

Shifting Behavior Of Muslim Party Voters From Identity Politics To Clientelism

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Abstract

This study aims to explore and analyze the shift in voter behavior during the general elections in Malang Regency, Indonesia. This study a descriptive qualitative approach, the research collects data with two techniques, in-depth interviews and focus group discussions, with dozens of informants, legislative candidates, political party administrators, election committees, election supervisors, and voters. The findings indicate a noticeable shift in religious voter behavior from the 2019 election to the 2024 election. In 2019, voters chose political parties and legislative candidates based on identity politics. Whereas, on 2024, shifted towards money politics and political clientelism. Several factors contribute to change voter behavior. First, a growing distrust of legislative members; second, an increasing economic orientation among voters; third, a low level of identification with political parties; and fourth, a trend towards more personal voter preferences. This study offers empirical contributions to political practices in democratic nations and provides theoretical insights into voter behavior, suggesting that economic factors are becoming more influential than sociological factors. This research also shows that Muslim voters, as the voter base for muslim-based parties in areas that are traditional Muslim voter bases, have shifted from voting based on muslim identity to voting based on monetary factors.

Keywords: Identity politics; political clientelism; muslim voters; rational choice.

INTRODUCTION

In previous elections, identity politics was one of the issues shaping voter behavior in Indonesia (Hidayah et al., 2025). Identity politics is formed among Muslim voters in Indonesia as a consequence of the doctrines conveyed by religious figures (Hemay et al., 2024). Indonesian political experts such as Edward Aspinall acknowledged that the 2019 election was a year of identity politics in Indonesia (Aspinall, 2019). This is also supported by Rizky Widian et al. According to Rizky Widian et al., identity politics began to be widely used in the 2014 elections, reaching its peak in the 2019 elections, including the 2017 regional elections in Jakarta (Widian et al., 2023). Leonard Sebastian and Alexander Arifianto said that the 2018 regional elections and the 2019 general elections were the most rampant practices of identity politics (Sebastian & Arifianto, 2021). This was also confirmed by other political researchers such as Yanwar Pribadi (Pribadi, 2021), Firmanda Taufiq and Luthfi Maulana (Taufiq & Maulana, 2024).

Identity politics becomes a struggle for politically interested parties (Lynch, 2006). Identity politics has a negative impact on democratic life. Identity politics has a direct impact on the lack of recognition of different groups (Hirvonen & Pennanen, 2019). Identity politics gives rise to social conflict in society (Hadiz & Chrysosgelos, 2017). Violent acts in politics are also triggered by the practice of identity politics (Siddiqi, 2010), including violence against certain ethnic groups (Verkaaik, 2016). Identity politics is defined as a social movement that spreads identity for political interests (Verkaaik, 2016). Identity politics cannot be separated from the existence of a history of certain identities that mutually influence group identities, or the identities of wider society or national identities (Liu & Hilton, 2005). Identity politics includes social processes that show a particular identity that differentiates it from other identities (Hill & Wilson, 2003). Identity politics is used as a manipulative tool to strengthen politics for economic and political purposes (Fuad, 2014). The concept of ethnicity as a broad term encompasses various groups based on skin color, language, and religion (Lampe, 2010). Identity politics is defined as political activity carried out by individuals or groups using specific identities, such as ethnicity, gender, religion or other identities, for political interests, both electoral politics and more general political interests.

Now, voter behavior in Indonesia has shifted from identity politics to money politics and vote buying, which are carried out by political actors during elections. The latest data from the 2024 election shows that the number of voters accepting money politics is increasing. Exit polls conducted by the Indonesian Political Indicators survey institute during the 2024 election showed that 46.9 percent of voters considered money politics acceptable. This number is an increase from the previous election, where 32 percent of voters considered money politics acceptable (Victoria, 2024). Money politics in Indonesia has formed a special model, as happened in the 2024 election, money politics in Indonesia took the form of

wholesale and retail (Yunita et al., 2024). The political process in democratic countries has been controlled by money politics (Gulzar et al., 2022). The voters have in an election are like commodities that can be bought and sold (Davies, 2021). Every political candidate competes to spend large amounts of money to win the election (Onur et al., 2024). Political parties also need large funds to win electoral political contests (Kumar, 2024). In the end, every candidate and political party competes to obtain large amounts of funds to be used in the election (Thomsen, 2023).

The shifting in voter behavior as a consequence of political clientelism carried out by political actors during elections does not only occur in Indonesia. In Indonesia, political clientelism is deliberately designed by the authorities to shape voter behavior (Yuda, 2021). Clientelism was designed as an effort to mobilize voters (Berenschot & Aspinall, 2022). Political clientelism in Indonesia takes the form of material and monetary transactions during elections (Aspinall & Hicken, 2022). Changes in voter behavior from identity to clientelism politics occur in many cases in various countries, such as what happened in Romania, loyal voters more easily accept clientelism (Gherghina & Tap, 2022), as well as what happened in Brazil, voters accept clientelism because in economic conditions that are in need of goods or materials (Bobonis et al., 2022), this also happened in Hungary (Scoggins, 2020). In Latin America, clientelism was accepted by voters because political parties did not have a clear ideology (Barreda & Otero-Fleticia M. Ruiz Rodríguez, 2024). Political clientelism, which alters voter behavior, also occurs in Muslim democracies, such as Turkey (Yıldırım, 2022), and happened in Jordan (Kao, 2022), and also in Tunisia (Perez-Galan, 2023). Political clientelism is often carried out by political parties because it is considered easier to influence voters (Habyarimana et al., 2021).

Several studies conducted in Indonesia have shown that the practice of clientelism is carried out by considering many factors to effectively shape voter behavior. One of these is related to the relatively poor economic conditions of voters (Sumarto & McCarthy, 2025). Political clientelism is considered effective in shaping voter behavior in rural areas (Mahsun et al., 2025). Political clientelism in Indonesia is carried out by legislative candidates, in the form of giving money to voters (Hicken et al., 2022). In Indonesia, political clientelism also occurs in areas based on religious and religious voters (Permana, 2021), and is also carried out by religious or religious-based parties (Kılıçdaroğlu, 2024). The studies describes the clientelism politics that occurs in Indonesia as a strategy to shape voter behavior, especially to gain voter support during elections.

These studies reveal the practice of political clientelism in Indonesia, but did not reveal much about the aspects or factors that cause political clientelism to be accepted by Indonesian voters. These studies also do not reveal a shift in voter behavior specifically from the 2019 general election to the 2024 general election, specifically the shift from voter behavior based on identity politics to voter behavior based on clientelism. This study explores this issue more broadly. First, it explores the shift in voter behavior from identity politics to clientelism. Second, it explains the factors causing the shift in identity politics to clientelism, particularly among voters of religious-based parties in Malang Regency, East Java.

METHODS

This article is based on the results of qualitative research, which was designed as field research conducted in Malang Regency, East Java, Indonesia in 2024. This study describes and analyzes the shift in political religious party voter behavior in the 2019-2024 elections. Data collection was performed using two techniques. First, in-depth interviews were conducted with the informants. Researchers conducted interviews with informants who were directly involved in the two elections. The interviewees included political party administrators, legislative candidates, general election committees, election supervisors and voters. Each group of informants interviewed consisted of three people, three political party administrators, three legislative candidates, three sub-district election committees, and three election supervisors. Thus, the total number of informants interviewed was twelve. The variety and number of informants interviewed as a form of triangulation of research data sources.

Second, focus-group discussions were conducted. Focus group discussions were conducted with voters from various sub-districts in the Malang Regency, East Java. The data collection activity was carried out by gathering informants in one place. On this occasion, each informant was invited to convey what they had experienced during the election. The informants who were brought in for the limited group discussion were voters who had voted in two elections, namely, the 2019 and 2024 elections. The selection of informants was based on data held by the sub-district election committee, then randomly

selected by being invited to the activity location. The informants involved 10 voters, consisting of five male voters and six female voters.

To obtain valid data, this study also uses time triangulation, namely the time of the general election in 2024 and 2019. The use of time triangulation to test for differences or shifts in voter behavior in the two election periods. Is voter behavior in the 2019 election the same or different from the behavior of political party voters in the 2024 general election. Time triangulation in research is needed to test data collected at different times (Ma & Norwich, 2007). The use of several data collection techniques in this study as a form of triangulation or cross-checking of the collected data. Triangulation in qualitative research functions to confirm and complete data (Breitmayer et al., 1993). Triangulation is intended to cover the shortcomings of one of the research data collection techniques (Thurmond, 2001). Relevant triangulation is used in this study as socio-political research in the form of empirical research (Hussein, 2009). In addition, triangulation was also conducted on the research object, or unit of analysis (Begley, 1996). The unit of analysis in this study is political parties. The political parties that are the units of analysis a political parties, the Kebangkitan Bangsa Party (PKB), parties based on muslim voters. This was done to test the behavior of voters from political party streams in Indonesia, voters of muslim-based political parties.

The data analysis used in this study is constant comparative analysis. Constant comparative analysis is used in qualitative studies (Hallberg, 2006), including in research that uses data collection techniques by conducting interviews (Boeije, 2002). Constant comparative analysis can be carried out on interview results that have become text (Leech, 2007). Constant comparative analysis refers to the data analysis technique proposed by Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss (Glaser & Strauss, 1999). Several steps must be taken by researchers when using constant comparative analysis (Grove, 1988). In this study, researchers took the following steps in constant comparative analysis. Researchers collected data by means of in-depth interviews and focus group discussions. Data that has been collected from in-depth interviews and focus group discussions is processed as a whole. Then the data that has been read is selected and sorted, then collected based on categories that are in accordance with the similarity of the topic, after which it is presented by comparing the two categories that have been compiled. The categories created are based on the type of political party chosen, religious-based.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

The Use of Identity Politics in Elections

The 2019 election in Malang Regency, East Java was marked by identity politics carried out by political party that won the election, muslim-based parties Kebangkitan Bangsa Party (PKB), a party based on muslim voters, used the identity as a symbol to gain voter support and vote acquisition. The manifestation and form of identity politics carried out by legislative candidates is by using these symbols on campaign props such as banners, billboards, stickers and others. In addition, legislative candidates when meeting with prospective voters in the voter base who have a certain identity, wear clothes, including using greetings and greetings that are on the identity. In addition, legislative candidates at the time of the election momentum are present at community activities and provide support for these activities. Such as religious activities.

This was explained by M-M, an informant who is a functionary of the largest political party in Malang Regency, East Java. According to M-M, his party has the spirit to fight for its identity as a party that adheres to mass organization. These principles and values are voiced by party elites, including legislative candidates. Another informant who is a political party functionary also admitted that his party carried out identity politics in the 2019 election. According to R-S, an informant who is a political party functionary admitted that in his party, the party elite have an obligation and responsibility to socialize the figure, teachings and ideology to the lowest level, namely the community and voters. Another informant, Z-A, who is a legislative candidate, admitted that the identity politics approach in his party was effective in gaining votes and support from ideological voters who were loyal to the identity promoted by his party. The number is still quite large, around 30 percent.

Identity politics in the form of symbols, songs, clothing, slogans, and others are conveyed by party structures, legislative candidates, party cadres, administrators and others to voters, when conducting political socialization and campaigns. In addition, identity politics is also displayed in the form of photos and images that depict a certain identity. While the administrators and legislative candidates of PKB

display photos and writings of mass organization as their campaign props. This was explained by another informant, H-B, one of the election supervisors.

The use of identity politics in the 2019 Election by both parties was able to increase the votes for party in the election. The identity politics carried out was able to attract sympathy and support from voters. Voters have a closeness to the party. This was explained by the research informant, S-M. Identity politics carried out by political parties in the 2019 election was effective in increasing political support from voters. This was explained by M-A, an informant who was a legislative candidate in the 2019 and 2024 elections. According to M-A, the same identity between his party and the voter's identity helped him gain votes as a legislative candidate. Likewise, when he went to the field to campaign, it was easy to be accepted by voters.

Identity politics, as an electoral strategy carried out by the PKB which became the won party. Identity politics practiced by PKB in the 2019 general election succeeded in increasing voters' votes and the number of seats in parliament. In Malang Regency, PKB won 290 thousand votes. The vote acquisition led PKB to win 12 seats in the Malang Regency Regional People's Representative Council. In fact, in 2014 the votes won by PKB were only 189,805, or the equivalent of eight seats. In the 2019 Election, PKB also succeeded in sending two people's representatives at the central level from the Malang Raya Electoral District. PKB also succeeded in placing two of its cadres in the East Java Provincial People's Representative Council from the Malang Raya electoral district.

The victory of political parties and the behavior of voters who voted because of identity politics in the 2019 election were caused by many factors. First, group fanaticism. Voters for religious-based parties come from religious organizations that are close to the PKB. Identity politics is increasingly influential when party elites at the national level give political messages to the community at the lower level, especially if it appears in the media, so it is easy to see. This was explained by research informant A-S, one of the election committees.

Shifting from Identity Politics to Political Clientelism

A shift in voter behavior occurred in 2019 to the 2024 election. A shift from identity politics to political clientelism. Voters who previously voted because of identity politics shifted to voting because of money politics. This was explained by the research informant, A-S, who was on the election committee. According to A-S, in the 2024 election, identity politics will no longer exist, both legislative candidates and party administrators will no longer use identity politics to gain voter support. The same thing was stated by one of the informants who is a legislative candidate. M-A, an informant who is running in two elections, namely the 2019 election and the 2024 election, admitted that the relevance of identity politics to party support and the acquisition of legislative candidates' votes only occurred in the 2019 election. The opposite happened in the 2024 election. Identity politics can no longer be a factor in leveraging legislative candidates' and parties' votes, losing to the presence of money politics, which he called "*politik isi tas*".

The shifting in political behavior of voters in the 2019 election, which tended towards identity politics to money politics in the 2024 election, was also explained by T-A, an informant who is also an election supervisor. Another informant, W-S, who is an election supervisor, stated that money politics in the 2024 election was very massive. This is different from the 2019 election. According to W-S, every legislative candidate must compete freely in the electoral district to get votes and support from voters. The shift in voter behavior has an impact on the reduction in votes or seats for political parties. Both political parties experienced a decrease in votes or seats in parliament in the 2024 election. This was acknowledged by informant R-S, an informant who is a political party administrator. According to R-S, the shift in voter behavior in the 2024 election has an impact on the reduction in party seats.

When calculated from the Kebangkitan Bangsa Party (PKB). In the 2024 election, in Malang Regency. The National Awakening Party won 11 seats in the Malang Regency Regional People's Representative Council in the 2024 election. This number decreased from the 2019 election. At that time, the National Awakening Party won 12 seats and was given the position of chairman of the Regional People's Representative Council.

Causes of Shifting from Identity Politics to Political Clientelism

There are several factors that cause the shift in voter behavior from the 2019 election to the 2024 election. First, distrust of political parties and elected representatives from political parties. Voters admit that they do not trust legislative members from political parties who have been elected in the general election. Voters do not trust party members who are people's representatives to fight for their aspirations,

the fate of the people who have chosen them. This arises from the reality that many party members who have been elected as legislative members rarely or never meet voters. In addition, the many corruption cases involving legislative members also further strengthen voter distrust of legislative members from political parties.

Voters' distrust of legislative members was conveyed by A-B, a voter who is an employee at a private company. A-B admitted that he did not believe it, because almost every month there were legislative members who were involved in corruption cases. Such as the corruption case of the "POKIR" funds which involved many members of the East Java Regional People's Representative Council. In addition to not trusting legislative members, many voters admitted to being disappointed that they had elected their representatives in the 2019 election, because after being elected they never came to their area. This was explained by W-T, an informant who works as a housewife. According to W-T, she was disappointed with the promises of legislative members, after being elected it turned out to have changed drastically.

Second, voter behavior based on economic factors. Voters who vote during elections are based on economic factors, namely seeking personal gain from the choice. Personal gain is in the form of getting a reward from the choice that is material, either in the form of money or other goods. Voters consider that the choice in the election is no different from trading or business activities, which seek economic gain. In practice, voters choose legislative candidates who give more money during the election. Each voter can get money ranging from Rp 50 thousand to Rp 150 thousand.

An informant who works as a small trader, I-S, admitted to choosing a legislative candidate who gave money. However, not only did he give money during the election, the candidate had also come to his place to do various social activities, and provide food. Another informant, T-T who works in a beauty salon, does not care about the legislative candidate's program, she admitted that she only cares about the money given by the candidate. T-T admitted that it may not be a lot but it is real and proven to exist. This causes high-cost politics. In the 2024 election, a legislative candidate at the district level could spend up to IDR 3 billion. For a legislative candidate at the provincial level, it could cost up to IDR 10 billion, and for a legislative candidate at the central level, it could cost up to IDR 30 billion. A legislative candidate admitted to spending all his money so he could be elected. This was conveyed by Z-A, an informant who was elected as a legislative candidate in the 2024 election.

Third, low party ID. Party identification (party ID) refers to the level of closeness of citizens to the party they believe they will choose during the general election. Low party ID is the root of other more serious problems. Low party ID has an impact on high political costs, voters are not interested in contributing to winning political parties in any form, especially in the form of financial donations. Low levels of engagement encourage passive voters in politics. In addition, voters also switch parties in every election. This was stated by W-D, one of the informants who is an entrepreneur. W-D admitted that he did not have a fixed choice of party for every election. He chose a party based on his wishes for every election. The same thing was stated by A-G, an informant who has a handicraft business. A-G, who is an alumni of an Islamic boarding school, admitted to changing political choices every election.

Fourth, personal preferences. Voters' political preferences in elections are increasingly independent in determining their choices. This occurs along with the rise of social media, which is used to access political information, including information on political parties and their members who are members of the legislature. The high personal preferences of voters have caused many voters to no longer choose parties or legislative candidates from political parties because of the greatness of party figures or public figures. An informant who works as a cold drink seller, U-S, admitted to choosing candidates because of his own choice. He and his wife chose legislative candidates who had been known directly in joint activities carried out by legislative candidates. The same statement was conveyed by D-N, an informant who works as a cake seller at home. According to D-N, he chose a legislative candidate he knew at a social activity he often attended. In addition, he liked the candidate because he appeared on many billboards and banners.

Empirically, shifts in voter behavior are triggered by various factors and conditions. Shifts in voter behavior are triggered by technical factors in elections, from voting through ballot boxes to voting by post (Hanmer & Traugott, 2004). There are also shifts in voter behavior that can be shaped by the gender factor of legislative candidates (Blackman & Jackson, 2021). In addition, shifts in voter behavior are also triggered by demographic factors (Altındağ & Kaushal, 2021). Voters who live in rural and urban areas also have different political choice behaviors (Brown et al., 2024). Political policies made by the ruling party also influence shifts in voter behavior (Gessler et al., 2022). The shifting in voter behavior is also

triggered by political communication carried out by political actors on social media (Belcastro et al., 2022). This is in line with the increasing public trust in political information on social media (Wei et al., 2023).

In the case that occurred in Malang Regency, East Java, the shift in voter behavior was triggered by the factors mentioned above. The shift in voter behavior was caused by the decreasing level of voter trust in political parties and legislative members elected in the election. Voter behavior in Malang Regency is relevant to the conditions that occur in voter behavior in Indonesia. Voters admitted that they did not believe that political parties and political party members who had been elected as legislative members in the election were fighting for the interests and aspirations of voters. This was evident from the attitude of elected legislative members who rarely or never came to meet with constituents. Legislative members only came again before the election to persuade voters to vote for them again in the next election.

The level of voter trust in political parties has generally decreased. As in several democratic countries in Europe, voters have reduced their level of trust in the ruling party, along with poor public services in rural areas (Mitsch et al., 2021). Voter dissatisfaction with issues thrown to the public has reduced voter trust in right-wing and left-wing political parties in Western Europe (Hillen & Steiner, 2020). Meanwhile, the decreasing level of voter trust in Malang Regency was caused by two things. First, elected legislators rarely visit voters, either in formal activities such as recess, or informal activities in activities carried out by residents who invite council members. Second, many elected legislators are involved in corruption cases. The latest case is that many legislators are suspects in the corruption case of the East Java Provincial Revenue and Regional Budget. Previously, there were many legislators at the city and district levels who were involved in corruption cases.

Voter behavior in Malang Regency, East Java, which shifted from the 2019 election to the 2024 election is a form of evaluation of political parties and legislative members who have been directly elected. Many voters shifted their choices from political parties previously chosen in the 2019 election to other political parties in the 2024 election. Several political parties that previously did not get seats in the Malang Regency Regional People's Representative Council in the 2019 election, in the 2024 election got seats, such as the Prosperous Justice Party. On the other hand, there are parties that got a lot of seats in 2019, in the 2024 election the number of seats decreased.

In many cases in democratic countries, voters evaluate their support for parties at every election (Kadt & Lieberman, 2020). Many voters are disappointed or even distrust political parties, then evaluate the political parties they have previously chosen, and switch their choices to other parties in the next election (Bøggild, 2020). Large parties or parties that usually win elections are eroded and their votes continue to decrease (Chou et al., 2021). Many trade union members do not vote for left parties at elections (Rennwald & Pontusson, 2020). Voters often switch political party choices from election to election (Venturino & Seddone, 2020).

The shifting in voter behavior in Malang Regency, Indonesia is a portrait of the phenomenon of voters who are no longer loyal to political figures. In many examples, in politics, the character of party leaders shows that even party figures no longer strengthen voter support for political parties (Silva et al., 2021). On the contrary, many voters of one political party like figures from other political parties (Daoust et al., 2019). Voters only become more loyal to candidates and party figures when the issues brought by the candidates and figures are in line with voters' expectations (Mummolo et al., 2021). Voters are only somewhat loyal to party members who give loyalty to voters (Folke & Rickne, 2020).

The shifting in voter behavior that occurred in Malang Regency can be analyzed using the theory of voter behavior. Voter behavior states that voter behavior is shaped by several factors, including sociological, economic, political, psychological factors, and communication in the media, including social media. In the shift in voter behavior from identity politics to money politics, the analysis that explains this condition is the rational choice theory. In the rational choice theory, humans do something because they are driven by the desire to gain material benefits. Including in carrying out political activities, giving choices during elections is no different from business activities that seek material or monetary benefits. Although the money received by voters is not large, it is only in the range of IDR 50 thousand to IDR 150 thousand for each vote. However, the money received during elections shapes voter behavior. Money is a concrete form of what voters need, while political programs and promises are considered unreal. Political promises and political programs from political parties and legislative candidates do not provide material benefits to voters.

From the perspective of rational choice theory, political interests are no longer able to maintain voters' choice of political parties during elections (Levi & Hechter, 2020). Even religious interests have been defeated by economic interests (Gauthier & Spickard, 2022). This happens because in rational choice theory, humans often prioritize their own interests over common interests (Petracca, 2009). Voting in a democratic country is given directly to each voter, to make a free choice. Each individual voter is free to make a choice based on their respective preferences. Voter preferences show an increasingly individualistic trend (Hindess, 2007). This shows a trend that is relevant to rational choice theory (Steiner, 2013).

The shift in voter behavior in Malang Regency from identity-based voting to a focus on economic considerations suggests that, theoretically, economic factors are more influential than identity factors such as religious and other forms of identity in shaping voter behavior. Moving forward, the use of identity and political symbols in electoral contests in Indonesia is likely to decline, or may even become obsolete, as they no longer hold relevance for garnering political support and increasing voter turnout. Voters are progressively transitioning from communal behavior to individual behavior, with individual political approaches particularly those that offer personal economic benefits becoming increasingly relevant and preferred among the electorate.

CONCLUSION

The shift in voter behavior from identity politics to political clientelism has significantly contributed to the field of political science and the functioning of democracy. Empirically, this shift is reflected in changing political practices in democratic nations, indicating a transformation in voter behavior from one election cycle to the next. It is essential to understand voter behavior as a dynamic phenomenon shaped by political actors rather than a static one. Theoretically, this shift suggests a transition from sociological factors, particularly identity, to economic factors, specifically money politics. The dominance of economic considerations in shaping electoral behavior underscores the evolving landscape of political engagement in elections. This study strengthens the hypothesis that diverse voters do not automatically choose religious parties or religious affiliations. Political choices and behavior are increasingly shaped by economic factors.

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Interview with Informants

1. Interview with M-M, July 13, 2024
2. Interview with R-S, July 12, 2024
3. Interview with Z-A, August 4, 2024
4. Interview with H-B, July 15, 2024
5. Interview with S-M, July 15, 2024
6. Interview with M-A, August 3, 2024
7. Interview with A-S, July 15, 2024
8. Interview with T-A, July 15, 2024.
9. Interview with W-S, July 15, 2024
10. Interview with R-S, July 12, 2024
11. Explanation of A-B in Focus Group Discussion, August 5, 2024
12. Explanation of W-T in Focus Group Discussion, August 5, 2024
13. Explanation of I-S in Focus Group Discussion, August 5, 2024
14. Explanation of T-T in Focus Group Discussion, August 5, 2024
15. Explanation of W-D in Focus Group Discussion, August 5, 2024
16. Explanation of A-G in Focus Group Discussion, August 5, 2024
17. Explanation of U-S in Focus Group Discussion, August 5, 2024
18. Explanation of D-N in Focus Group Discussion, August 5, 2024