

Articulated Security Model for the Citizen Satisfaction of the Inhabitants of the Province of Sullana, 2025

María de Lourdes Antón Chunga¹

¹PhD student in Public Management and Governance from the César Vallejo University – Piura, Peru,

^{*}<https://orcid.org/0009-0008-0721-6951>

ABSTRACT

Public safety is a fundamental pillar for the comprehensive development of any society. However, when communities lack safe conditions, devastating impacts are generated that deteriorate the social fabric, paralyse the local economy and erode confidence in democratic institutions, creating a downward spiral that threatens governance and collective well-being. The study aimed to design a coordinated security model to improve citizen satisfaction among the residents of the Province of Sullana by 2025. The research adopted a quantitative approach with a non-experimental descriptive-propositional design. The sample comprised 384 residents selected by simple random sampling from a population of 311,454 inhabitants. The survey technique was used with two questionnaires as instruments: one for citizen security (18 items) and another for citizen satisfaction (16 items), both validated by five experts and with a Cronbach's alpha reliability greater than 0.7. The most representative result revealed that 76.8% of residents perceived a low level of citizen security and 81.5% expressed dissatisfaction with public management. The proposed model articulates five strategic components, taking advantage of S/ 105,709,407 in unspent provincial budget resources, demonstrating full viability without requiring additional funding.

Keywords: public safety, citizen satisfaction, articulated model, public administration.

INTRODUCTION

Public security is essential for the sustainable development of societies, the lack of safe conditions affects social relations and the economy, especially in developing nations, where the challenges of citizen protection and public order are alarming and hinder progress and stability, the relationship between security and citizen satisfaction has generated a growing academic interest in understanding how both factors influence the perception of well-being, this study aligns with SDG 16: Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions, focusing on violence reduction, rule of law, equitable justice, effective institutions and inclusive decisions.

Data from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2023) reveal that Latin America and the Caribbean face the greatest challenges of coexistence, with 33% of the world's murders and only 8% of the population. The region has an average of twenty violent deaths per hundred thousand inhabitants, four times more than the global average (UNODC, 2023). The United Nations Development Programme estimates that crime and violence annually consume 3.5% of regional economic output, resources that could be allocated to education, health, infrastructure and community development, economically disadvantaged communities are the most affected, increasing social disparities and eroding government credibility, which strengthens a spiral of weak institutions (UNDP, 2024).

Studies by the Inter-American Development Bank indicate that recent security strategies have limitations in reducing crime, these approaches focus on punitive responses and the use of force, ignoring the factors that originate criminal behavior. (IDB, 2023). An analysis by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean reveals that citizen satisfaction with protection services depends on the ability of institutions to coordinate efforts between government entities and levels, recent evaluations show that institutional coordination in Peru has a score of only 3.2 out of 10. The dispersion of responsibilities and the lack of operational guidelines limit effective responses to demands for protection and access to justice (ECLAC, 2024).

In Peru, citizen protection challenges are critical and need coordinated interventions from various sectors, the National Institute of Statistics and Informatics reports that 85.7% of those over 15 years of age fear being a victim of crime in the next year, evidencing an environment of unrest that affects the quality of life of millions. It is alarming that only 12.3% of citizens trust security entities, which reveals a crisis of legitimacy and credibility. (INEI, 2024).

The Ombudsman's Office (2024) has investigated the limitations of the system for the protection of citizen rights, its findings show that the lack of coordination between institutions is a key barrier to guaranteeing security, 67% of municipalities lack citizen security plans, vital to coordinate preventive and

control actions. The lack of strategic planning leads to ineffective and reactive actions, with no impact on crime.

The lack of coordination between police forces, municipal surveillance and neighborhood organizations is a critical problem pointed out by the defense entity, these three instances should be coordinated, but they often operate in an independent and contradictory way, replicating actions in some areas and neglecting others, the lack of guidelines, communication platforms and tactical coordination causes ineffective responses to crime, wasting resources and frustrating expectations of citizen protection. Sullana, in the department of Piura, faces intense security challenges, with factors that increase its vulnerability to crime, its proximity to the Ecuadorian border, commercial dynamism, disorganized urban sprawl, and illicit trafficking routes creating a complex context for public security.

The Regional Observatory of Citizen Security of Piura (2024) reports that Sullana has a 42.3% victimization rate, above the 35.8% departmental, which indicates that almost half of its inhabitants have suffered crimes, the high crime rate is focused on property crimes, with also cases of interpersonal violence and gender aggressions. Only 18.5% of residents are satisfied with protective services, reflecting a lack of confidence in responses to insecurity. The Ministry of the Interior has classified Sullana among the 50 provinces with the greatest security problems, supported by criminological indicators, a 28% increase in property crimes in the last year exceeds the national averages, which reflects more criminal activity and changes in operations, with organized groups that use technology and exercise extreme violence. deeply affecting the inhabitants. (MININTER, 2024).

The limited citizen participation in security is an important deficiency recognized by the authorities, since the spaces for neighborhood participation are underutilized and function more as a protocol, in addition, the lack of an integrated scheme that unites governmental, business and community efforts prevents taking advantage of synergies to address insecurity, the 334,000 residents of the province need solutions that the system, fragmented and with limited resources, has not provided, insecurity in Sullana generates serious socioeconomic consequences; markets and businesses face constant threats, increasing prices and reducing competitiveness, families are concerned about the safety of their children, which affects school performance and contributes to educational dropout, perpetuating social vulnerability. In addition, health personnel suffer aggressions, which makes it difficult to retain professionals and affects the quality of care.

Faced with this reality, the study problem arises: How will the design of an articulated security model improve the citizen satisfaction of the inhabitants of the Province of Sullana, 2025?, this study is crucial to analyze citizen security from the perspective of the inhabitants who face this reality and can offer valuable information on their perception and satisfaction.

The study can empower this population and encourage their participation in the implementation of policies that address this reality, this research will benefit the inhabitants affected by security problems and the authorities, who will be able to implement measures to protect the population and improve their management in this difficult situation, the objective of the study was proposed: To design an articulated security model for the citizen satisfaction of the inhabitants of the Province of Sullana in the year 2025 and as specific objectives: (1). To diagnose the level of citizen security of the inhabitants of the Province of Sullana. (2). Identify the points of action that improve the level of citizen satisfaction of the inhabitants of the Province of Sullana; (3). Evaluate the feasibility of budgetary and human resources to obtain results that improve the level of citizen security of the inhabitants of the Province of Sullana.

Mendoza (2010) defines citizen security as a social environment where people live without threats of violence or aggression, this situation should occur in daily life and in known communities. Soto and Távara (2019) define citizen security as the conditions that allow people to exercise their fundamental rights and freedoms with peace of mind, Cadena-Urzúa et al. (2023) define citizen security as the comprehensive protection of fundamental rights, highlighting the importance of equality, solidarity, and equity in opportunities and treatment.

According to the Law, Citizen Security is a comprehensive and coordinated effort led by the State and developed through the participation of various sectors of society. It includes the fight against crime and the prevention of crime, functions of the law and order control system, the prison control system and social reintegration to support community life and eradicate violence, so that, in public spaces, people have freedom and without fear of being confronted by criminals (Official Gazette El Peruano, 2023; Legislative Decree 1618).

Table 1 Summary of the most representative theories of citizen security

Author	Year	Title of the theory	Dimensions	Brief explanation
Herman Goldstein	1979	Problem-oriented policing	1. Identification of the 2. Problem. Analysis. 3. Answer	In fact, it is based on identifying specific citizen security problems and proposing specialized and personalized solutions instead of reacting ex post to specific events.(Mediavilla Lizano, 2004).
George L. Kelling	1982	Broken windows theory	1. Physical disorder 2. Social disorder	In short, the theory holds that disorder in the city can encourage criminality and that intervention in minor crimes can prevent the commission of serious crimes (Ezquerro, 2019).
Lawrence W. Sherman	1998	Evidence-based policing	1. Data collection 2. Analysis 3. Implementation	This argumentative model is based on scientific evidence, which allows the application of police and citizen security strategies seeking to increase the levels of operational efficiency (Vargas-Téllez, 2022).
Robert Sampson	2012	Collective Efficacy	1. Social cohesion 2. Control social informal	A theoretical model based on social cohesion, this model attributes important effects to participation to the increase in combating security (Aguilera, 2012).
David Weisburd	2015	Crime hotspots	1. Spatial concentration of crime 2. Targeted intervention	This intervention seeks to know and identify various geographical areas, in which crime and various social ills succumb, using a series of police strategies that focus on the reduction of criminal activity (J. O. García & Rey, 2020).
David Kennedy	2016	Interruption of group violence	1. Inter-institutional collaboration 2. Focused deterrence 3. Alternatives to violence	Theoretical model focused on the reduction of violence replicated by gangs and criminal groups, in which police forces play a decisive role by offering protection and targeted alternatives (Barreto-Zorza et al., 2018).

Note: Aspects related to the most important theories in the field of citizen security.

These theories address citizen security from various perspectives, allowing to focus on and address problems of crime and insecurity in urban environments, Law 27933 (2023) in Peru evaluates citizen security in three dimensions: a) risk actors: Law 27933 (2023) defines risk actors as individuals involved in local crimes. Murazzo (2020) broadens the definition to include all actors that contribute to citizen security, such as judges, police officers, security guards, and private security companies, b) urban contexts: Law 27933 (2023) defines urban contexts by the characteristics of a territory where criminal acts that threaten the community arise. This concept refers to the difficulties in the city related to disorder, occupation of spaces and criminality, and c) institutional efficiency: Law 27933 (2023) requires the entity to have a security plan and systems to address criminal acts. The law clarifies that these systems can include municipal patrols and citizen participation.

Citizen security is a collaborative process that requires the participation of the entire society to achieve peaceful coexistence, this effort goes beyond the absence of crime and includes social, economic, political and cultural aspects, citizen security is a shared responsibility between government, citizens, communities and the private sector, it seeks to achieve sustainable social peace that allows people to live with dignity and without violence, it includes crime indicators and citizens' perception of security. (Velázquez, 2024). According to Article 5 of Law 27933, the National Council for Citizen Security is the highest authority in the development and supervision of citizen security strategies. This body operates with technical independence (CONASEC, 2023).

According to the National Plan for Citizen Security (2023), there are 6 strategic objectives: (1). Establish the link between the reduction of the growth of the homicide rate, identifying factors that influence it to develop effective strategies. It analyzes the causes of homicides and their relationship with social, economic, and criminological variables. (2). Reduce deaths from traffic accidents. It includes road safety measures, driver and pedestrian education, infrastructure improvements, and traffic enforcement. (3). Protect vulnerable groups, such as women, children, the elderly, and people with disabilities, from violence and discrimination. It develops policies and programs to prevent, detect and punish violence, in addition to supporting victims. (4). Reduce robberies in public spaces such as streets and parks. It includes increasing police presence, improving lighting, and encouraging citizen participation in crime prevention in high-risk areas. (5). Reduce victimization by criminal gangs against individuals and companies. A comprehensive approach is needed to dismantle these gangs, investigate their members and protect victims and witnesses. (6). Improve the coordination and capacity of citizen security institutions at all levels. It requires strengthening inter-institutional cooperation, improving management, and allocating resources appropriately for an effective response to citizen security challenges.

García et al. (2023) highlight that community opinion on public services is key to municipal policies, on the other hand, Petracci (1998) highlights that citizen satisfaction is crucial, as it reflects the effectiveness of governments in serving and attending to the population, various authors have explored citizen satisfaction from various theoretical perspectives. Citizen satisfaction in the public sphere reflects how government services meet the expectations of the population, this approach emphasizes that public entities must adequately meet citizen demands to improve their image, Asensio (2012) points out that citizen satisfaction in the public sector depends on the quality of services, so governments must optimize processes and human resources to offer efficient services, transparent and citizen-centered. In summary, Carrión et al, in emerging sectors, the services available and the perception of the customer vary. This creates challenges in the satisfaction of public services.

Transparency and access to public information are key to citizen satisfaction, according to Transparency International (2019), openness and transparency in public decision-making fosters citizen trust in the system, cohesion between citizens and security authorities is essential to ensure effective services, citizen satisfaction with services is key for researchers and governments to improve public administration, Research shows that good public contact improves user satisfaction. In the aforementioned case, negative opinions are a consequence, not a cause (Cavero et al., 2022).

According to "Wiki Government" by Beth Simone Noveck, the theory of Open Government is based on four key pillars. (1). Transparency ensures citizen access to government information and promotes accountability. (2). Second, citizen participation seeks to involve citizens in decision-making and foster collaboration between government and society. (3). Third, collaboration involves cooperation between governments, public-private partnerships, and civil society organizations to address common challenges. (4). Innovation involves using technologies to improve public services and adapt to social demands. Noveck points out that these dimensions are interconnected and mutually reinforcing, transparency fosters participation and collaboration, while innovation is key to meeting citizen needs and addressing government challenges. These dimensions foster a more open and citizen-centred government.

METHODOLOGY

Due to the characteristics of the research, it was a basic study, quantitative approach, non-experimental design, descriptive-propositional scope, the research was geographically limited to the province of Sullana, Peru; temporarily to the year 2025; population-based to the 311454 inhabitants (National Institute of Statistics and Informatics, 2017), among the inclusion criteria, we have that: must reside in the province of Sullana for at least 12 months, be 18 years of age or older, be able to understand and answer the questions, voluntarily agree to participate in the study, in the exclusion criteria, we have: not have resided in the province of Sullana continuously in the last 12 months, being under 18 years of age, having disabilities that prevent them from understanding or adequately answering the questions, refusing to participate or not providing informed consent, holding public office or having conflicts of interest related to citizen security in the province, for the sample the corresponding formula was used to determine the appropriate sample size in finite populations, resulting in a total of 384 inhabitants who were part of the research, thus guaranteeing an appropriate statistical representativeness of the population under study, simple random sampling is a sample selection method in which each individual of the population has an equal and independent probability of being chosen to be part of the sample, this procedure guarantees representativeness and impartiality in the sampling process, avoiding selection biases and ensuring that

the results obtained can be generalized to the population of interest with a high degree of statistical confidence.

The survey technique was used, whose instrument was represented by an information collection questionnaire, having defined the theoretical model or models for both variables, the instruments were built taking into account the dimensions and indicators described in the theoretical part of the study in order to give relevance and transcendence to both instruments. five specialists in the field of professional careers were summoned so that, through their judgment as experts, they assess both scales, the process of statistical reliability was carried out using Cronbach's alpha coefficient, whose values exceeded the threshold of 0.7, which demonstrated the suitability of these scales for this problematic reality, in the first questionnaire, the traditional Likert scale will be used, where 1 corresponds to: totally disagree and 5 to: strongly agree, on the other hand, in the second questionnaire, an alternative scale will be used, the Likert scale, in which 1 represents: totally dissatisfied and 5: totally satisfied, it should be taken into account that in order to analyze the data of a statistical nature, Microsoft Office Excel tools were used and version 26 of the SPSS software, with the use of these tools it will be possible to elaborate descriptive frequency tables with absolute-relative values and above all the application of statistical correlation tests using Spearman's coefficient.

The ethical principles of this research follow the rules of the César Vallejo University, including confidentiality, data privacy and voluntary participation with informed consent. In addition, the APA Standards seventh edition for writing will be strictly applied.

RESULTS

A security model was designed to satisfy the citizens of Sullana by 2025.

Board 1 Structure of the MASC Model

Component	Problem identified	Proposed intervention	Assigned resources	Indicators of success
Articulated governance	72.9% perceive low decentralized management (Deficient)	Joint Executing Unit between 9 municipalities + PNP + GORE	15% budget (S/ 59.9 million)	90% effective inter-institutional coordination
Proactive transparency	86.5% dissatisfaction with transparency	Digital portal with real-time statistics + Participatory budgeting	10% budget (S/ 39.9 million)	50% of citizens access information monthly
Technological innovation	81.5% dissatisfaction with innovation	Command Center + 200 AI cameras + Citizen App	35% budget (S/ 139.9 million)	30% reduction response time
Comprehensive prevention	82.0% perceive criminal gangs as low level (Deficient)	Socio-economic programmes + Recovery of public spaces	25% budget (S/ 99.9 million)	25% reduction in crime in intervened areas
Specialized response	79.9% perceive homicides as low level (Deficient)	Specialized Prosecutor's Offices + Flagrante delicto courts + Follow-up cases	15% budget (S/ 59.9 million)	40% increase in clarified cases

Total, Budget: S/ 399,703,935 (resources already available according to budget analysis)

Rationale of the Model

The diagnosis is based on findings of 384 residents of Sullana through validated instruments, the results show a crisis in citizen security, with 76.8% perceiving low security and 81.5% dissatisfaction. Institutional disarticulation is worsening, with 72.9% describing decentralized management as deficient.

Component 1. The inefficiency is due to institutional fragmentation between the nine municipalities of Sullana, the Regional Government and the National Police. The budget analysis showed that Sullana has

a budget of S/ 399,703,935, but only executes 73.6%, leaving S/ 105,709,407 unused. The 26.4% gap shows a lack of coordination between governments. The model suggests forming a Joint Executing Unit to coordinate resources. Miguel Checa achieved 82.5% of budget execution with S/ 1,896,321 in personnel, demonstrating that efficiency depends on management, not resources.

Component 2. Proactive Transparency: Citizen dissatisfaction with transparency reached 86.5%, with 37.8% very dissatisfied with the frequency of updating information. The lack of transparency generates mistrust and limits citizen participation. Creating a proactive transparency portal addresses this need. The proposal includes automatic publication of crime statistics, real-time budget monitoring and police reports. This intervention seeks to improve the negative perception, since 49.0% of citizens are dissatisfied with obtaining government information.

Component 3. The 81.5% dissatisfaction with technological innovation includes 34.9% of very dissatisfied with new ideas and projects. The lack of technological modernization contrasts with the success of Medellín, which reduced homicides from 370 to less than 20 per 100,000 inhabitants with technological innovations. The proposed Command Center uses S/ 95,831,605 already invested, evidencing Sullana's capacity to manage complex technological projects. The installation of 200 cameras with predictive analytics addresses the perception that the current number of cameras is insufficient, with 49.2% considering it inadequate.

Component 4. Comprehensive Prevention: 82.0% of the population considers criminal gang crime to be low. 83.3% of those surveyed disagree about the effectiveness of dismantling criminal gangs. 82.9% know victims of criminal gangs in their environment. Prevention programs address the structural causes. Lancones allocated 61.9% of its budget (S/ 12,784,421) to investments, and Marcavelica 59.9% (S/ 18,931,247), which shows capacity for large-scale preventive programs.

Component 5. 79.9% of the population perceives homicides as low, while only 3.1% believe that they are decreasing. Impunity is aggravated, since 81.3% do not trust the resolution of homicides by the authorities. The creation of prosecutors' offices and specialized courts responds to the crisis of justice. The proposal includes a digital system to follow cases from complaint to sentence, addressing the perception of institutional abandonment.

Financial and Operational Viability

The budget analysis showed financial viability. Sullana has the second largest provincial budget with S/ 399,703,935, only behind Piura with S/ 673,170,802. Current expenditure allocates S/ 71,847,234 to personnel and social obligations (24.4% of the budget), compared to 54.6% of the Regional Government, which reflects a greater orientation towards investment. The budget distribution shows varied capacities that the model uses. Marcavelica leads with S/ 42.8 million, followed by Querecotillo with S/ 29.9 million and Lancones with S/ 26.6 million. It allows for gradual deployment based on local capabilities.

Implementation Time Frame:

The implementation consists of four six-month phases, based on current budget experience. Phase I (Articulation) shows that 73.6% of current execution indicates basic administrative capacity. Phase II is based on S/ 95,831,605 already invested in non-financial assets, demonstrating experience in projects. Phases III and IV are based on best practices, such as Miguel Checa's efficiency (82.5%) and Marcavelica's investment capacity (S/ 18,931,247 in assets).

Sustainability of the Model

Sustainability is based on three pillars. The model optimizes resources without increasing the budget, turning 26.4% of inefficiency into strategic investment. Formalization by municipal ordinances guarantees continuity despite political changes, the transformation of consultative spaces into decision-making spaces encourages citizen appropriation. The model offers an evidence-based response to the security crisis in Sullana, using institutional resources and capacities to transform the perception and reality of citizen security.

With respect to the first specific objective, a diagnosis of the level of citizen security of the inhabitants of the Province of Sullana was carried out.

Board 2 Evaluation of the Level of Citizen Security with Public Management

Dimension	Item	Response Scale									
		1Strongly disagree		2Disagree		3Neither agree nor disagree		4Agree		5Totally agree	
		f	%	f	%	f	%	f	%	f	%
Homicide	Q1. Homicide rate has decreased significantly	115	29.9%	192	50.0%	61	15.9%	12	3.1%	4	1.0%
	Q2. Homicide cases are effectively solved	127	33.1%	185	48.2%	58	15.1%	10	2.6%	4	1.0%
	Q3. Prevention programs are sufficient	119	31.0%	188	49.0%	62	16.1%	11	2.9%	4	1.0%
Homicide subtotal		361	31.3%	565	49.0%	181	15.7%	33	2.9%	12	1.0%
Fatalities traffic accidents	Q4. Decrease in deaths due to accidents	108	28.1%	181	47.1%	72	18.8%	18	4.7%	5	1.3%
	Q5. Increased road safety education campaigns	112	29.2%	178	46.4%	70	18.2%	19	4.9%	5	1.3%
	Q6. Road infrastructure improvements	105	27.3%	183	47.7%	73	19.0%	17	4.4%	6	1.6%
Subtotal deaths - traffic accidents		325	28.2%	542	47.0%	215	18.7%	54	4.7%	16	1.4%
Violence vulnerable groups	Q7. Complaint rate reflects reality	110	28.6%	180	46.9%	68	17.7%	20	5.2%	6	1.6%
	Q8. Prevention programs are effective	114	29.7%	177	46.1%	69	18.0%	18	4.7%	6	1.6%
	Q9. Solved cases indicate effectiveness of the system	108	28.1%	182	47.4%	71	18.5%	17	4.4%	6	1.6%
Subtotal violence - vulnerable groups		332	28.8%	539	46.8%	208	18.1%	55	4.8%	18	1.6%
Robberies thefts	Q10. Feels safe in public spaces	122	31.8%	186	48.4%	60	15.6%	12	3.1%	4	1.0%
	Q11. Surveillance cameras are sufficient	118	30.7%	189	49.2%	61	15.9%	11	2.9%	5	1.3%
	Q12. Willingness to	42	10.9%	95	24.7%	108	28.1%	98	25.5%	41	10.7%

		participate in prevention									
Robberies - Thefts subtotal		282	24.5%	470	40.8%	229	19.9%	121	10.5%	50	4.3%
Crime criminal gangs	P13. Effective work in dismantling bands	130	33.9%	190	49.5%	52	13.5%	9	2.3%	3	0.8%
	P14. Meet victims of criminal gangs	125	32.6%	193	50.3%	53	13.8%	10	2.6%	3	0.8%
	P15. Resolved cases reflect real commitment	128	33.3%	191	49.7%	51	13.3%	10	2.6%	4	1.0%
Subtotal crime - criminal gangs		383	33.2%	574	49.8%	156	13.5%	29	2.5%	10	0.9%
Decentralized management	P16. Improvement in inter-institutional coordination	106	27.6%	176	45.8%	78	20.3%	19	4.9%	5	1.3%
	P17. Transparent and efficient quoting	111	28.9%	174	45.3%	75	19.5%	18	4.7%	6	1.6%
	P18. Satisfaction with management of authorities	109	28.4%	175	45.6%	76	19.8%	19	4.9%	5	1.3%
Subtotal management	decentralized	326	28.3%	525	45.6%	229	19.9%	56	4.9%	16	1.4%
Total general (18 items)		2009	29.1%	3215	46.5%	1218	17.6%	348	5.0%	122	1.8%

Note. f = absolute frequency; % = percentage. The response scale ranges from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 5 (Strongly agree).

The homicide dimension showed a negative perception in Sullana. In item P1 on homicide reduction, 29.9% strongly disagreed and 50.0% disagreed, while only 3.1% agreed. The trend was accentuated in item P2 on homicide resolution: 33.1% in total disagreement, 48.2% in disagreement and only 2.6% in favor. Item P3 on the adequacy of prevention programs indicated that 31% strongly disagreed and 49% disagreed. The results showed that the population sees an institutional incapacity in the face of homicides, coinciding with the Provincial Action Plan for Citizen Security of Sullana 2024-2027, which identifies contract killings as a priority crime.

Dimension Fatalities - Traffic Accidents: Item P4 revealed that 28.1% strongly disagreed and 47.1% disagreed about the decrease in fatalities, with only 4.7% agreeing. Item P5 on road safety education campaigns showed 29.2% total disagreement and 46.4% disagreement. Item P6 on road infrastructure improvements was critical, with 27.3% strongly disagreeing and 47.7% disagreeing; only 4.4% noticed improvements. The lack of investment in road infrastructure, with only 20.4% of the municipal budget allocated to it, contributed to these negative perceptions.

Violence Dimension - Vulnerable Groups: The results reveal an alarming violence against vulnerable groups. Item P7 showed that 28.6% strongly disagreed and 46.9% disagreed that the complaints reflect reality. Item P8 on program effectiveness had 29.7% total disagreement and 46.1% disagreement. Item P9 on resolved cases had 28.1% total disagreement and 47.4% disagreement. The data indicated a notable underreporting of cases and a perception of impunity, coinciding with CORESEC Piura, which identified family violence as a priority problem.

Robbery – Theft Dimension: In P10 on public safety, 31.8% strongly disagreed and 48.4% disagreed with feeling safe. Item P11 revealed that 30.7% strongly disagreed and 49.2% disagreed regarding the adequacy of surveillance cameras. Item P12 showed a different pattern: 10.9% opposed participating in prevention programs, while 25.5% agreed and 10.7% strongly agreed, indicating greater citizen willingness to get involved.

Delinquency - Criminal Gangs: This dimension showed the most alarming results of the study. Item P13 showed that 33.9% strongly disagreed and 49.5% disagreed on the dismantling of gangs, with only 2.3% in favor. Item P14 showed that 32.6% strongly disagreed and 50.3% disagreed with not knowing victims, indicating high victimization. Item P15 showed 33.3% total disagreement and 49.7% disagreement. The results confirmed the presence of organized crime in Sullana, aligning with MININTER reports on extortion and gangs as the main threats.

In the Decentralized Management Dimension, 27.6% strongly disagreed and 45.8% disagreed with improvements in P16 on inter-institutional coordination. Item P17 on budget transparency had 28.9% total disagreement and 45.3% disagreement. Item P18 showed 28.4% total disagreement and 45.6% disagreement in satisfaction with management. The institutional disarticulation is reflected in the budget analysis that showed an execution of 73.6% in Sullana, leaving S/ 105.7 million unused for citizen security.

Board 3 Diagnosis of Citizen Security - Sullana

Dimension	Low Level		Intermediate level		High Level		Diagnosis
	f(x)	f(%)	f(x)	f(%)	f(x)	f(%)	
Homicide	307	79.9	65	16.9	12	3.1	Low
Fatalities - Traffic accidents	284	74.0	77	20.1	23	6.0	Low
Violence - Vulnerable groups	288	75.0	73	19.0	23	6.0	Low
Robberies - Thefts	300	78.1	65	16.9	19	4.9	Low
Crime - Criminal gangs	315	82.0	58	15.1	11	2.9	Low
Decentralized management	280	72.9	81	21.1	23	6.0	Low
Citizen Security	295	76.8	70	18.2	19	4.9	Low

Table 3 shows a critical diagnosis of citizen security in all the dimensions evaluated. 76.8% of the inhabitants of Sullana rated citizen security as low, 18.2% as medium and 4.9% as high.

The dimension of Crime – Criminal Gangs showed an alarming 82.0% of the population at a low level. Negative perception is based on citizens' direct experience with crime. Most of the respondents knew victims of criminal gangs, evidencing the normalization of violence in the province. The infiltration of organized crime and the alleged collusion between authorities and criminals explain these results. Homicides were the second most critical dimension with 79.9% at a low level. The negative result was due to the inability of the justice system to adequately prosecute these crimes, creating a sense of impunity and increasing the perception of insecurity. The lack of preventive programs led to the perception of institutional abandonment in the face of lethal violence. Contract killings, recognized in official planning as a criminal priority, have become a daily threat that is not adequately addressed by the authorities.

The dimension of Robberies - Thefts had a low level of 78.1%, based on experiences of insecurity. Citizens moved through unsafe and dark public spaces, creating 'spaces of fear' according to criminology. The lack of surveillance cameras and scarce municipal presence fostered an environment of crime, making citizens feel vulnerable.

Violence against Vulnerable Groups is 75.0% at a low level, indicating a serious structural problem. The negative result was due to the normalization of domestic violence, distrust in the reporting system and the revictimization of victims. There was citizen awareness of the underreporting of cases, since victims preferred silence in the face of a judicial system perceived as ineffective.

Deaths due to traffic accidents had 74.0% at a low level. The negative perception is due to the deterioration of road infrastructure, the lack of adequate signage and the absence of road safety education campaigns. On a daily basis, citizens saw the poor condition of streets and avenues, with potholes, lack of demarcation, broken traffic lights and dangerous crossings. Municipal investment in infrastructure was insufficient, reaching only 20.4% of the budget.

Decentralized Management had a low level of 72.9%. The result is explained by the evident fragmentation among security institutions. Citizens noticed that the National Police and local authorities were acting uncoordinatedly, duplicating efforts in some areas and neglecting others. The lack of an integrated information system and coordination protocols maintained this disarticulation.

The security diagnosis in Sullana showed that 76.8% of the population feels low security. The results show the failure of security policies, with three out of four citizens without state protection. The perception of insecurity reflects failures in crime control and the loss of confidence in the institutions that guarantee public order.

According to specific objective two, the points of action that improve the level of citizen satisfaction of the inhabitants of the Province of Sullana were identified.

Board 4 Evaluation of the Level of Citizen Satisfaction with Management

Dimen sion	ITEM	Response Scale									
		1Very dissatisfied		2Dissatisf ied		3Neither satisfied dissatisfied		4Satisfied nor		5Very satisfie d	
		f	%	f	%	f	%	f	%	f	%
Transp arency	P19. Ease of obtaining information on security measures	142	37.0	188	49.0	48	12.5	5	1.3	1	0.3
	P20. Response received when requesting information	138	35.9	191	49.7	50	13.0	4	1.0	1	0.3
	P21. Information Update Frequency	145	37.8	185	48.2	49	12.8	4	1.0	1	0.3
	P22. Local Government Transparency	140	36.5	189	49.2	50	13.0	4	1.0	1	0.3
Subtotal transparency		565	36.8	753	49.0	197	12.8	17	1.1	4	0.3
Citizen particip ation	P23. Opportunities to participate in decisions	125	32.6	182	47.4	72	18.8	4	1.0	1	0.3

Dimension	ITEM	Response Scale									
		1Very dissatisfied		2Dissatisfied		3Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied		4Satisfied		5Very satisfied	
		f	%	f	%	f	%	f	%	f	%
	P24. Level of citizen participation	128	33.3	178	46.4	73	19.0	4	1.0	1	0.3
	P25. Influence of citizen opinions	130	33.9	176	45.8	73	19.0	4	1.0	1	0.3
	P26. Diversity of participants	122	31.8	179	46.6	78	20.3	4	1.0	1	0.3
Subtotal citizen participation		505	32.9	715	46.5	296	19.3	16	1.0	4	0.3
Collaboration	P27. Joint work between authorities	132	34.4	180	46.9	67	17.4	4	1.0	1	0.3
	P28. Government-business partnerships	135	35.2	177	46.1	67	17.4	4	1.0	1	0.3
	P29. Participation of social organizations	128	33.3	181	47.1	70	18.2	4	1.0	1	0.3
	P30. General Joint Work	130	33.9	179	46.6	70	18.2	4	1.0	1	0.3
Subtotal collaboration		525	34.2	717	46.7	274	17.8	16	1.0	4	0.3
Innovation	P31. Use of technologies	136	35.4	181	47.1	62	16.1	4	1.0	1	0.3
	P32. New ideas and projects	134	34.9	183	47.7	62	16.1	4	1.0	1	0.3
	P33. Policy adaptability	132	34.4	184	47.9	63	16.4	4	1.0	1	0.3
	P34. Innovative services	135	35.2	182	47.4	62	16.1	4	1.0	1	0.3
Subtotal innovation		537	34.9	730	47.5	249	16.2	16	1.0	4	0.3
Total general (16 items)		2,132	34.7	2,915	47.5	1,016	16.5	65	1.1	16	0.3

Note. f = absolute frequency; % = percentage. The response scale ranges from 1 (Very dissatisfied) to 5 (Very satisfied).

The results in transparency were very negative. Item P19 revealed that 37% were very dissatisfied and 49% dissatisfied, with only 1.3% satisfied. The P20 item on responses to requests had 35.9% very dissatisfied and 49.7% dissatisfied. Item P21 showed 37.8% very dissatisfied and 48.2% dissatisfied. Item P22 on government transparency reported 36.5% of very dissatisfied and 49.2% of dissatisfied. The

results show a violation of Noveck's (2009) principle of open government, where transparency is key to institutional legitimacy.

Item P23 shows 32.6% very dissatisfied and 47.4% dissatisfied. The P24 item revealed 33.3% very dissatisfied and 46.4% dissatisfied. Item P25 on the influence of citizen opinions is of concern, with 33.9% very dissatisfied and 45.8% dissatisfied. Item P26 on diversity showed 31.8% very dissatisfied and 46.6% dissatisfied. The lack of participation mechanisms contradicted Law No. 27933, which required the participation of civil society.

Item P27 revealed that 34.4% of respondents were very dissatisfied and 46.9% dissatisfied with the work between authorities. Item P28 on government-business collaborations showed 35.2% very dissatisfied and 46.1% dissatisfied. Item P29 showed 33.3% very dissatisfied and 47.1% dissatisfied in participation of social organizations. Item P30 revealed 33.9% very dissatisfied and 46.6% dissatisfied.

This dimension showed the greatest dissatisfaction. Item P31 indicated that 35.4% were very dissatisfied and 47.1% were dissatisfied with the use of technologies. Item P32 showed 34.9% very dissatisfied and 47.7% dissatisfied. Item P33 on policy adaptability had 34.4% of very dissatisfied and 47.9% of dissatisfied. Item P34 on innovative services had 35.2% of very dissatisfied and 47.4% of dissatisfied. The lack of technological modernization in security contrasted with the success of Medellín, which reduced its homicide rate from 370 to less than 20 per 100,000 inhabitants thanks to innovative strategies.

Board 5 Diagnosis of Satisfaction – Identification of Action Points

Dimension	Low Level		Intermediate level		High Level		Diagnosis
	f	%	f	%	f	%	
Transparency	332	86.5	52	13.5	0	0.0	Low
Citizen participation	300	78.1	84	21.9	0	0.0	Low
Collaboration	307	79.9	76	19.8	1	0.3	Low
Innovation	313	81.5	70	18.2	1	0.3	Low
Citizen Satisfaction	313	81.5	71	18.5	0	0.0	Low

Note. Satisfaction levels were classified according to the average number of responses on the Likert scale: Low = 1.00-2.33 (very dissatisfied to dissatisfied), Medium = 2.34-3.66 (neither satisfied nor dissatisfied), High = 3.67-5.00 (satisfied to very satisfied). f = absolute frequency; % = percentage.

First Action Point: Transparency, with 86.5% of the population at low level and 0% at high level, is the most critical and urgent aspect. The result showed the urgent need to reform access to public information. Implement a proactive transparency system that publishes real-time information on citizen security, including crime statistics, responsible budgets, CODISEC minutes, and reports on police and municipal actions. The lack of satisfied citizens suggests that even a small improvement would have an immediate positive impact.

Second Action Point: The Innovation dimension, with 81.5% at the low level and 0.3% at the high level, is the second priority. The diagnosis urged to modernize the citizen security management system with technology. A digital transformation program is needed that includes a video surveillance system with predictive analysis, an app for georeferenced complaints, a citizen participation platform, and an integrated command center.

Third Action Point: Collaboration is low (79.9%) and only 0.3% is high; it is proposed to create formal mechanisms for inter-institutional articulation. The diagnosis indicated the need to create a joint citizen security unit with the participation of the National Police, Regional Government and municipalities. It would include signing agreements with the private sector to co-finance security projects and integrating social organizations in planning and evaluation.

Fourth Action Point: With 78.1% at low level and 0% at high, Citizen Participation needs a total restructuring. It was proposed to transform consultative spaces into decision-making ones, giving binding power to citizen decisions on security. This could include participatory budgeting for citizen security projects, binding consultations for strategic decisions, and neighborhood committees with resources for preventive actions.

Strategic Synthesis of Action Points

81.5% of the population has low citizen satisfaction, with no high-satisfaction respondents, indicating the need for comprehensive intervention. The action points needed a systemic approach that integrated transparency, innovation, collaboration and participation.

Finally, in specific objective 3, the feasibility of budgetary and human resources was evaluated to obtain results that improve the level of citizen security of the inhabitants of the Province of Sullana.

The budget evaluation showed that Sullana had significant but underutilized financial resources. The analysis of the provincial budget revealed a PIM of S/ 399,703,935, with an execution of S/ 293,994,528, which is equivalent to 73.6%, leaving S/ 105,709,407 unused.

Available Financial Resources: The consolidated budget of the province showed the capacity to improve citizen security. The Provincial Municipality of Sullana managed S/ 100,925,719, executing S/ 74,436,655, while the eight districts administered S/ 298,778,216. This distribution showed resources available at various levels of local government.

The analysis of the expenditure showed key aspects for feasibility. Of the provincial budget, S/ 71,847,234 were used for personnel, S/ 84,527,456 for goods and services, and S/ 95,831,605 for non-financial assets. The distribution showed that the Regional Government assigned S/ 1,856,408,026 (54.6%) to personnel, while Sullana had a more balanced structure focused on investment.

Optimization Opportunities: The 26.4% gap offers S/ 105.7 million for citizen security. The districts with the best execution were Miguel Checa (82.5%, S/ 13,846,372 of S/ 16,775,531) and Salitral (81.0%, S/ 11,120,335 of S/ 13,734,090).

Marcavelica had the largest budget with a PIM of S/ 42,834,754 and an execution of S/ 31,573,195, while Querecotillo had a PIM of S/ 29,877,649 and executed S/ 20,331,477. Lancones presented a PIM of S/ 26,610,039 and executed S/ 20,665.46, allocating S/ 12,784,421 to non-financial assets, 61.9% of its budget.

Interprovincial Comparison and Positioning. Sullana was second in the provincial budget with S/ 399,703,935, surpassed only by Piura with S/ 673,170,802. Sullana, with 73.6%, was surpassed by Piura, which reached 80.4% and S/ 541,429,045. Talara executed 78.0% (S/ 191,028,755 of S/ 244,907,379) and Sechura 77.3% (S/ 209,142,826 of S/ 270,430,473).

Human Resources Feasibility Analysis

Expenditure on personnel showed large differences between districts. The Municipality of Sullana spent S/ 28,891,653 on personnel, while Miguel Checa only used S/ 1,896,321, achieving 82.5% of budget execution with less spending. Ignacio Escudero allocated S/ 3,471,638, Lancones S/ 2,551,653, Marcavelica S/ 5,044,825, Querecotillo S/ 3,677,086 and Salitral S/ 2,312,777. Bellavista reported a PIM of S/ 10,976,321 and an execution of S/ 9,361,280, without expense details.

Investments in projects varied between districts. Marcavelica led with S/ 18.9 million in non-financial assets, followed by Lancones with S/ 12.8 million and Querecotillo with S/ 12.2 million. The Provincial Municipality invested S/ 15,196,025.

In view of this information, the evaluation determined full financial feasibility based on the following specific data:

(1). Unexecuted resources: S/ 105,709,407 of the difference between PIM (S/ 399,703,935) and accrued (S/ 293,994,528) in Sullana, (2). Current investment: S/ 95,831,605 in non-financial assets, evidencing project management capacity, (3). Margin in personnel expenses: S/ 71,847,234 of S/ 293,994,528 (24.4%) was for personnel and obligations, compared to 54.6% of the Regional Government.

Human Resources Viability

The feasibility of human resources was based on concrete budgetary evidence: Differentiated efficiency: Miguel Checa with only S/ 1,896,321 in personnel (11.3% of its total budget) achieved 82.5% of execution.

Proven investment capacity: Districts such as Lancones (61.9% in investments) and Marcavelica (59.9% in investments) demonstrated orientation towards development projects.

Consolidated human resources: The nine municipalities totaled S/ 71,847,234 in personnel and social obligations, a sufficient base to implement an articulated security model.

The budgetary and human resources viability to implement the citizen security model is confirmed. With an annual budget of S/ 399,703,935, of which S/ 105,709,407 are not executed and S/ 71,847,234

(24.4%) are allocated to personnel, Sullana can transform its citizen security with better management of resources without the need for more funds.

DISCUSSION

The research revealed a serious security situation in Sullana, with 76.8% of residents feeling low security and 81.5% citizen dissatisfaction. These results partially coincide with previous studies in Latin American contexts, but have particularities that require specific analysis.

Guerra's (2023) research in Iquitos found a strong positive correlation between citizen security and population satisfaction (Spearman's $Rho = 0.777$), indicating that improvements in security would increase satisfaction. The results in Sullana showed greater dissatisfaction than that of Guerra, possibly due to contextual differences between provinces. Iquitos has 249,275 adults in a consolidated metropolitan area, while Sullana faces challenges due to its border location and transnational criminal organizations.

Transparency was considered the most critical, with 86.5% of the population evaluating it as low, which contrasts with the open government principles of Noveck (2009). The lack of transparency was evidenced in the difficult access to information on security (37.0% very dissatisfied), the poor response to citizen requests (35.9% very dissatisfied) and the irregular updating of public data (37.8% very dissatisfied). These findings indicate that Sullana faces a deeper crisis of institutional legitimacy than other jurisdictions in the region.

Comparative analysis with the Medellín experience, according to Vásquez et al. It is relevant to contextualize these results. The reduction of the homicide rate in Medellín from 370 to less than 20 was achieved through technological strategies and institutional coordination. Sullana showed an 81.5% citizen dissatisfaction in technological innovation, revealing a critical gap that affects the institutional response. The lack of integrated video surveillance and citizen platforms contributes to the high perception of insecurity.

Delinquency and criminal gangs showed an alarming 82.0% of the population at a low level, exceeding the critical levels of Cadena-Urzuá et al. (2023) in communes of the Metropolitan Region of Chile. The Chilean findings link poverty, population density, and crime, in line with Sullana. The case of Sullana stands out for the infiltration of transnational organised crime, not addressed in previous studies, which explains the perception of institutional abandonment.

The low perception of homicides (79.9%) shows a structural problem in the justice system beyond municipal capacities. Francia (2023) found a weak positive correlation between security and citizen satisfaction in Comas, related to public policies. Sullana showed a notable disconnect between institutional actions and citizen expectations, with only 3.1% of the inhabitants seeing the reduction in homicides as effective. This disparity indicates that the strategies of Metropolitan Lima are not transferable to provincial contexts with different characteristics.

Valdés' study. (2022) identified domestic violence, drug trafficking, and media influence as key factors of insecurity in Sullana. 75.0% negatively perceive violence against vulnerable groups, similar to the underreporting and revictimization pointed out by Valdés. The convergence of results in Latin America indicates structural patterns of violence that require coordinated multisectoral approaches.

Berti et al. investigated. In Ecuador, the right to citizen security is based on constitutional protections that require decentralized emergency plans. In Sullana, 72.9% of the population perceives decentralized management as deficient, which shows the failure of inter-institutional coordination mechanisms in Peru. The budget underexecution of 26.4% shows that S/ 105,709,407 remained unused, indicating that the problem is the lack of management, not the scarcity of resources.

The budget analysis showed paradoxes that contrast with successful international cases. The Inter-American Development Bank (2024) points out that Latin American countries with more investment in security reduce crime, but Sullana, despite having S/ 399,703,935, faces high levels of perceived insecurity. The contradiction is due to the inefficient distribution of resources, with only 20.4% of the municipal budget allocated to investments.

The results of citizen participation (78.1% low) contradict Tejeda and Palafox (2021) in Sonora, where neighborhood participation increased the perception of insecurity. In Sullana, low citizen participation is related to high levels of insecurity, indicating that the lack of participatory spaces feeds institutional distrust and social deterioration. The methodological difference shows that citizen participation needs specific designs for sociocultural contexts.

Inter-institutional collaboration had a 79.9% negative perception, in contrast to successful experiences documented internationally. The case of Medellín, cited by Vásquez et al. (2023) showed that collaboration between local government, security forces, and civil society is key to reducing crime. The lack of coordination in Sullana could explain the high insecurity, despite having more resources than other successful jurisdictions.

The diagnosis of citizen satisfaction showed that no respondent reached a high level in the dimensions evaluated, exceeding the severity of cases in the regional scientific literature. Francia (2023) in Comas and Guerra (2023) in Iquitos reported high satisfaction, although a minority, indicating that in complex urban contexts there are those who recognize institutional advances. The lack of positive perceptions in Sullana indicates a crisis of institutional legitimacy, reflecting a 'state failure' in the provision of public goods.

Comparing with successful international experiences shows gaps in the implementation of citizen security strategies. SDG 16 sets targets to reduce violence, promote the rule of law and build effective institutions. The results in Sullana show a notable departure from international standards, with negative perception rates that are double the regional averages.

The research found opportunities for improvement by optimizing resources. The analysis showed that Miguel Checa executed 82.5% of the budget with 11.3% in personnel expenses, while Marcavelica reached 59.9% in investments. The differences in experiences in the same province show that there are replicable institutional capacities, challenging the idea of general structural incapacity.

Findings on citizen willingness to participate in prevention programs showed divergent patterns. 35.4% showed willingness to participate in crime prevention, but the dimensions of formal participation show great dissatisfaction. This contradiction indicates that there is social capital without effective institutional channels, which represents a challenge and an opportunity for participatory public policies.

Evidence shows that citizen security in Sullana is multidimensional and requires a comprehensive approach. The combination of institutional disarticulation, technological deficit, information opacity and low citizen participation creates a scenario that goes beyond unisectoral interventions. This complexity aligns with UNDP's human security frameworks, which highlight multidimensional approaches to the structural causes of insecurity.

CONCLUSIONS

The implementation of the Articulated Model of Citizen Security (MASC) in Sullana is an effective response to the crisis, with 76.8% of the population feeling low security and 81.5% dissatisfied. The proposed model includes five interdependent components to address the structural deficiencies detected: governance for institutional fragmentation (72.9% of negative perception), transparency for access to information (86.5% of dissatisfaction), technological innovation for modernization (81.5%), comprehensive prevention against criminal gangs (82.0% of ineffectiveness) and specialized response to homicides (79.9% of deficiency). The viability of the model depends on S/ 105,709,407 available in the provincial budget, evidencing that the problem is operational and not financial. Successful examples such as Miguel Checa, with 82.5% of budget execution and only 11.3% in personnel expenses, demonstrate that transformation is possible with efficient management and inter-institutional coordination.

The security diagnosis in Sullana reveals that 76.8% of the inhabitants consider it low, highlighting a negative perception of 82.0% about criminal gangs, 79.9% in homicides and 78.1% in robberies. The negative perception is due to several factors: the influence of organized crime along the border, the normalization of violence (82.9% know of victims), impunity (only 2.6% see homicide resolution as effective), and insecurity in public spaces (80.2% do not feel safe). 72.9% of the population considers decentralized management deficient, evidencing the lack of coordination between the Police, the Regional Government and the municipalities, which act in a fragmented manner and duplicate efforts, while the lack of integrated protocols and information systems perpetuates ineffective responses to growing crime.

The action points to improve citizen satisfaction highlight transparency as a priority, with 86.5% of dissatisfaction and no satisfied respondents, which indicates a crisis of institutional legitimacy that requires reforming access to information through the automatic publication of georeferenced crime statistics and budgets with real-time monitoring. Innovation is key, with 81.5% dissatisfaction. A complete digital transformation is required with intelligent video surveillance, apps for complaints and digital platforms, since 79.9% see the current cameras as inadequate. With 79.9% at a low level, inter-institutional collaboration needs joint executing units that include all security actors to overcome the current fragmentation. The 78.1% of dissatisfaction in citizen participation requires transforming

consultative spaces into decision-making bodies with binding power, allocating a specific budget for security and creating neighborhood committees with resources. 36.2% are willing to participate in preventive programs, but lack effective channels.

The feasibility evaluation confirmed the implementation of the model with a provincial budget of S/ 399,703,935, freeing up S/ 105,709,407 for immediate reassignment. The comparative analysis showed that Miguel Checa has an efficiency of 82.5% with only S/ 1,896,321 in personnel, while the Provincial Municipality spends S/ 28,891,653 less effectively, indicating that the problem is inefficient management, not lack of resources. The installed investment reaches S/ 95,831,605 in non-financial assets, with Marcavelica allocating 59.9% and Lancones 61.9% to investments, demonstrating skill in managing complex projects. The provincial spending structure, with 24.4% for personnel compared to 54.6% for the Regional Government, allows resources to be reallocated to operations without affecting basic functions, taking advantage of the capacities of each municipality to implement a gradual and complementary model.

BIBLIOGRAPHIC REFERENCES

1. Aguilar-Barceló, J. G., López-Leyva, S., & Mejía-Ramírez, M. (2023). Corruption, public insecurity and subjective well-being in Mexico. *Latin American Profiles*,
2. Aguilera, A. (2012). Collective Efficacy as a Strategy for Social Control of Neighborhood Space: Evidence from Cuernavaca, Mexico. *INVI Magazine*, 27(74), Article 74. Alcántara M. del R., & Argomedo Valiente, D. D. (2024). Multisectoral Safe Neighborhood Strategy: insecurity, crime and violence in Huacho, Peru. *Status &*
3. Arias Gonzáles, J. L. (2021). Research design and methodology. *Enfoque Consulting EIRL*. <https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.5034967>
4. Avila, F. (2018). Characterization of people in relation to the perception of security and citizen coexistence, through a multivariate analysis. <https://repository.libertadores.edu.co/handle/11371/2078>
5. Inter-American Development Bank, (2024). Citizen Security in Latin America and the Caribbean. IDB. <https://www.iadb.org/es/noticias/seguridad-ciudadana-en-latino-america-y-el-caribe>
6. Inter-American Development Bank. (2023). Citizen Security in Latin America: Towards an Integrated Intervention Model. IDB Publications. <https://doi.org/10.18235/0004892>
7. Barreto-Zorza, Y., Enriquez-Guerrero, C., Córdoba-Sastoque, A. M., Rincón-García,
8. Berti, L. C., Díaz, Y. C. O., & Pérez, P. V. V. (2021). Citizen security based on ecuadorian legal regulations: Case of parroquia alpachaca, cantón ibarra. *Universidad y Sociedad*, 13(S2), 338-346. Scopus.
9. Bisquerra, R. (1989). *Methods of research Educational: Practical guide*.
10. Bonilla D., & Castillo, S. V. (2016). Insecurity and neighborhood protection mechanisms in urban Peru. *URVIO. Latin American Journal of Security Studies*, 0(19), 37-52. <https://doi.org/10.17141/urvio.19.2016.2401>
11. Bravo, C. (2021). Citizen Security and its Relationship with Citizen Satisfaction in the District of José Leonardo Ortiz. *Institutional Repository - UCV*. <https://repositorio.ucv.edu.pe/handle/20.500.12692/69439>
12. Cadena-Urzúa, P., Iftimi, A., & Montes-Suay, F. (2023). Citizen security as a fundamental element for human development: Analysis crimes in Chile using a spatiotemporal logistic model. *Iberoamerican Journal of Development Studies*, 12(1), 30-49. Scopus. https://doi.org/10.26754/ojs_ried/ijds.699
13. Capron, G. (2021). Security, mistrust and the symbolic dimension of segregation in gated communities. *EURE (Santiago)*, 47(142), 121-137. <https://doi.org/10.7764/eure.47.142.06>
14. Carrillo, M. S. (2018, November 23). Piura is the second most populous department in Peru with 1,856,809 inhabitants - National Census 2017. <https://censo2017.inei.gob.pe/piura-es-el-segundo-departamento-mas>
15. Cavero, V., Hernández, A., Miranda, J. J., Alata, P., Alegre, M., & Diez-Canseco, F. (2022). Satisfaction and perceptions of aspects of the city that affect health, by socioeconomic level, 2010-2019, in Metropolitan Lima. *Peruvian Journal of Experimental Medicine and Public Health*, 39(1), 83-90.
16. Cobo, J., De La Guerra, J. P., Goicochea, D. A., & Torres, P. C. (2023). Satisfaction of school directors about the support services offered by the Municipality of Lima- Peru. *Revista de Ciencias Sociales*, 29(1), 289-311.
17. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. (2024). Governance and Citizen Security Index in Latin America 2024. ECLAC.
18. Comunes, *Journal of Public Policies and Problems*, 1(18), 39-58.
19. Cordero, S. (2020). Citizen Security and Community Participation in Latin America. *Revista Científica General José María Córdova*, 18(29), Article 29. <https://doi.org/10.21830/19006586.561>
20. Ombudsman's Office. (2023). Ombudsman's Office: It is necessary to evaluate the functioning of the National System of Citizen Security in the face of an increase in delinquency. *Ombudsman's Office -*
21. Ombudsman's Office. (2024). Ombudsman's Report No. 194: Citizen Security in Peru - Analysis of Inter-Institutional Articulation. Office of the Ombudsman of Peru.
22. Official Gazette El Peruano. (2023). Legislative Decree that updates Law No. 27933, Law of the National System of Citizen Security—LEGISLATIVE DECREE - N° 1618 N° 1618-
<http://busquedas.elperuano.pe/dispositivo/NL/2247004-1>
23. Espinoza, I., & Frago, J. T. (2021). Analysis of the quality of public health services with the SERVPERF model: A case in the Isthmus of Tehuantepec. *Bookkeeping and Administration*, 67(1), Article 1.
24. Ezquerria, V. (2019, September 5). Broken window syndrome. Vanesa Ezquerria Architect Passivhaus. <https://www.vanesaezquerria.com/sindrome-de-la-broken-window/>
25. Francia, M. (2023). Perception of citizen security and satisfaction of users in the district of Comas, Lima - 2022.

26. García, J., & Rey, M. Á. R. (2020). Perception of insecurity in neighborhoods and collective efficacy: A case study. *Yearbook of the Faculty of Law. University of Extremadura*, 36, Article 36. <https://doi.org/10.17398/2695-7728.36.757>
27. García, V, Martínez, F. de M. G., Esparza, R. M. V., & Félix, B. I. L. (2023). Citizen satisfaction about municipal services in the state of Zacatecas, Mexico. *RICSH Ibero-American Journal of Social and Humanistic Sciences*, 12(24), Article 24.
28. Gaviláñez, F. (2021). Statistical designs and analyses for agricultural experiments. Ediciones Díaz de Santos.
29. Regional Government of Piura. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2023). *Global Study on Homicide 2023*. UNODC.
30. González i, , & Carvajal Martínez, J. E. (2023). Government Policy as a Generator of Conflict: Criminality, Security and Perception of Insecurity in the Cities of Bogotá, Medellín and Cali 2020-20211. *Via Inveniendi et Iudicandi*, 18(1), 94-116. <https://doi.org/10.15332/19090528.9197>
31. González, R. (2024). Citizen Security as a Human Meta-Right and Accountability as a Guarantee: Some Concept Notes. *Estado & comunes, revista de políticas y problemas públicos*, 1(18), 181-199.
32. Guerra J. A. (2023). *Citizen Security and Citizen Satisfaction in the City of Iquitos, 2022*. César Vallejo University.
33. Hernández-Gutiérrez, J. C., & Recuero-López, F. (2024). Violence, insecurity and electoral participation in Mexico. *Spanish Journal of Sociological Research*, (185), 79-96. <https://doi.org/10.5477/cis/reis.185.76-96>
34. Hernández-Sampieri, R. & Mendoza Torres, C. P. (2023). *Research Methodology: The Quantitative, Qualitative, and Mixed Routes* (2nd ed.). McGraw-Hill Education.
35. https://bibliotecadigital.uchile.cl/discovery/fulldisplay/alma9910045854697039_36/56UDC_INST:56UDC_INST
36. <https://doi.org/10.22201/fca.24488410e.2022.2956>
37. Hurtado. (2007). Paradigms and Research Methods in Times of Change. *El Nacional*.
38. IDB | Evidence Platform. (n.d.). Retrieved March 4, 2024, from <https://live-idb-eseguranca.pantheonsite.io/>
39. IDEHPUCP. <https://idehpucp.pucp.edu.pe/analisis1/la-percepcion-de-corupcion-en-el-peru-en-los-ultimos-anos/>
40. National Institute of Statistics and Informatics (2017). Statistical Compendium and Results End of the Population Census: https://www.inei.gob.pe/media/MenuRecursivo/publicaciones_digitales/Est/Lib1553/20TOMO_01.pdf
41. National Institute of Statistics and Informatics. (2024). *Citizen Security Statistics: July - December 2023*. INEI. <https://www.inei.gob.pe/media/MenuRecursivo/boletines/estadisticas-seguridad-ciudadana-2024.pdf>
42. J. V. (2018). Perception of violence from schoolchildren of two educational institutions in the town of Kennedy, Bogotá. *Journal of Public Health*, 20, 438-444. <https://doi.org/10.15446/rsap.v20n4.61085>
43. K. P., Bustos-Sanchez, J. D., Lopez-Bernal, A. S., Mendez-Rivas, D., & Rincon- Lopez,
44. León, A., Díaz, S., & Márquez, L. (2023). Analysis of the perception of insecurity with a gender approach in the choice of public transport. Case study Tunja, Colombia. *Eure*, 49(147). <https://doi.org/10.7764/eure.49.147.02>
45. Law 27933. (2023). Law No. 27933. <https://www.gob.pe/institucion/congreso-de-la-republica/normas-legales/331205-27933>
46. Lio, V. (2024). Images of the crime. From the preventive use to the media effectiveness of security cameras. *Immediate Communication*, 19(1), 93-115. <https://doi.org/10.18861/ic.2024.19.1.3506>
47. M. F. R. (2023). Medellín, lessons of a change in citizen security. *Revista Criminalidad*, 65(3), 47-64. Scopus. <https://doi.org/10.47741/17943108.509>
48. Mamani, K. del R., & Vilca, G. L. (2022). Service quality and user satisfaction in municipal public libraries in southern Peru. *Revista de Ciencias Humanísticas y Sociales (ReHuSo)*, 7(3), 1-16.
49. Mediavilla Lizano, J. (2004). Problem solving. An approach to police work [Http://purl.org/dc/dcmitype/Text, Universitat de Barcelona]. <https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/tesis?codigo=144306>
50. Mendoza, Y. (2010). Citizen Safety of Public Spaces: Community Initiatives to Improve Quality of Life. *Venezuelan Journal of Economics and Social Sciences*, 16(2), 111-124.
51. Merchán-Hamann, E., & Tauil, P. (2021). Proposal for classifying the different types of descriptive epidemiological studies. *Epidemiologia e serviços de saúde: revista do Sistema Unico de Saúde do Brasil*, 30 1, e2018126. <https://doi.org/10.1590/s1679-49742021000100026>.
52. Ministry of the Interior. (2024). *National Crime Map 2024: Provincial Analysis of Citizen Insecurity*. MININTER - National Observatory of Citizen Security.
53. Provincial Municipality of Sullana. (2024). *Local Citizen Security Plan 2024: Situational Diagnosis*. Provincial Committee of Citizen Security of Sullana.
54. Regional Observatory of Citizen Security of Piura. (2024). *Statistical Bulletin on Citizen Security - First Semester 2024*.
55. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC, 2023). *Unodc.org*. Retrieved September 18, 2025, from https://www.unodc.org/res/WDR-2023/WDR23_ExSum_Spanish.pdf
56. Patio, G. R. (2021). The global reproduction of insecurity and the need to rethink the human dimension from a criminology of the south. *Revista Notas Históricas y Geográficas*, 27, 255-289.
57. Paz, G. M. E. B. (2014). *Research Methodology*. Grupo Editorial Patria.
58. Peru. <https://www.defensoria.gob.pe/defensoria-del-pueblo-es-necesario-evaluar-el-funcionamiento-del-sistema-de-seguridad-ciudadana-antes-de-aumentar-el-delito>
59. Petracci, M. (1998). The measurement of the quality and satisfaction of the citizen - user of privatized public services.
60. *Poblado-del-peru-con-1-856-809-inhabitants/*
61. Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú. (2021, February 2). The perception of corruption in Peru in recent years.
62. United Nations Development Programme. (2024). *Regional Human Development Report 2023-2024: Human Security and Development in Latin America*. UNDP.
63. Rodríguez-Chávez, O. (2024). Divergent dynamics of immigration due to insecurity and violence in Mexico. *Estudios Fronterizos*, 25, e144. <https://doi.org/10.21670/ref.2408144>
64. Rodríguez, O., & Masferrer, C. (2024). Migration due to insecurity and violence in Mexico prior to the Covid-19 pandemic: vulnerabilities and characteristics. *Salud Publica de México*, 66(2), 130-136. <https://doi.org/10.21149/14774>

65. Rojas Aravena, F. (2023). The multiple crises in Latin America and the emergence of security as a regional priority. *CEIPAZ Yearbook*, 16, 159-178.
66. Rojas, D. B., & Castillo, S. V. (2016). Insecurity and neighborhood protection mechanisms in urban Peru. *URVIO. Latin American Journal of Security Studies*, 19, Article 19. <https://doi.org/10.17141/urvio.19.2016.2401>
67. Sarria Agudelo, A. F., & Astorquiza Bustos, B. A. (2023). Institutional trust and the black figure of crime. *Criminal Policy*, 18(35), 34-61. <https://doi.org/10.4067/s0718-33992023000100034>
68. Tejeda Parra, G., & Palafox Moyers, C. G. (2021). Perception of citizen security in Sonora. *Región y Sociedad*, 33, e1438. <https://doi.org/10.22198/rys2021/33/1438>
69. Trejos Rosero, L. F., Pachón, P., & Rojas, C. (2022). A general approach to the Citizen Culture approach in the Security Policies of the District of Barranquilla. *Justice*, 27(41), 79-94. <https://doi.org/10.20983/noesis.2021.2.7>
70. Triana Sánchez, J. L. (2021). Perception of insecurity, fear of crime and self-protection measures: the case of Acapulco, Guerrero. *Noesis. Journal of Social Sciences*, 30(60), 166-190. <https://doi.org/10.20983/noesis.2021.2.7>
71. Valdés, G., Juan, V.-V., & Coluccio, G. (2022). Descriptive study of the heterogeneity sources in citizens' perception of safety and justice in northern Chile. *Interciencia*, 47(3), 75-83. Scopus.
72. Vargas-Téllez, G. (2022). The challenges of criminology from the utopian proposals of Lawrence W. Sherman. *Criminal Law and Criminology*, 42(113), Article 113. <https://doi.org/10.18601/01210483.v42n113.07>
73. Vásquez, J. C. R., Steevens, K. N. C., Sechague, J. D. O., Russo, L. N. C., & Peláez,
74. Velázquez, R. G. (2024). Citizen Security as a Human Meta-Right and Accountability as a Guarantee: Some Concept Notes. *Estado & comunes, revista de políticas y problemas públicos*, 1(18), 181-199.
75. Wang, C., Teo, T. S. H., Dwivedi, Y., & Janssen, M. (2021). Mobile services use and citizen satisfaction in government: integrating social benefits and uses and gratifications theory. *Information Technology & People*, 34(4), 1313-1337.
76. World drug report (2024). United Nations: Office on Drugs and Crime. Recuperado el
77. Yuspahrudin, A., Abbas, H., Pahala, I., Eliyana, A., & Yazid, Z. (2024). Fostering proactive work behavior: Where to start?. *PLOS ONE*, 19. <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0298936>