureau of the Central Committee and General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party.<sup>25</sup> Despite the objection of some Ukrainian leaders who demanded that the position be given to

Molotov, Kaganovich was subjected to a major attack from some members of the Ukrainian Communist Party because he was appointed to this position because he was of Jewish origin, even though his roots were Ukrainian and he spoke the Ukrainian language at an intermediate level.<sup>26</sup> Kaganovich was required to steer the course between the rival factions in Ukraine, while satisfying Stalin's desire to consolidate his control over them.<sup>27</sup> Therefore, since his arrival in Ukraine in April 1925, he sought to dominate the power structure by imposing his complete control over Ukrainian political and economic life, and exploiting his position as a member of the central leadership of the Communist Party and Stalin's envoy to achieve this.<sup>28</sup> Lenin's choice to implement the Ukrainianization policy and eliminate the opposition within the Communist Party was not arbitrary. Kaganovich had many qualities that made him the best choice for Lenin, the most prominent of which was that he was fluent in the Ukrainian language, and secondly, he was firm in completing the tasks assigned to him to the best of his ability, in addition to his belief in the philosophy that says "the end justifies the means." When Stalin assigned him to manage affairs in Ukraine, his orders were completely clear: to purge the party apparatus of those who opposed his policy, and he stressed that he take all necessary measures to purge the party, when he said to him on March 20, 1925: "You must organize and purge the Ukrainian party, and purge the government administration of everyone whose loyalty is not completely assured, and you must also rid it of incompetent officials."<sup>29</sup> It seems that Kaganovich was well prepared to carry out the tasks assigned to him by Stalin in Ukraine. He took Khrushchev with him, as his deputy, to undertake most of the small tasks, as he was fluent in Ukrainian, and Kaganovich himself was free to devote himself to the big tasks, to ensure that the goals for which he came were achieved with complete success.<sup>30</sup> It can be said that not taking more than one person with him is an indication of Kaganovich's leadership style, his self-confidence, and his tendency to work independently to ensure that the decisions he made and implemented were under his direct supervision without any outside interference, and to ensure that communication between him and Stalin remained direct in an attempt to increase Stalin's trust in him. Kaganovich began to reorganize the organizations of the Ukrainian Communist Party, to subordinate them completely to the central party apparatus in Moscow, and thus eliminate the opposition within the Ukrainian Communist Party to Stalin's policy, and end the opposition of Ukrainian workers' groups to communist policy.<sup>31</sup> The reorganization of the Ukrainian Communist Party, led by Kaganovich, was characterized by speed and decisiveness. He based his evaluation of party members on lists prepared in advance in Moscow, while he was in charge of personnel affairs. He made his decisions regarding appointments and dismissals based on two main criteria: party discipline and adherence to the party line. Those who proved their complete loyalty to the party were promoted to a higher position or remained in their position. As for those who showed nationalist tendencies, their party rank was demoted, as a last opportunity to adjust their position. In contrast, Kaganovich did not hesitate to expel any member who he deemed unwinnable to the party, based on his personal assessment.<sup>32</sup> The researcher believes that Kaganovich followed a clear approach based on rewarding loyalists and eliminating opponents, whether through direct exclusion or marginalization of those suspected of disloyalty, which strengthened the party's control in accordance with Moscow's central vision.. Kaganovich was fully aware of where his opponents' pressure points lay, Whenever opposition to his policies escalated, he would direct a ready-made accusation at them: "anti-Semitism." This accusation was enough to silence his opponents, especially since Stalin, who was then seeking to gain the support of the Jews, did not want to spark an open conflict over this issue, so he supported his general secretary in Ukraine without hesitation. Thus, in less than a year, Kaganovich succeeded in imposing the Stalinist approach on the Ukrainian party apparatus, as he imposed a strict hierarchical system. Local party secretaries had to consult with the party committees before making decisions, so as to demonstrate the apparent unity of leadership. This model extended to all lower levels, from municipalities to factories, whether in party or governmental structures.<sup>33</sup> He had to overcome all the failures of the Ukrainianization policy before assuming his new position, due to its failure to be implemented correctly since 1923, in addition to his knowledge that it was a highly controversial policy. He had to follow a strategy that would ensure its successful implementation and achieve its goal of building a solid support base for the Soviet Communist Party among the Ukrainian population, which

was predominantly peasant, and transforming Ukraine into a model socialist republic, to form the nucleus of the socialist revolutionary movements in Eastern Europe.<sup>34</sup> . Although the Soviet government's policies towards nationalities were at that time very complex, as there were extremist nationalities in every Soviet region, and no one wanted to give up his nationality,<sup>35</sup> But Kaganovich believed that the national minorities in Ukraine, consisting of Germans, Poles, and Jews, who were more prosperous and educated than the Ukrainian majority, differed from the national minorities in the other Soviet republics, and that they were well-established, stable, and cohesive.<sup>36</sup> However, he admitted that he was very nervous when he was assigned the position, because the Ukrainian Communist Party has great influence and is of great importance to the center.<sup>37</sup> . Kaganovich faced many difficulties in implementing the Ukrainianization policy, the most prominent of which was the position of the united Jewish minority, which opposed Soviet policy in general, and Ukrainianization policy in particular, as a result of their villages being destroyed by the Soviet authorities, since the early 1920s, which led to the spread of Zionist groups.<sup>38</sup> Very active in Ukraine<sup>39</sup> Kaganovich found that the Jews were determined to preserve their unity and identity, and were resisting the policy of Ukrainianization.<sup>40</sup> . In contrast to the Jewish minority, the Polish minority, most of whom were from the working and peasant classes, were dispersed among the Ukrainian cities after the disappearance of the settlements in which they lived. Since the beginning of the 1920s, they adapted to the Soviet system, as a result of the activity of the Polish communists who were able to control the Polish minority, supported the policy of Ukrainianization, and promoted it among the Poles, by establishing gatherings that targeted workers, peasants, soldiers, and teachers, to instill communist ideas among them.<sup>41</sup> . Kaganovich's arrival in Ukraine marked a major turning point in the implementation of the Ukrainianization policy. Upon assuming office in 1925, he worked to promote it, and took the initiative to meet with the educated Ukrainian elite, and spoke to them in Ukrainian, mixed with some Belarusian words, and promised them to study the Ukrainian language, so that he could deliver his speech at the Ukrainian Communist Party conferences in Ukrainian only.<sup>42</sup> . In the context of promoting the Ukrainianization policy, on April 1, 1925, Kaganovich formed a committee in the Politburo of the Ukrainian Communist Party to oversee all aspects of the Ukrainianization policy, including the development of Ukrainian Communist Party cadres, the recruitment of Ukrainians into the party, and making the Ukrainian language the official language of the party, the state, trade unions, and the Ukrainian army. He also promoted the use of the Ukrainian language in Ukrainian schools and the media.<sup>43</sup> The Ukrainian Parliament supported Kaganovich's efforts, calling in its session held on April 4, 1925, to expand the scope of efforts to achieve Ukrainianization.<sup>44</sup> . Kaganovich sought to highlight the importance of Ukrainianization for the Soviet Communist Party, calling it terms in keeping with the communist revolution, such as “revolutionary task,” “great endeavor,” “arduous task,” “concentrated willpower.” In other words, he considered Ukrainianization a fundamental revolutionary project, not a temporary tactic that could be easily abandoned.<sup>45</sup> Kaganovich's strategy for implementing the Ukrainianization policy included Ukrainian literary circles. He issued a party instruction on April 10, 1925, prohibiting any Ukrainian literary organization from claiming to represent the Ukrainian Communist Party, or to monopolize the Communist Party line in this area.<sup>46</sup> . Kaganovich's strategy for implementing the Ukrainianization policy was more decisive than the Ukrainianization policy that began in 1923. It was implemented under the direct supervision of the Communist Party, after it had been managed only by government departments. It began to be implemented by the Communist Party apparatus itself, starting with the elimination of party voices opposing Ukrainianization, and the conversion of all the main party publications from Russian to Ukrainian, including the newspaper *Kommunist*. *Kommunist*, the mouthpiece of the Ukrainian Communist Party, and all paperwork of the lower party apparatus, in addition to that all party meetings became in Ukrainian, and studies in party schools were converted into Ukrainian, and the party required all its members to learn the Ukrainian language, including the Communist Soviet Union of Youth, known as the Komsomol.<sup>47</sup> and workers<sup>48</sup> To ensure the success of the Ukrainianization policy and its implementation in accordance with the plans drawn up for it by the center, Kaganovich ordered the Information Department of the Ukrainian Parliament to request regular reports from the local party committees, which were then formed in every Ukrainian province and city to monitor the

Ukrainianization policy, as well as to request reports from the Ukrainianization committees formed in all commissariats, economic institutions, factories, and the literacy department of the Education Commissariat Ministry of Education. Thus, he was able to create a comprehensive and wide network to monitor the implementation of the Ukrainianization policy.<sup>49</sup>

The left wing of the Ukrainian Communist Party and the Russian-dominated Ukrainian trade union movement strongly opposed Kaganovich's Ukrainianization policy, arguing that the vast majority of Ukrainian urban residents were Russian-speaking. Kaganovich also clashed with some members of the Ukrainian Communist Party, led by the People's Commissar of Education, Alexander Yakovlevich Chomsky. Alexander Yakovlevich Shumsky<sup>50</sup> ...who, at the plenary session of the Ukrainian Central Committee on April 6, 1925, demanded that the policy of Ukrainianization be implemented more decisively and quickly, and that the necessary measures be taken to Ukrainianize the Ukrainian Communist Party as quickly as possible. Stalin took a neutral position towards this conflict, but he reprimanded Kaganovich for his indecisive behavior.<sup>51</sup>

Kaganovich not only placed the Ukrainianization policy under the supervision of the Ukrainian Communist Party, and imposed strict control over the implementation of the policy through party and government supervisory committees, but he also emphasized the need to use force and pressure on all Ukrainians to implement the Ukrainianization policy. The measures of force and pressure were represented by the dismissal of any employee or worker who was proven not to cooperate with the Ukrainianization policy. The Ukrainian Politburo, in a letter sent to Stalin, boasted of the strict political line that Kaganovich followed towards Ukrainianization, as it stated: "None of the previous party secretaries in the party exercised such firmness and pressure in implementing Ukrainianization."<sup>52</sup>

In order to reassure the Ukrainians that the Ukrainianization policy was in their interest, Kaganovich declared on May 3, 1925, before the Ninth All-Ukrainian Congress that it would be an example to be emulated in Europe and the East, that it would allow all Ukrainians, workers and peasants, to participate in government, that the Ukrainianization policy would preserve the Ukrainian cultural heritage, and that he would work to raise the cultural level of the population by eliminating illiteracy, to ensure the growth of Ukrainian culture.<sup>53</sup>

The Ukrainian Communist Party, led by Kaganovich, decided on July 1, 1925, to establish local cultural centers for peasant writers, supervised by party members to guide them. The Ukrainian Communist Party explained the establishment of these centers by saying that the role of proletarian writers was absent in the Ukrainian arena, and by the importance of them gaining their historical right to play a distinguished role in Ukraine.<sup>54</sup> The reports of the Polish consulate in Kharkiv indicated that although Kaganovich had achieved significant success in implementing the Ukrainianization policy in some areas, especially the introduction of Ukrainian national curricula in primary education, and the partial Ukrainianization of newspapers and periodicals, this policy had not achieved much in higher education and central administrative bodies, including the Ukrainian national security services, due to the passive resistance of some Ukrainian intellectuals, especially intellectuals of Polish origin who grew up in the shadow of Russian culture, and the weak standardization of the vocabulary and spelling system of the Ukrainian language.<sup>55</sup> When Kaganovich emphasized the need to train and develop only those state employees who were fluent in Ukrainian, during a conference of the Ukrainian Communist Party held at the end of December 1925, he was severely criticized by some party members who opposed the Ukrainianization policy. They accused him of following a pro-Ukrainian and pro-kulak policy, and criticized the party's internal policy by describing anyone who disagreed with him or Lenin as a deviant. They also criticized the failure of the Ukrainian Communist Party leadership to address the causes of Ukrainian workers' discontent.<sup>56</sup> In April 1926, controversy erupted in Ukraine again regarding the Ukrainianization policy strategy. This was due to the focus on popular gatherings in major cities, and the requirement that advertisements and signs be written in Ukrainian, as well as the issuance of official stamps exclusively in Ukrainian. Kaganovich justified his adoption of this strategy by bridging the large gap between the villagers, the majority of whom spoke Ukrainian, and the city dwellers, the majority of whom spoke Russian. He stated that the villagers who frequented the cities had the right to read signs in their native language. The Ukrainian Communist

Party, through Petrovsky, justified the adoption of this strategy by saying: "The peasants come to the city centers in Kharkov and Odessa, and they see the signs written only in Russian, and they ask, "Where is Ukraine?" We are doing our best so that every peasant, every Ukrainian individual, from a member of the Legislative Council to the lowest individual, can read the signs in their native language, to understand that this government is their government, and so that the peasant feels that the government belongs to them."<sup>57</sup>.

The Ukrainian Communist Party, led by Kaganovich, appears to have recognized the importance of peasants' proficiency in the Ukrainian language and sought to capitalize on this advantage to strengthen their support for the Ukrainianization policy, employing it as an effective means of countering voices opposing this policy. This reflects the party's vision of using linguistic identity as a tool to achieve its political goals.

Kaganovich was elected a candidate for membership in the Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union at the plenary session of the Ukrainian Central Committee in June 1926. At the same session, he strongly attacked the opposition in the Ukrainian Communist Party, ensuring that the oppositionists were not given the opportunity to spread their ideas in Ukraine. He accused them of exploiting the country's critical economic situation and international anti-Soviet sentiment to achieve their own interests.<sup>58</sup>.

In order to strengthen his control over Ukraine and silence the voices of opposition within the Ukrainian Communist Party, on July 14, 1926, Kaganovich issued instructions to the party organizations to expel all opponents in the party, after accusing them of committing criminal acts that harmed Soviet national security. Later, in October of the same year, he made some changes in party positions, removing some officials from their positions, and in the following month November he led a major purge in which nine opposition leaders were arrested.<sup>59</sup>.

Opponents of the Ukrainianization policy continued to criticize it. In November 1926, a number of articles appeared criticizing it. The newspaper "Bolshevik" described the promotion of local languages and cultures by the Ukrainian Communist Party as "terrorism against Russian speakers." The newspaper article condemned the forced learning of Ukrainian by Ukrainian workers. A book entitled "National Culture" by V. Vananyan also appeared during the same period. V. Vaganyan attacked the policy of Ukrainianization, considering it a costly, reactionary, and useless experiment, and that it caused a slowdown in the development of mass culture.<sup>60</sup>.

Despite the criticism, Kaganovich succeeded in achieving tangible progress in the Ukrainianization policy. In the statement issued by the Ukrainian Political Bureau in the Ukrainian language for the first time in late January 1927, it was indicated that as a result of commitment to the Ukrainianization policy at the highest level, and firmness in its implementation, the number of schools using the Ukrainian language rose from 6150 schools in 1922 to 15148 schools at the beginning of 1927, and the number of children receiving education in the Ukrainian language reached two million children, and the distribution of newspapers in the Ukrainian language rose from 90 thousand copies in 1924 to 612 thousand at the end of 1926, and the percentage of Ukrainians in the Ukrainian Communist Party rose from 30% in 1923 to 52% at the beginning of 1927.<sup>61</sup>.

In February 1927, Kaganovich responded to criticisms of the Ukrainianization policy, pointing out that the aim of this policy was not only to raise the level of national consciousness, but also to eliminate the linguistic and cultural differences among the Ukrainian people and to ensure the integration of Ukraine into the Soviet system. He denied that the Ukrainianization policy had caused tensions and exclusions within the Ukrainian Communist Party, and confirmed the promotion of nine Ukrainians to the position of regional secretaries in the party.<sup>62</sup>.

With Stalin issuing warnings on July 1, 1927, about the possibility of war breaking out between the Soviet Union and Poland, the Ukrainian leadership was placed on high alert. Kaganovich toured the Ukrainian regions bordering Poland from July 15 to August 15, 1927, to supervise the readiness of the military units there. He used this visit to learn about the party situation there, so he held a meeting with party officials in those regions, and discussed with them the preparations to repel any Polish aggression on Ukrainian lands.<sup>63</sup>. While serving in the Ukrainian Communist Party office, Kaganovich maintained Stalin's confidence, which he had gained through his services, and remained the only Jew

close to Stalin after the latter carried out a purge in July 1927 in which he eliminated most of the early Jewish communist leaders and removed the others from his inner circle. This came in the wake of the uprising of Leon Davidovich Trotsky. Leon Davidovich Trotsky<sup>64</sup> Against Stalin and accusing him of deviating from Marxist ideology and leaning towards totalitarianism<sup>65</sup> As an alternative to the original union of Soviet Socialist Republics<sup>66</sup>. Then, reports received by Kaganovich on September 1 of the same year confirmed that if Poland launched a war on Ukraine, poor and middle-class peasants would fight alongside the Soviet government, and it was likely that some of the rich peasants, the "kulaks," would work to overthrow the Soviet government. Based on this information, he met with peasants and soldiers, urged them to defend the country, and strengthened their morale.<sup>67</sup> Then he spoke before the Ukrainian Politburo Committee responsible for border security on September 13, 1927, and stressed in his speech the importance of reorganizing the territories and transferring the population from the border area to enhance security there.<sup>68</sup>. As part of the purge, Kaganovich blessed the Shakhty trial in the spring of 1928. Shakhty Trial<sup>69</sup> For mining engineers, the Ukrainian anti-corruption unit is conducting a thorough investigation into the loyalty of engineers in the Donets Basin. Donets Basin<sup>70</sup> For the Communist Party<sup>71</sup> His harsh, authoritarian leadership style in Ukraine led to a deterioration in his relations with some members of the Ukrainian Communist Party, and when they reached their peak, Stalin made the decision to withdraw him from Ukraine in June 1928.<sup>1</sup>. Kaganovich arguably played a pivotal role in implementing the Ukrainianization policy in Ukraine, seeking to strike a balance between strengthening Ukrainian cultural identity and ensuring centralized Communist Party control. Although this policy was intended to integrate Ukrainians into the Soviet socialist project, Kaganovich used it as a tool to consolidate state influence and suppress any potential resistance. His approach to implementing Ukrainianization was characterized by decisiveness, and while it contributed to achieving the party's goals, it also sparked controversy over the impact of these policies on Ukrainian national identity. His efforts were part of a broader strategy to consolidate Soviet hegemony over the republics affiliated with the Soviet Union.

### **Third: Kaganovich's political role after his return from Ukraine 1928-1934**

After Kaganovich's term as General Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party ended in June 1928, he returned to Moscow and stated that he regretted leaving Ukraine: "Despite the difficulties of work in Ukraine, I regretted leaving because I grew up in Ukraine, joined the underground organization of the party there in Kiev, and for the past three years I invested all my strength and energy in building socialist Ukraine, but I did not break off relations with it."<sup>72</sup>.

Kaganovich's influence in the Soviet Communist Party did not decline after his recall from Ukraine. He returned to work in the party secretariat with great effectiveness, and his loyalty to Stalin increased. His positions became completely identical to those of Stalin, and he began to closely follow any shift in Stalin's positions, changing his own positions to match his own. He enthusiastically adopted the leftist shift advocated by Stalin, so much so that he was called a "left-wing Stalinist."<sup>73</sup> In 1928, he was able to defeat one of the symbols of this opposition, who controlled the party organization in Moscow, namely Nikolai Alexander Uglanov. Nikolai Alexandrovich Uglanov<sup>74</sup> Then he was elected instead of him, and he took his place.<sup>75</sup>. Then, in December 1928, he was appointed a member of the Presidium of the Central Council of All-Union Trade Unions AUCCTU<sup>76</sup> He led a campaign to discredit the Soviet Communist Party oppositionist Mikhail Ilyich Tomsy. Mikhail Ilyich Tomsy<sup>77</sup>, who was the head of the trade unions, and worked to reorient the union under the slogan of "orientation towards production"; Kaganovich firmly replied that this slogan was a violation of proletarian democracy, and Kaganovich firmly responded to the accusation by saying: "Democracy is not an idol for the Bolsheviks"

<sup>78</sup>.

In early 1929, Kaganovich took charge of party cadre policy, submitted major reports on the subject to the party, and was responsible for developing the role of the guides as a vital part of the party's management mechanism. The main task of the guides, as defined by the Central Committee resolution of January 14, 1929, was to monitor the work of party organizations in implementing the policies of

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(1) RW Davies etale., Op. Cit., p. 27.



industrialization and collectivization, mobilizing the party ranks, and monitoring cadre policy. In February of the same year, Kaganovich published a short article entitled "On the Work of the Guides," in which he rejected the "slander" of the Mensheviks and Trotskyists that the party apparatus had become an enemy of party democracy. He insisted that the party apparatus was the instrument that ensured the implementation of policy.<sup>79</sup> In his capacity as the person responsible for the actions of party cadres, Kaganovich asked the Unified State Political Administration OGPU<sup>80</sup> Conducting highly accurate investigations of state employees in economic institutions, to identify elements hostile to the Soviet regime, the Directorate completed its political investigations in mid-November 1929, which included 9,000 engineers and other specialists in the state's economic institutions, and revealed the existence of an organized war against the Soviet authority. 500 specialists were arrested on charges of sabotage, and the former big capitalists and landowners constituted 29% of this number, while the rest came from the educated elite.<sup>81</sup> By 1930, Kaganovich's teenage dream of becoming one of the leaders of the revolution had come true. He had even more than that, rising to the top of the Soviet Communist Party leadership, becoming the third most important figure after Stalin and Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov. Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov<sup>82</sup> His responsibilities increased from this year onwards, as he became a full member of the Politburo of the Communist Party, and the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Moscow. He replaced Stalin by signing the minutes of the Politburo of the Communist Party, when Stalin was absent.<sup>83</sup> Thus, Kaganovich became a communist figure, a prominent member of the Soviet government, and an indispensable figure in Stalin's life. On August 6, 1931, the latter authorized him for the first time to manage the daily work of the party's Politburo, while he was enjoying a long vacation.<sup>84</sup> Kaganovich followed Stalin's dictatorial policy to control the party opposition. He contributed to monitoring Communist Party members who opposed Stalin's policy. The correspondence between them showed that he monitored what party members said in public forums and their actions in the circles for which they were responsible, including his criticism of Nikolai Ivanovich Bukharin. Nikolai Ivanovich Bukharin<sup>85</sup> The party official responsible for industrial science and technology, and described him as a confused and fickle party member, especially in his speech at a public gathering in northern Moscow, and the report he presented to the industrial officials on August 26, 1931, in which he called for changing the socialist structure in the Soviet Union to develop industry in it, and Kaganovich accused him of providing incorrect information about the internal conflicts of the Soviet Communist Party, and the state's economic failures, which harmed the interests of the Communist Party.<sup>86</sup> Stalin's dictatorial policy took a new course in 1932. He began to apply the principles of revolution from the top levels of the country downwards, especially towards the nationalities. His plans required central control of political power, economic resources, and the energies of the masses. He discouraged ethnic loyalties, considering them a potential centrifugal force and a distraction from the state's main task of modernizing the entire country.<sup>87</sup> Kaganovich was one of the tools of implementing Stalin's new policy. In July 1932, during his tenure as head of the Central and Moscow organizations of the Communist Party, he was tasked with attending the Ukrainian party conference in the Ukrainian capital, Kiev, to draft a law on the necessity of meeting the goals of the central government in Moscow in the supply of grain. During this period, Stalin entertained the idea of reappointing Kaganovich to the presidency of the Ukrainian Communist Party, but he backed down from his idea due to his urgent need for his services in the General Secretariat of the Communist Party.<sup>88</sup> Then in 1933 he was appointed supervisor of the party purge committee to expel disloyal and unsuitable elements, especially in areas that were of concern to the Soviet leadership, exposed to external attack, and areas that had witnessed failure in the collective farms.<sup>89</sup> At the 17th Party Congress, held from December 6, 1933 to February 10, 1934, Kaganovich presented proposals to abolish the Central Control Commission and the Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate, and to establish a new system of party and administrative control. He himself was appointed chairman of the new Party Control Commission.<sup>90</sup>

By 1934, Kaganovich held several positions at the same time, performing various roles, to the point that he had to ask the Politburo of the Soviet Communist Party to relieve him of one of his posts, especially the head of the transport department. Kaganovich remained associated with many key government and party positions, including being General Secretary of the Party Central Committee,

Stalin's deputy in the party, head of the party organization in the capital, Moscow, and Stalin's deputy in the Defense Committee, the highest body responsible for decisions related to defense. His personal relationship with Stalin reached its peak, as he spoke at the funeral of Stalin's wife, at the request of Stalin himself, who was unable to speak due to his deep grief.<sup>91</sup>.

During this period, Kaganovich outshone Molotov, becoming Stalin's right-hand man, and developing a large base within the Soviet Communist Party, especially in the Moscow branch. His party base reached its peak at the 17th Congress of the Communist Party, where party members showered him with praise during the congress, and many of them linked his name with Stalin's, opposing them as the true leaders of the party, to the point that Western journalists expected Kaganovich to be Lenin's successor in the future.<sup>92</sup>.

## CONCLUSION

The period from 1922 to 1934 was a pivotal and highly influential period in Kaganovich's political career. During this period, he emerged as one of the members of the new elite of revolutionary administrators belonging to the proletarian class, who played a pivotal role in shaping the political development of the Soviet Union in the following period. This period represented a true breakthrough for Kaganovich in the world of politics. Research has shown that Kaganovich's political activity went through three stages:

**1. The first stage:** Which extended from the beginning From 1922 until March 1925, he was able to build his upward career towards the centers of influence in the state and the party, and played a pivotal role in formulating political decisions in it, as he succeeded in He managed employment files and sensitive positions, and was crucial in supporting the Stalinist orientation within the party, which earned him Stalin's personal trust.

**2. The second stage:** Which extended from the end of March 1925 until June 1928, during which he succeeded in leading the Ukrainian Communist Party, and managed its organizational work in detail and with a security perspective, which made him Stalin's right-hand man there. He led the "Ukrainization" policy forcefully, using the party's tools and institutions to impose the Ukrainian language and the dominance of Soviet communism, while punishing opponents and rewarding supporters.

3. The third stage, which extended from early July 1928 until 1934, saw Kaganovich reach the peak of his political influence within the Soviet Union. He became a model of a loyal Stalinist bureaucrat, serving as a political echo of Stalin, not just an ally, and an effective tool in consolidating his repressive authority. However, despite his power, he continued to operate in the shadows, driven by a mixture of loyalty and ambition.

## Footnotes

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- (1) Lazar Kaganovich: He was born in 1893, in the village of Kahana, Kyiv Province. topoor Jewish family and was unable to complete his studies Because he was poor. very, Joined in 1911 Bolsheviks, and Elected as a representative. In the Constituent Assembly on the Bolshevik list, and in December 1917 Appointed a delegate to the Third All-Russian Congress of Soviets. and Appointed to the All-Russian Executive Committee of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, and He moved with the rest of the Executive Committee to Moscow in the spring of 1918. In the year 1922 send me Turkmenistan And there he met Bestalin Where he led with Stalin Military campaign to eliminate White Russians And the remnants of the loyalists For the Tsar there And in 1925 it became Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine, In the year 1930 A Become a member. In the Political Bureau of the Soviet Communist Party Y and worked as a minister For transportation and industry For the period 1937-1940, he was expelled from the party in 1957, and died in 1991. See:

Roy Aleksandrovich Medvedev, *All Stalin's Men*, Anchor Books, New York, 1985, pp. 113-133.

- (2) Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin: child general 1878 in the village of Gori in Georgia, from a poor family as his father worked as a cobbler, and he was expelled from the theological seminary in Tbilisi in 1899 as a result of his interest in the revolutionary movement, and He joined the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party in 1901, and in 1903, when the party split into two wings, he joined the Bolsheviks led by Lenin. He worked for the Bolshevik newspaper Pravda as an editor. Before being exiled to Siberia from July 1913 to March 1917, He played a major role in the events of the Bolshevik Revolution., Appointed in 1922 Secretary General of the Communist Party, and He seized power after Lenin's death in 1924, becoming Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars in 1941 until March 1946, and then Chairman of the Council of Ministers until his death in 5 March 1953. For more See:

John Paxton, Leaders of Russia and the Soviet Union: from the Romanovs Dynasty to Vladimir Putin, Taylor and Francis Group, New York and London, 2004, pp. 107-109.

- (3) EA Rees, Iron Lazar a Political Biography of Lazar Kaganovich, Anthem Press, London, 2012, p. 42.
- (4) Stuart Kahan, The Wolf of the Kremlin: The First Biography of L.M. Kaganovich, The Soviet Union's Architect of Fear, William Morrow and Company INC, USA, 1987, p. 115.
- (5) There were hundreds of thousands of names from all over the country, and Kaganovich had to go to the Ministry of Defense every day at five in the morning and receive new lists, which he reviewed until eleven at night, and if necessary, he would sleep in his office at the ministry. He looked:

Ibid., pp. 115-116.

- (6) Valerian Kubyshev: Born in 1888 in Omsk, Siberia, he joined He joined the Bolshevik organization in 1904, and continued his party activity in various cities in Siberia and St. Petersburg., Arrested many times During the reign of the Caesars, he was exiled four times. He was one of the leaders of the February Revolution. 1917, then led the October Revolution From the same year In Samara, and later led. Fighting on the Eastern and Turkestan fronts against Kolchak, as a member. In the Revolutionary Military Council on the fronts, We elect a member. In the Central Control Committee of the Party Communist At the Eleventh Congress in 1922, And he became a secretary to the Central Committee of the Party Communist In 1922 and 1923, And in 1926 it became President. To the Supreme Council for National Economy, then Member. In the Political Bureau of the Central Committee in 1930 and assumed the presidency State Planning Commission, and Assistants. To the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, He was appointed in 1933. President. to the Soviet Control Committee, and Assistant to the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, and It was also. Member. in the Central Executive Committee of the USSR. Looks:

Editorials, Valerian Kuibyshev, The Communist International Journal, Vol. XII, NO. 3, 5 February 1935, p. 79.

- (7) E.A. Rees, Op. Cit., p. 42.
- (8) Leonard Schapiro, The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Second Edition, Vintage Book- A Division of Random Books, New York, 1971, P. 252.
- (9) Della Huffines, Ukrainian Jew and Stalin's Deputy: An Examination of Soviet-Jewish Relations Through the Life of Lazar Moiseyevich Kaganovich, Thesis- University of North Carolina, USA, 2023, p. 33; Stuart Kahan, op. Cit., p. 114.
- (10) Faraj Jamran, Stalin, Hindawi Publishing and Distribution House, United Kingdom, 2017, p. 127.
- (11) Leonard Schapiro, Op. Cit., p. 252.
- (12) Stuart Kahan, op. Cit., p. 115.
- (13) Leonard Schapiro, Op. Cit., p. 254.

- (14) Lazar Kaganovich, Pammies business, Pfather, Komenist-large, professional, party and Soviet-More work, Moscow, 2003, P. 349.
- (15) The Supreme Soviet Congress: The supreme political body of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. It consists of a bicameral body: the Federation Council, elected by the congress members from among the representatives of the union republics, and the Council of Nationalities, which includes representatives of the union republics according to the population of each republic. The Supreme Soviet Congress is the expression of the sovereignty of the entire Soviet people, and the entire supreme power of the state is concentrated in it. All the highest state bodies are accountable to it, and the Congress has the right to issue laws. For more, see: Abdul Wahab Al-Kayali, Encyclopedia of Politics, Vol. 1, Arab Foundation for Studies and Publishing, Beirut, 1998, p. 36.
- (16) Central Executive Committee of the Soviet Union: It is the committee of Responsible for implementing policies and legislation approved by the conference Supreme Soviet. See: same source, p. 37.
- (17) The ministers representing the united government are: the Ministers of Defense, Foreign Affairs, Trade, Railways, and River Transport. See: Mohamed Mohamed Saleh et al., The Great Powers Between the Wars 1914-1945, Baghdad, D.T, p. 158.
- (18) Third International: also called the communist state Communist International Its short name is Comintern. Comintern The Comintern, an association of national communist parties founded in 1919, had the stated goal of promoting world revolution. However, the Comintern primarily served as a Soviet control apparatus over the international communist movement. It held seven world congresses between 1919 and 1935, and was formally dissolved in 1943. See: Martin White, The Politics of Power, translated by Omar Salim Al-Tal, Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, Qatar, 2024, p. 366.
- (19) R.W. Davies et al., The Stalin–Kaganovich Correspondence, Yale University Press, New Haven & London, 2003, p. 25.
- (20) Ibid., P. 26.
- (21) Pierre Renoven, History of the Twentieth Century 1900-1948, translated by: Nouredine Hatoum, Dar Al Fikr, Damascus, 1978, p. 213.
- (22) A Prominent members of the Soviet Communist Party who The messengers to the Soviet republics and regions were: A. A. Andreev AA Andreev to North Caucasus, Suleimov Sulimov to the Urals, Bauman to Moscow, Vareikis to the Central Black Earth Region, Sheboldaev to the Lower Volga, and Khataevich to the Middle Volga. Looks:  
R. W. Davies et al., Op. Cit., pp. 25-26.
- (23) Stuart Kahan, op. Cit., p. 133.
- (24) Immanuel Quiring: Born in 1888 in the village of Friesental, Samara. Of Volga German descent, he was a Soviet politician and economist. He was a member of the Soviet Communist Party from 1912, and held several positions, including Vice President of the Soviet Union from 1925 to 1930, and then First Vice President from 1934. Although he did not receive an academic education, he was awarded a doctorate in 1934 for his efforts in raising the level of the Soviet economy. He headed the Institute of Economics of the Red Professors and the Institute of Economics of the Communist Academy. He was known for his opposition to the policy of Ukrainianization, and was executed during the purge that took place in the Soviet Communist Party in 1937. See:  
Robert Wellington Campbell, A Biobibliographical Dictionary of Russian and Soviet Economists, Routledge Taylor and Francis Press, London, 2012, p. 222.
- (25) Terry Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939, Cornell University Press, London, 2001, p. 84; R.W. Davies et al., Op. Cit., p. 26.

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- (26) The most prominent opponents of Kaganovich assuming the position of General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party are: PetrovskyPetrovsky, and ChobarChubar. Looks:  
Terry Martin, op. Cit., p. 85; R. W. Davies et al., Op. Cit., p. 26; Jan Jacek Bruski, *Between Prometheus and Realpolitik: Poland and Soviet Ukraine, 1921–1926*, Jagiellonian University Press, Kraków, 2016, p. 64.
- (27) E.A. Rees. Op. Cit., p. 61.
- (28) Jurij Borys, *Who Ruled the Soviet Ukraine in Stalin's Time? (1917-1939)*, *Revue Canadienne des Slavistes*, Vol. 14, No. 2, Ukrainian, Summer, 1972, p. 222.
- (29) Stuart Kahan, op. Cit., p. 133.
- (30) Ibid., p. 134.
- (31) Jurij Borys, *Who Ruled the Soviet Ukraine in Stalin's Time? (1917-1939)*, *Revue Canadienne des Slavistes*, Vol. 14, No. 2, Ukrainian, Summer, 1972, p. 222.
- (32) Stuart Kahan, op. Cit., p. 135.
- (33) Ibid., p. 136.
- (34) It is worth noting that the Executive Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party set January 1, 1926, as the presumed deadline for the full implementation of Ukrainianization. See:  
Della Huffines, Op. Cit., p. 47-48; R. W. Davies et al., Op. Cit., p. 26; Jan Jacek Bruski, Op. Cit., p. 172.
- (35) Stuart Kahan, op. Cit., p. 134.
- (36) By "minorities," Kaganovich meant the peoples classified by the Soviet term "Western national minorities," namely the Poles, Germans, Bulgarians, and Greeks. The Western minority of greatest concern to the Ukrainian government in the 1920s was the German minority, a thriving Protestant community. See:  
Della Huffines, Op. Cit., p. 47-48; Terry Martin, op. Cit., p. 84; R. W. Davies et al., Op. Cit., p. 26
- (37) Terry Martin, op. Cit., p. 84.
- (38) Zionism: A political and religious movement that emerged in the late nineteenth century, founded by Jewish intellectuals from Eastern Europe, most notably Theodor Herzl. Its goal was to establish a national homeland for the Jews in Palestine. For more on Zionism, see:  
Abdel-Wahhab Mohamed El-Messiri, *Encyclopedia of Jews, Judaism, and Zionism*, Vol. 6, Dar Al-Shorouk, Beirut, 1999, pp. 13-25.
- (39) Ibid., P. 36.
- (40) Stuart Kahan, op. Cit., p. 135.
- (41) The Soviet authorities capitalized on the emigration of Polish employees from Ukraine. They filled vacant positions, especially those of teachers, with new recruits who had received special communist training in Moscow and Kiev but had received no education in Polish culture. They also hired non-Polish teachers fluent in Polish to teach in Polish schools, contributing to the inculcation of communist ideas among Polish students by imposing curricula that carried a communist, anti-Polish ethos. See:  
Serhii Plokyh, *Unmaking Imperial Russia: Mykhailo Hrushevsky and the Writing of Ukrainian History*, University of Toronto Press, Canada, 2005, p. 173.
- (42) It is worth noting that Kaganovich did not keep his promise at the Ukrainian Communist Party Congress held in 1925, but he did keep it at the next congress held in 1927. See:  
Terry Martin, op. Cit., p. 86.
- (43) RW Davies etale., Op. Cit., p. 26.
- (44) Terry Martin, op. Cit., p. 35.
- (45) Ibid, p. 87.

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- (46) EA Rees. *Op. Cit.*, p. 65; Olena Palko, *Making Ukraine Soviet: Literature and Cultural Politics under Lenin and Stalin*, Bloomsbury Academic, London, 2022, p. 99.
- (47) COMSOL: is the organization Youth of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Founded in 1918, And included Members aged 14-28 years., It was used As a means of political education of Soviet youth via Providing a sense of community, engaging in activities, and strengthening identity. It was used As a means of supporting the Soviet army, and spreading propaganda, I reached The organization Its peak during the Stalinist era. valley Its members played pivotal roles in key moments of Stalin's political career, including the Five-Year Plans, purges, and World War II, giving them the political experience they needed to emerge as a new generation of party leaders. The organization was dissolved. In 1991, after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Looks:
- James R. Millar, *Encyclopedia of Russian History*, Vol. 1, Macmillan Reference, New York, 2004, pp. 313-314.
- (48) Terry Martin, *op. Cit.*, p. 85.
- (49) *Ibid.*, P. 86.
- (50) AA Alexander Yakovlevich Shumsky: Born in 1890 in Volhynia, Russia, he joined the Socialist Revolutionary Party (1909-1917) and became the leader of the Ukrainian Communist Party (1919-1920), then the plenipotentiary of the Soviet Republic in Poland (1921-1923), and served as the Commissioner of Education in Ukraine (1924-1927). He was expelled from the Communist Party in 1933, arrested in 1935 on charges of deviating from communism, and after his release, he was killed in 1946 by a group from the Soviet Ministry of State Security. See:
- Bernard Isaacs, VI Lenin: *Collected Works - October 1917–November 1920*, Vol. 44, 4th Ed., Translated from the Russian by: Clemen Stutt, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 2014, P. 602-603.
- (51) It is worth noting that Chomsky is one of the most ardent defenders of the Ukrainian policy. For more, see:
- R. Jurij Borys, *Op. Cit.*, p. 221; EA Rees. *Op. Cit.*, p. 65-66; W. Davies et al., *Op. Cit.*, p. 27.
- (52) Terry Martin, *Op. Cit.*, p. 86.
- (53) EA Rees. *Op. Cit.*, pp. 63-64.
- (54) Olena Palko, *Op. Cit.*, p. 100.
- (55) Quoted from:
- Lewis Chester, Stephen Fay and Hugo Young, *The Zinoviev Letter*, Heinemann Press, London, 1967, p. 98.
- (56) The most prominent opposition figures who criticized the Ukrainianization policy at the conference were: P. Solodub, P. Solodub, and Dashkovsky. I. Dashkovsky. Looks:
- E.A. Rees. *Op. Cit.*, p. 66.
- (57) Terry Martin, *op. Cit.*, p. 88-89.
- (58) RW Davies et al., *Op. Cit.*, p. 27.
- (59) The most prominent changes in positions include the dismissal of Kerkiza. Kirkizh From the post of Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party Organization in Kharkiv, Postyshev was appointed Postyshev. Instead, he appointed Kirkizha as head of the Ukrainian Central Control Commission, then removed him from his new position in January 1927, after accusing him of supporting the opposition and working against Stalin, and replaced him with V.P. Zatonsky. VP Zatonsky. Looks:
- E.A. Rees. *Op. Cit.*, p. 76.
- (60) *Ibid.*, P. 73.
- (61) *Ibid.*, P. 66.
- (62) *Ibid.*, P. 71.

(63) Ibid., p. 70; R.W. Davies et al., Op. Cit., p. 27.

(64) Leon Davidovich Trotsky: Born in 1879 in the city of Yanovka Ukrainian, in the name of Lev Davidovich Bronstein. Born to a Jewish family, he completed his primary and secondary education in Odessa and Nikolaev. He began his political activity while still in high school in 1896. He was arrested in 1898 for participating in several demonstrations and workers' strikes. He was imprisoned for two years and then exiled to Siberia for four years. He participated in the October Revolution of 1917 and served as Chairman of the Soviet Military Revolutionary Council and a member of the Politburo of the Soviet Communist Party. He was dismissed from his post in 1926 and emigrated to Turkey in 1929. He moved between several countries, including Belgium, France, Denmark, Austria and Britain. He announced the establishment of the Fourth International in 1938. He was assassinated in Mexico in 1940. For more about his life, see:

Leon Trotsky, *My Life: An Attempt at an Autobiography*, Dover Value Editions, USA, 2007; Walter J. Whittemore Jr., *Untimely Deaths by Assassination*, iUniverse Rev. publishing house, USA, 2012, P. 103-110.

(65) Totalitarianism: A term that denotes totalitarianism, a form of political organization characterized by the state's complete control over all aspects of public and private life. Power is concentrated in the hands of a single party or leader, such that the state is integrated into all aspects of national life and completely controls all human activities within the framework of a single authority and a single worldview, in which the individual must dissolve into the whole. For more, see: Ahmad Saifan, *Dictionary of Political, Constitutional, and International Terms*, Maktabat Lubnan Publishers, Beirut, 2004, p. 109.

(66) The purge included many communists, who were exiled, imprisoned, or executed, including leaders of the First International who were among the first to initiate the communist revolution, including Trotsky, Zinoviev, Martynov, Zaslulich, Axelrod, Martov, and others. For more, see: William Carr, *The Jews Behind Every Crime*, 2nd ed., Dar Al-Kitab Al-Arabi, Beirut, 1982, p. 207; William Garçay, *Stones on the Chessboard*, translated by Saad Jazairli, Dar Al-Qalam Al-Arabi for Publishing and Distribution, Quneitra, 2022, p. 209.

(67) EA Rees. Op. Cit., p. 70; R. W. Davies et al., Op. Cit., p. 27.

(68) E.A. Rees. Op. Cit., p. 71.

(69) Shakhty Trial: A public trial. The trial was held on May 18, 1928, and lasted for 41 days. It was the first show trial in the Soviet Union, after accusing (53) Engineers and managers in the city of Shakhty were accused of conspiring to sabotage the Soviet economy in cooperation with the owners of the mines. Coal, 34 of whom were sentenced to prison, while 11 were executed. For more, see:

James R. Millar, Op. Cit., Vol. 4, P. 1378-1379; Stephen Kotkin, *Stalin*, Penguin Press, New York, 2014, pp. 702-707.

(70) Donets Basin: An industrial region in southeastern Ukraine, covering an area of 60,000 km<sup>2</sup>, it is one of the richest regions in the coal, iron ore, and chemical industries, and is rich in natural resources. See:

RF Sachsenhofer<sup>1</sup> and VA Privalov, Basin Evolution and Coal Geology of the Donets Basin (Ukraine, Russia), *Journal of Berg und Hüttenmännische*, December 2004, p. 212.

(71) RW Davies et al., Op. Cit., p. 27.

(72) Della Huffines, Op. Cit., p. 48.

(73) RW Davies et al., Op. Cit., P. 30-31.

(74) Oglanov: Born in 1886 in Feodoretskoye village, In the city Laroslavl, to a Russian peasant family, He graduated from the village school, join In 1903 he joined the Social Democratic movement., participated in Russian Revolution of 1905, then Worked in labor unions Since

1906, it has become Chairman of the St. Petersburg Trade and Industry Workers' Union. In 1912, he participated in the October Revolution of 1917. He became secretary of the Petrograd Regional Party Committee in 1921, then secretary of the Nizhny Novgorod Regional Committee, and became first secretary of the Moscow City Committees for the period 1924-1928. Work in Duration 1928-1930 People's Commissar of Labor of the Soviet Union. He was accused of being against the revolution and executed on July 18, 1937. See:

David R. Marple and Alla Hurska, *Joseph Stalin: A Reference Guide to His Life and Works*, An Imprint of the Rowman and Littlefield Publishing Group, London, 2022, pp. 241-242.

(75) RW Davies et al., *Op. Cit.*, p. 28; Lazar Kaganovich, *Previous inventor*, p. 390.

(76) Presidency of the Central Council of Trade Unions of All Federations Presidium of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions. It is the highest authority in the Soviet trade union structure, and The link between the Communist Party and the labor movements, through its control of the trade union committees at the branch level, and the labor unions in the republics of the Soviet Union, and Responsible for managing and implementing policies and decisions that Qaraha Full Council of Trade Unions and organizing activities. Trade union activities at various levels through coordination between regional and industrial federations, ensuring a unified line and direction of labor policies.. Looks:

James R. Millar et al., *Vol. 4. Op. Cit.*, P. 1566-1567.

(77) Mikhail Ilyich Tomsy: Born in 1880 in Petrograd to a working-class family, he joined the Social Democratic Party in 1904 and became involved in trade union activities in 1904, which led to his arrest, five years in prison, and exile to Siberia. He was elected to the Central Committee of Trade Unions in 1919 and became a member of the Politburo of the Communist Party in 1922. In 1928, he joined the opposition to the Communist Party, was expelled from the Politburo, and dismissed from his position as head of the trade unions. In 1931, he was appointed to the government publishing house. In 1936, he was accused of coordinating the opposition in the Russian Red Army with the right-wing opposition within the party, so he shot himself and committed suicide. See:

*Ibid.*, *Vol. 4. Op. Cit.*, P. 1560.

(78) RW Davies et al., *Op. Cit.*, p. 28.

(79) The "responsible guide" had a vital function; It is the focus on key issues, and to be fully "politicized.". It is seen:

E.A. Rees. *Op. Cit.*, p. 86.

(80) Joint Political Directorate of the State Unified State Political Directorate): Founded This directorate, in its capacity as Successor to the State Political Directorate (GPU), and it is The secret police of the Soviet Union November of the year 1923 to July of the year 1934, It was responsible for the internal and external security of the Soviet Union. and played a major role In implementing the policy of forced collectivization of agriculture under Joseph Stalin, so suppressed the resistance, And the deportation of millions to forced labor camps, It also persecuted political opponents inside the country. And outside of it. It is seen:

Kevin P. Riehle, *The Russian FSB: A Concise History of the Federal Security Service*, Georgetown University Press, Washington, 2024, p. 106.

(81) Of the 106 people arrested in connection with the railway case, 62% were from the ranks of the old noble nobility, the merchant class, and the clergy. This was presented as evidence that the campaign was coordinated by the "leading elite of the old capitalist system.", and Insert In Kaganovich's report Names of 23 specialists. Industrially prominent, Among them: S. A. Khrennikov and V. I. Zhdanov, former heads of the Gomzi Metallurgical Union, and later senior specialists at Glavmetal, Dr. N. Shvetsov, former chairman of the Leningrad Shipbuilding Union, Taub and



Gartman, Chief Engineer of the Industrial Division at Gosplan, A. Svestin, Technical Director of Yugostal. It is seen:

E.A. Rees. Op. Cit., p. 87.

(82) Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov: Russian politician born in 1890 in the city of Kukara, He joined the Bolshevik Party in 1906, Secretary General of the Communist Party in 1920, and He became Prime Minister in 1930, and Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1939, And he was dismissed in 1957, then Expelled from the Communist Party in 1961, Died in 1986. See: Alia Abdullah Jaafar, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov and his political role in the Soviet Union from 1906 to 1962, Unpublished master's thesis, College of Education for Science Humanity-Al-Muthanna University, 2020.

(83) Martin McCauley, *Who's Who in Russia Since 1900*, Routledge, USA, 1997, p. 106; R.W. Davies et al, Op Cit., P.29.

(84) Della Huffines, Op.Cit., p. 50; R.W. Davies et al, Op Cit., P.37.

(85) Nikolai Ivanovich Bukharin: Born in 1888 in Moscow, he joined the Bolsheviks in 1906, traveled to the United States in 1911, and returned to Moscow in 1913. He worked as an editor for Pravda from 1917 to 1929, a member of the Politburo of the Communist Party from 1924 to 1929, and an editor for Izvestia from 1934 to 1937. As a prominent member of the party opposition, he was convicted and executed by firing squad in 1938. See:

Barry Jones, *Dictionary of World Biography*, Australian National University Press, Canberra, 2013, p. 124.

(86) Bukharin's report included a call for socialist reconstruction to develop industry, and his speech north of Moscow addressed the same issue. See:

R.W. Davies et al, Op Cit., p. 42.

(87) Della Huffines, Op. Cit., p. 51.

(88) R.W. Davies et al, Op Cit., p. 30.

(89) Chaired the committee Rodzutak, Yaroslavsky, Shkiratov, Stasova, and four others Its main reliance was on Kaganovich, and its work included areas exposed to foreign invasion (the Far East, Eastern Siberia, Belarus, and Karelia), areas of Ukraine where collective farm management had failed (Odessa, Kyiv, and Vinnitsa), as well as important and politically influential cities (Moscow, Leningrad, and the Ural Mountains). See:

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(90) R.W. Davies et al, Op Cit., p. 30.

(91) Della Huffines, Op. Cit., p. 48.

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