

## The Emergence And Development Of The Oil Industry In Qatar 1946-1952

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### Abstract:-

*Qatar's location is distinguished by being in the heart of the Arabian Gulf, which is considered one of the most important centers and vital and strategic areas in the region and the world, which led to its exposure to several risks as a result of this importance stemming from its distinguished geographical location, in addition to its famous diving sites, which became the focus of attention of the greedy. In addition, Qatar was distinguished by being one of the emirates of the Arabian Gulf in which oil was discovered, which added another importance to it, making it a focus of conflict and competition between major countries in order to exploit and dominate this wealth. However, Qatar benefited from this main source of energy and wealth, and the importance of this material from an economic point of view, which was able to transform it from a diving and trading society to a civilized industrial society. However, the presence of oil in the lands of (a country) does not mean its transformation into an industrial country, because the presence of oil without investing it does not provide the desired benefit from it. Therefore, the oil industry is one of the industries that require large capital for surveying, exploration, and drilling operations until reaching the stage of extraction and then export. Therefore, the oil countries, including Qatar, resorted to foreign companies because they lacked the money and experience in the early stages of oil discovery and the development of the oil industry. Its economic and social impacts, which demonstrated the role of profit sharing or income tax with the oil company, increased the emirate's financial returns and contributed to the development of Qatar and the establishment of an economic structure for agriculture, industry, trade, investments, finance, and industrial projects. The oil industry also played a role in developing the social aspect. The petroleum industry played a role in the development of social conditions, including health, which developed effectively through the Qatari government allocating a portion of the state budget to improve the health sector. The Qatari government also developed the education sector.*

**Key Words:** oil, origin of industry, Qatar

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### INTRODUCTION :-

The Arabian Gulf region witnessed the discovery of oil in the early 1930s. In addition, the region enjoyed abundant natural resources, especially mineral wealth. The discovery of oil had a clear impact on the economic and social structure, and later on the political system. In May 1932, oil was discovered in Bahrain in the Awali field in the western part of the island of Bahrain. Subsequent discoveries followed in the entire region. After that, the Qatari government granted a concession to the British Anglo-Persian Company (Anglo-Persian Oil Company) in 1935 for a period of (75) years. The company began exploring for oil in 1937, as the first oil well was discovered in the city of Dukhan in 1939, but due to World War II, the British government stopped the oil company's procedures, when the Italian Air Force bombed the oil wells in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia in 1940. After the end of World War II, the company resumed its work in the city of Dukhan, where it drilled more than 48 wells during 1949, and the latter exported the first shipment of oil abroad in 1949. After that, the economic conditions changed, as it relied on oil imports without traditional crafts such as pearl diving, fishing, shipbuilding and other traditional crafts. Oil is the lifeblood and one of the most important sources of energy and a natural resource of a strategic nature due to its importance in the economic, commercial and military fields. The oil industry is one of the topics that has been little studied in the historical aspect, and as a result of the importance of the development of the oil industry in Qatar, the researcher decided to choose the topic (the emergence of the oil industry in Qatar and its internal repercussions 1946-1952) as the title of the research. The year 1946 was chosen as the beginning of the study after the company resumed its exploration and search for oil and exported it abroad. In addition to that, there was British competition with American companies regarding the concession for territorial waters. The year 1952 was chosen as the end of the research, which is the year in which the first Qatari government budget was prepared from oil revenues after the decision of the principle of sharing profits with the oil company at the end of 1952, according to which the Qatari government benefited from the oil company's participation in its profits.

The study included two axes, in addition to an introduction and a conclusion. The first axis was entitled: The Beginning of Oil Production and Export and the Profit-Sharing Agreement: which dealt with the start of exploration,

drilling operations, oil extraction and export, and the method of surveying and drilling and the location of oil after accurately determining the location based on experts and pioneers of the British company and exporting the first shipment of oil abroad in 1949, in addition to the emergence of the continental shelf and territorial waters. The research also explained the emergence of fierce competition between British and American companies over lands and territorial waters that were not included in the first concession, and the American company obtaining an oil concession in 1949, in addition to the Qatari government entering into negotiations regarding signing a profit-sharing agreement. The second axis addressed oil revenues and their impact on internal developments in Qatar, explaining the internal developments that occurred in Qatar through the continuous demand of members of the Al Thani family to increase their financial allocations from oil rents, after exporting the first shipment of oil abroad and increasing financial returns, in addition to granting an oil concession to the American company in territorial waters. Britain put pressure on its ruler, Sheikh Abdullah bin Qassim, abdicated in favor of his son, Sheikh Ali, and demanded that the Al Thani family increase their financial revenues. He responded to their demands and also agreed to the British conditions for appointing a permanent British representative in Qatar, as well as appointing an advisor to the ruler and a commander to maintain order and train the Qatari forces.

#### **AXIS 1: BEGINNING OIL PRODUCTION, EXPORT, AND PROFIT-SHARING AGREEMENT**

After the end of World War II and the reasons that had stopped exploration work were removed, the Qatar Petroleum Company began preparing to resume its activity, and practically began taking the necessary steps for this in 1946, as it expanded the city of Dukhan and provided it with warehouses and facilities, extended its pipelines, and resumed exploration operations. Based on a general study of Qatar's coasts, the company saw that the most suitable place to establish an export port was the Amsaid area, due to the depth of the waters there, which is located south of the eastern coast of Qatar. On the other hand, it confirmed its inability to establish a port for it on the western coast of Qatar, due to the shallowness of the waters and the abundance of coral reefs, in addition to the presence of its own port, Zekreet, which it uses only for small ships.<sup>(i)</sup>

At the same time, the company wrote to the ruler of Qatar on August 10, 1946, regarding obtaining a general license for the company's aircraft to land in Qatar, as stipulated in Article Six of the oil concession agreement. The company stressed the need for aircraft to land at the Royal Qatari Air Force Airport near Doha, while it pledged to establish its own airport in the fifth area of the Dukhan camp, and Qatar agreed to this necessity, and the latter confirmed that its use would be for the company's business only, and not for other commercial purposes.<sup>(ii)</sup> To compensate for what the company lost due to the cessation of exploration work during the events of World War II, the latter tried, and at the beginning of 1947, it expanded the base of exploration operations by drilling five wells at once, which put it in a problem represented by the difficulty of obtaining skilled workers, engineers and geophysicists to work. To address this problem, it coordinated with the American Standard Company to exchange consultations and overcome these obstacles. The latter provided it with advice in the same matter, and directed it to benefit from the countries of Eastern Europe: Romania, and Hungary in particular, in order to study the layers of the earth in the region. The former presented the matter to the British Political Resident in Bahrain, Cornelius James Bailey. (Cornelius James Belly)<sup>(iii)</sup> And consulted him on whether or not using these people would pose a threat to British national security, and authorized him to grant them entry visas to Qatar, Bahrain and the coast in the event of approval, but British policy did not approve of them, and the Queen rejected the proposal to employ Hungarians and Romanians to work in Qatar, and explained that the reason for the rejection was more functional than political, and pointed to the use of British nationals from the Petroleum Concessions Limited Company.<sup>(iv)</sup>

Based on that, the company intensified its efforts to achieve more oil discoveries based on the privileges it obtained from the ruler of Qatar. It sent a new geological team, after the British government's approval, to the south of the Umm Bab area to conduct a comprehensive survey in the area. The latter was provided with the necessary supplies and guarding provisions, and continued its work until oil was discovered. The company began establishing approximately (35) survey stations, which allowed the flow of labor to Qatar, strengthened the company's activity, and compensated for its losses during the war. Although the oil exploration privileges in Qatar were suspended for that company, and it had the freedom to move in Qatari territory, the right to approve the entry of workers of various nationalities such as Iranians, Omanis, Muscatis, and Saudis was within the authority of Sheikh Abdullah bin Qassim Al Thani.<sup>(v)</sup> The ruler of Qatar in form,<sup>(vi)</sup> The main reason for bringing these foreign workers was the small population of Qatar, the poverty of their environment, and the fact that they were the least fortunate in terms of nutrition among the Arab tribes that inhabited the region.<sup>(vii)</sup>

Due to their lack of experience in that field, the company employed a few of them in the drilling work. Information confirmed that the foreign workers who arrived in Doha were in increasing numbers for work, and they were often sent to the Dukhan camp. It is worth noting that oil exploration in Qatar opened the country's doors to foreign workers in

the summer of 1947. Therefore, the company rebuilt and expanded the Dukhan camp, established warehouses, workshops and tanks, extended pipelines, and chose the site of Amsaid as a pivotal point for launching exploration work. It also established a port in the same area in October 1948, in preparation for importing exploration equipment and preparing the port for export work, especially since indicators confirmed the abundance of Dukhan field oil reserves and the presence of promising commercial quantities.<sup>(viii)</sup>

As a result, the company established two airports, one in the Dukhan area and the other in the Amsaid area, and extended two pipelines to transport oil from the Dukhan field to the port in Amsaid, the first 14.5 inches in diameter, and the other 16 inches. The length of these two pipelines was 14 miles, and then they joined together in one pipeline with a diameter of 20 inches, to complete the distance to the Amsaid area. The length of that pipeline reached 35 miles, and the company then drilled nine other productive wells.<sup>(ix)</sup> In the same context, a liquid gas separation station was established.<sup>x)</sup> In the Khatiya area, as well as linking the Dukhan area to the Amsaid area with a paved road, that road in Qatar was unusual at that time, because there was no paved road in the area before, despite that, in reality, if compared to the known paved roads, it was very bad, as its paving did not take a straight form, but rather it was up and down, and its paving was not with tar as is known in paving roads, because the company used quantities of crude oil that it sprayed on that road after paving it, and it was described by some as a monopolistic company that was "stingy" to the extreme, and this work was considered one of its disadvantages in the country<sup>(xi)</sup>.

The exploration was not limited to the Dukhan area only, but the oil company learned about drilling, exploration and geological surveying in all parts of the Emirate of Qatar. At the beginning of 1949, the company drilled two wells in the middle of the peninsula, but it did not find oil in commercial quantities. It continued its operations and drilled approximately 58 wells, 48 of which produced oil in commercial quantities. The Dukhan field oil was considered one of the best types of oil in the world.<sup>(xii)</sup> The company continued its work in Qatar and completed its work in the port of Amsaid on the eastern coast, to be an export port, and to receive large tankers, in addition to extending two new pipes with a diameter of 24 inches, and a distance estimated at 35 miles. It linked them to the Dukhan field, in addition to paving modern roads, telegraph lines, and establishing storage basins with an estimated capacity of (265,546) tons, equivalent to (2,177,576) barrels of oil. The first oil tanker, named President Mwny, was loaded with Qatari oil on December 23, 1949, to the European countries.<sup>(xiii)</sup> ...and with a load estimated at (80) thousand tons, amidst a grand celebration, attended by the ruler of Qatar and members of his ruling family, with representatives of the company in Doha. The production of the Emirate of Qatar of crude oil in the same year amounted to (387) thousand tons.<sup>(xiv)</sup>

In fact, these results encouraged the Qatar Petroleum Company to build an oil refinery and a small factory in the port of Um Said, as the country lacked an oil refinery until 1949. It began operating in 1950 with a production capacity estimated at (6,500) gallons of gasoline, (200) gallons of kerosene, and (6,500) gallons of diesel, in order to meet the local needs of these derivatives. In addition, it provided natural gas in quantities exceeding the local need, and put in place a development plan based on maximum utilization of natural gas. Therefore, it established a gas isolation station in the Dukhan field, which is the Khatiya station, which was built in 1949 and was later developed. It also established a system for transporting gas to and from consumption centers, by extending a network of gas pipelines to stations established in the Qatari regions.<sup>(xv)</sup>

The company intensified its work by drilling new wells in the second zone of the fourth Arab region within the Dukhan field, where oil was found at a depth of (6,500) feet below sea level. Its production reached (21,000) barrels per day, and production began in 1950. As a result, oil production increased and financial returns rose rapidly. July 1951 witnessed the highest rate of oil production, reaching (231,480) tons, exported from the port of Amsaid. The company continued to drill (24) new wells, and the number of wells drilled at the end of the year reached 26 wells. During November of the same year, more than (18) oil tankers were shipped. The company also sought to increase production, as the increase became regular every month, and the production quantity reached (2,800,000) million tons in the same year.<sup>(xvi)</sup> Therefore, the monthly production depended primarily on the availability of oil tankers, which transported it to European markets. In 1952, the company increased its oil exports, as it shipped more than (268,772) tons per month. It was found that the increase in Qatari crude oil production for the two years mentioned above came as a result of the ban on exporting Iranian oil after the nationalization movement carried out by Muhammad Musaddegh.<sup>(xvii)</sup> Which led to an increase in oil exports at the end of 1952 to more than three million tons.<sup>(xviii)</sup> The following table shows oil production, the increase in the quantity of exports, and the financial amounts resulting from that.<sup>(xix)</sup>

**Table No. (1) Qatari oil exports and imports in dollars<sup>(xx)</sup> American (1949-1952)**

Percentage of oil imports in US dollars	Exports in tons	Number of carriers	The year	T
1,000,000	387,000	1	1949	1
1,500,000	1,546,420	106	1950	2

4,000,000	2,246,522	149	1951	3
10,000,000	3,222,670	212	1952	4

The above table shows that there is a continuous increase in the quantity of oil production and export in Qatar. This indicates the policy followed by the oil company through expanding the process of exploration and drilling and increasing the drilling of wells, in addition to improving the work of the explored wells and maintaining them for the purpose of improving and increasing the quantity produced significantly in the following years. It is also possible to establish a note on the year 1951 after the movement of nationalizing Iranian oil, which made Britain request the oil-producing country, including Qatar, to increase oil exports to fill the shortage in the global oil markets. Consequently, this matter led to a significant escalation in the work of producing and exporting Qatari oil. This was evident through the increase in Qatari imports, as a result of the large financial returns during that period, as they rose from (1,000,000) million dollars in 1949 to (10,000,000) million dollars in 1952.

First: Maritime privilege and British-American competition:

Qatar was of great strategic and economic importance to all British political and diplomatic circles, and the latter worked hard to preserve it by obtaining the oil concession at a time when the Arabian Gulf witnessed the entry of new competitors through American and other foreign oil companies.<sup>(xxi)</sup> When the then US President Harry Truman spoke, (Harry Truman)<sup>(xxii)</sup> The United States of America, which emerged from the Second World War victorious and strong, has the right to exploit the natural resources found on the seabed and under the seabed in the high seas adjacent to the country's coasts. And since the right of any coastal government to exercise its authority over the natural resources found on the seabed and in the soil layer adjacent to its coasts has been established and adhered to by countries, including the Emirate of Qatar.<sup>(xxiii)</sup>

This theory appeared in the United States of America and was known as the continental shelf theory, which is based on the fact that shallow areas are a geological extension of the continent. Based on the theory and its application to the Arabian Gulf region, the entire sea is a continental shelf for the surrounding countries due to it being shallow. The countries overlooking the seas began to define their territorial waters as they pleased, some of them considering it 3 nautical miles, then 6, then 12 nautical miles.<sup>(xxiv)</sup>

It seems that American interests did not accept defeat in Qatar, especially after its government failed to reach an agreement with the British government regarding the re-division of the world's oil fields. In October 1946, American companies contributing to the Iraq Petroleum Company announced that the Red Line Agreement was void and that they were carrying out this work alone. These measures were the beginning of a broad American campaign to obtain concessions for American companies in the Arabian Gulf. The latter expected the escalation of disputes between the Saudi government and the Emirate of Qatar regarding their common borders. Under the directives of the King of Saudi Arabia, Aramco decided to send an exploration team to the region.<sup>(xxv)</sup>

Based on that, the ruler of Qatar, Abdullah bin Qasim, asked the British government to declare the maritime borders of the emirate, i.e. the seabed outside the territorial waters (continental shelf), to encourage any efforts that pave the way for greater utilization of the world's natural resources. Since these are valuable resources that may be found under the parts of the Arabian Gulf located near the coasts of Qatar, it is therefore possible to double the work, exploration, and utilization of those resources located under the waters. He wanted organized investment and to maintain periodic maintenance, out of his keenness to exploit those resources and to be properly restricted. It is fair that the seabed and the underlying layer (the layer in which the oil is found) extending to a reasonable distance from the coast belong to him, and that its management be by the coastal government that is adjacent to it.<sup>(xxvi)</sup>

The American administration decided to send a geological mission to the Arabian Gulf region during the period from December 8-15, 1943, and submitted its report which included (there is oil in the Arabian Gulf region in very large quantities, and the oil reserve in the Emirate of Qatar alone is estimated at about one billion barrels, and only a few wells have been drilled in it, and the percentage of wells drilled in the entire region is only 5% of the total number of wells drilled in America)<sup>(xxvii)</sup>.

Here, the American administration felt that the policy of non-direct intervention and recognition of Britain's responsibility in the region was no longer compatible with the new developments that resulted from the final stage of World War II. Contacts began with the British embassy in Washington in January 1944, to hold a joint meeting between the American and British sides. On April 13, 1944, the two parties entered into discussions that resulted in reaching an agreement that guaranteed the two countries the exploitation of oil in the Arabian Gulf region on an equal basis, and that the nations would have the right to obtain oil easily and smoothly.<sup>(xxviii)</sup>

The American administration realized that Britain would retreat before it after the end of World War II, and that things would be in its favor, because it had set for itself a framework that did not go beyond providing aid to countries that were looking to improve their economic conditions, provided that this aid was to serve American political and economic interests.<sup>(xxix)</sup> On March 15, 1946, the US State Department issued a memorandum entitled "Present US Policy Towards

the Emirates,” in which it clarified the foundations of US policy towards the Emirates of the Arabian Gulf. Britain’s position in the Gulf region should not result in any harm to US interests in the region. The US government should take measures that would support US interests in other areas of the Gulf, and seek to expand these interests by various means, whether through supporting local governments or cooperating with Britain, in addition to providing support to US missionary missions working in the region.<sup>(xxx)</sup> .

The American administration turned to supporting companies operating in the Arabian Gulf region to take what it saw as appropriate for its interests, after its failure to reach an agreement with the British government regarding the re-division of oil fields in the world. From this standpoint, representatives of American companies announced their participation in the Iraq Petroleum Company. After the cancellation of the Red Line Agreement in 1946, American companies sought to negotiate with the ruler of Qatar, Abdullah bin Qasim, and negotiations began between the latter and representatives of two American oil companies, namely Haight and Whitman (Height (Whiteman on behalf of Central Mining and Investment Corporation, and Robert Morton on behalf of Superior Oil Company)<sup>(xxxi)</sup>), in order to obtain a concession to search and explore for oil in Qatari waters, at a distance of three miles within the borders of the territorial waters. However, the inclusion of all Qatari lands in the first concession belonging to the British company made the American companies compete with the British company in the territorial waters belonging to the Emirate of Qatar.<sup>(xxxii)</sup> .

This prompted the Saudi government on May 28, 1949, to announce the extension of its jurisdiction over its continental shelf. The British government advised the rulers of the Gulf to issue their own declarations affirming their sovereignty over the natural resources in the submerged areas and to adopt a median line between the eastern and western shores, because it considered the entire Gulf to be a continental shelf, with a water depth not exceeding two hundred meters. Accordingly, a median line must be followed to determine the rights of the emirates located on either side of it. These declarations issued by the rulers placed large areas of submerged lands under their sovereignty, and included large areas that extended beyond the borders of territorial waters.<sup>(xxxiii)</sup> Therefore, the concessionaires considered that the new areas fell within the scope of their submerged water concessions.<sup>(xxxiv)</sup> .

In light of this, the ruler of Qatar issued a statement on June 8, 1949, in which he claimed control over the seabed beneath the Arabian Gulf in areas outside the territorial waters adjacent to the mainland of the Qatari Islands. Since there were no previous commitments to any person or company in the declared concession area, American companies took the initiative to submit offers to the ruler of Qatar, Sheikh Abdullah Al Thani, which prompted British companies to do what American companies had done.<sup>(xxxv)</sup> In June of the same year, the ruler of Qatar granted an oil concession in the submerged areas of the sea belonging to the Emirate of Qatar to the American Superior Oil Company and its partner, the American Central Mining and Investment Company, which formed the International Orient Oil Company. The agreement stipulated that both companies have the right to a concession. The agreement consisted of 28 articles, the terms of which did not differ from the concessions of foreign companies in the region and the exploitation of Arab oil. The agreement included the company’s guarantee of the right to exploration, drilling, development, production, transport and sale of oil, gas or any other material extracted from under the waters of the Arabian Gulf in the territorial waters of the Emirate of Qatar. It indicated the payment methods to be in Indian rupees. The ruler of Qatar signed in August 1949 with the representatives of the two companies that agreement, which covered the Emirate of Qatar’s territorial waters far from the shore at a distance estimated at (3) miles.<sup>(xxxvi)</sup> Within a period of (65) years from the date of signing the concession.<sup>(xxxvii)</sup> The two companies shall pay a non-refundable sum of (500,000) rupees under any circumstances, regardless of the price of the concession, in addition to (1,000,000) rupees annually, with the first payment to be made one year after the date of signing the agreement. When oil is discovered in commercial quantities, the annual rent shall cease and the agreed upon amount shall be converted into a concession tax, provided that it is not less than (1,000,000) rupees annually. Calculations shall also be made at the end of each year from the date of signing the agreement.<sup>(xxxviii)</sup> .

In fact, granting concessions in Qatar’s territorial waters has raised problems between oil companies. Qatar Petroleum Limited, the original concession holder, was considered the owner of all the concession lands in Qatar, including the territorial waters. However, it was not included in the territorial waters in the first concession contract, but it considered its entry implicit as long as it granted the concession in all the lands of the emirate. Granting the concession in favor of American companies is considered a reason for the change in British policy towards the ruler of Qatar, Abdullah bin Qasim, and the consideration of replacing him with someone who meets the demands of British policy.<sup>(xxxix)</sup> This agreement provoked the Qatar Petroleum Company Limited, a subsidiary of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, and it filed several protests, as it considered the granted area to be subject to its concession, and demanded that the matter be referred to arbitration, according to what was stated in the concession agreement of 1935. The ruler of Qatar agreed to arbitration to resolve the matter, and they chose the city of Cairo to be the arbitrator between them.<sup>(xl)</sup> Both parties appointed a representative for them, and the ruler’s representative was his Crown Prince Sheikh Ali bin Abdullah Al Thani.<sup>(xli)</sup> After deliberation and meeting between Lord Murad Kleef (Murad Kleef) and Mr. Walter decided to travel to London and conduct an in-depth study of the matter and then announce the final decision. At the end of February 1950,

they issued their ruling after several meetings in favor of the ruler of Qatar, which included the following:<sup>xliii)</sup>

- 1- Petroleum Development Concession: Includes the islands controlled by the Sheikh on the date on which the concession was signed, whether or not they appear on the geographical map after the concession.
- 2- The concession included the surface of the earth, the territorial waters below the land and sea, the lands of the Emirate of Qatar and its islands.
- 3- The concession does not include the surface of the land submerged in water or what is in the ground located in the deep seas of the Arabian Gulf and adjacent to the territorial lands of Qatar.

This decision was considered a victory for the ruler of Qatar, who considered it a way out of the monopolies of British oil companies, and opened the way for other companies to compete in exploring for Qatari oil, the result of which came in November 1950, confirming the Sheikh's right to grant the concession to whomever he wanted, and describing the first concession granted in 1935 as not including Qatar's territorial waters but only the land lands.<sup>xliiii)</sup>

As a result, the International Offshore Oil Company began its offshore exploration work in the territorial waters after obtaining a judicial decision supporting its right to the concession. Its equipment and marine geological workers reached the concession area. However, with the start of their work, administrative and technical obstacles and natural difficulties appeared, which hindered the progress of the international company's work, in addition to the fierce competition from British companies that were exploiting border problems and not allowing the company's workers complete freedom to prospect and explore, in addition to the huge losses the company suffered due to the storms in 1951, which sank the equipment, towers and devices used, and Exploration costsExcavationExpensive oil at the bottom of the sea...and the demand of the ruler of Qatar to increase allocations, concession revenues, and share profits, which prompted it to give up its maritime concession after nearly 24 months.<sup>xliiv)</sup> As a result, the company decided to withdraw from the Qatar oil concession, and a dispute arose between it and the ruler.Regarding the issue of the annual payment of (1,000,000) rupees, which was due to be paid according to the stipulated period of August 5, 1952, the company refused to pay, as it had stopped its work in the territorial waters since the beginning of the year, after suffering large financial losses that made it stop its work with the concession, and it confirmed that the ruler was aware of that, but those excuses did not satisfy the ruler, which prompted him to request a settlement and the company's submission to arbitration, and the latter succeeded after the ruling came in his favor, and the oil company paid the annual financial amounts to Qatar.<sup>xliiv)</sup>

It appears that the International Offshore Oil Company suffered significant financial losses during its search for oil in the territorial waters, and justified its withdrawal from the concession due to the very high cost of offshore operations in the waters of the Arabian Gulf, and that it did not find encouraging commercial quantities in the seabed that would enable it to pay the cost of machinery and workers, in addition to the continuous demands by the ruler of Qatar to increase the annual rent and his discussion of the principle of sharing profits. It was also revealed that the company had several offshore oil concessions in the Arabian Gulf region, which made it give up the Qatari oil concession.

These concessions led to the emergence of some companies that expressed their desire to obtain an oil concession in Qatar. They contacted the ruler's senior advisor, Abdullah Darwish, who explained to them that he hoped that the American Superior Company would reconsider its move. However, one day after the Superior Company's withdrawal request was submitted, representatives of the British companies sought and asked Cairo to negotiate with the ruler of Qatar regarding the oil concession in the territorial waters.<sup>xlivi)</sup> This mediation succeeded in making the ruler of Qatar, Ali bin Abdullah, grant the concession to the Dutch company, Royal Dutch Shell.<sup>xlvii)</sup> (Royal Dutch Shell, in which Britain and the Netherlands each contributed 40-60%, and the company established a branch known as Qatar Shell. The company was registered according to English law and its headquarters was in St. Helens, London. It was called the Dutch Shell Company. This company was famous for its distinguished activity in the field of oil exploration and drilling, using modern devices and means to find it in submerged areas.<sup>xlviii)</sup> Accordingly, the negotiations between the two parties contributed to the conclusion of an agreement on November 29, 1952, between the Ruler of Qatar and George Ormsby Higgins.George Ormsby Higgins) Representative of the Company<sup>xlix)</sup>.

Under that agreement, the concession area was defined, and included the seabed, the following: the level of the tidal waters in the waters of the Arabian Gulf, taking into account any rights granted under any existing concession, as well as what falls under the sovereignty of the Ruler of Qatar outside the territorial waters, and all islands, reefs, shoals and reefs that appear or are formed naturally, or by the company after the decline of the tidal level within the known area, and after the boundaries of this area have been marked and accurately laid, a map showing the agreed boundaries shall be prepared and attached to that agreement, and it shall form part of the territorial waters, meaning the waters adjacent to, extending and existing from the lands of Qatar.<sup>0)</sup> This agreement also determined the basis of three nautical miles from the low tide level, and the type of extracted materials such as: crude oil, asphalt, ozokerite, natural gas, and others. <sup>ii)</sup> It also stipulated that the concession period would be 75 years, starting from August 6, 1952. The agreement

included 30 articles, most of which were similar to the oil agreements and contracts concluded with the emirates and sheikhs of the region. Among its most important provisions are the following:<sup>(iii)</sup>:-

- 1- The sole and exclusive right within the boundaries of the concession area to search, drill, develop and produce materials.
- لـ The right within the boundaries of the concession area and elsewhere within the State of Qatar to dispose of and export materials.
- بـ In exercising its rights under paragraph (a), the Company shall take into account the prior rights of Qatar Petroleum Development Company Limited in accordance with the agreement dated 17 May 1935.
- جـ Nothing in this Agreement shall prevent the Ruler of Qatar from granting any rights to any other person or company to search for, drill, extract, produce or develop anything other than materials or to build or construct within the Concession Area or in or over the waters covered by it, so long as such rights do not interfere with the rights granted or their operations under this Agreement.
- 2- The Company shall pay to the Ruler of Qatar, upon signing this Agreement, in consideration of its execution, the sum of 23,1976 pounds sterling, and shall pay to the Ruler on 29 October 1952 the sum of 131,976 pounds sterling, which shall not be refunded in any way, and the Company shall also pay to Qatar, as of 6 August of the same year, an annual rent of 75,415 pounds sterling until the date of commencement of regular exports of oil, and then the sum of 37,707 pounds sterling annually from that date until the termination of the Agreement, and this rent shall be paid in full on 6 August for each year.<sup>(liii)</sup>
- 3- The company shall commence exploration and research work for materials in the concession area within nine months from the date of signing the agreement, and shall commence drilling operations for a test well in the concession area within two years from that date, provided that the company has a two-year term after paying an amount of (37,707) British pounds for each year.
- 4- The company pays the ruler of Qatar a royalty (rent) as follows:<sup>(liv)</sup>:-
  - لـ Four shillings and six pence for every ton of oil exported.
  - بـ An amount of two shillings and three pence for every ton of asphalt or ozokerite produced and exported by the company.
  - جـ An amount of two and a quarter pennies for every 1,000 cubic feet of natural gas that the company produces and sells.
  - حـ The Company shall not pay a royalty for materials in or outside the Concession Area within the Emirate of Qatar used by the Company or its employees for the purpose of carrying out operations pursuant to this Agreement.
  - دـ Any royalty due to the Governor before the commencement of regular exports of oil in any year under this Article shall be paid at the same time as the rents for the same year paid, and the Company shall furnish to the Governor at the same time, by resolution, the quantities and materials to be exported in the year.
  - وـ The royalty due to Qatar under this Article for any year after the date of commencement of regular exports shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement.
  - يـ The necessary measurement of materials in accordance with this Article and this Agreement shall be made at the point of export and, in the case of natural gas, at the point of sale. In the case of liquid materials, the measurement shall be made in tanks or by measuring instruments, and in the case of solid materials, by weight. The Ruler of Qatar may appoint an authorized agent to attend the inspection of these measurements in accordance with the usual custom.<sup>(lv)</sup>
- 5- The company will pay a tax allowance of six pence per ton of the exported materials for which a royalty is due, in return for the company being granted from the date of signing the agreement, as shown below:<sup>(lvi)</sup>:-
  - لـ Importation with exemption from all import duties and other charges of water, petroleum, fuel, machinery, motor vehicles, vehicles, aircraft, equipment, pipes, tank equipment, machinery, timber, tools, ironwork, building materials, medicines, office supplies, household furniture and other articles of any kind necessary to the Company or its employees in its operations. The Company shall pay the normal duties applicable to British merchants in the Emirate of Qatar in respect of personal effects, merchandise, general goods and supplies imported for the personal use of its employees, provided that nothing imported duty-free for use in Qatar may be sold.
  - بـ The Company's ships and any ships carrying materials shall be supplied with fuel and imported petroleum products, and all materials, their derivatives and goods previously imported by the Company shall be exported in accordance with paragraph (a) above, and such import or export shall be exempt from export duties and any other fees.
  - جـ Exemption, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (b) of this Article, from all taxes of any kind, whether of the State or of a municipality, and whether actually imposed or to be imposed on its operations, capital, income, profits, excavations, factory or property, including buildings, whether owned by the company or leased from any

other person or persons, and on materials before or after their removal from the land or after technical manufacturing operations carried out on such materials.

- Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (a) of this Article, the Company shall not be exempt from its obligation to pay Qatar Income Tax for any year or part of a year after the date on which regular exports of oil commence.
- 6- The company undertakes, starting from the date of commencement of regular oil exports, to pay the ruler of Qatar 50% of the oil profits as follows:<sup>(lvii)</sup>-
  - The Company undertakes, in addition to the initial term and the following three years, that the Governor's revenues, in accordance with the above paragraph, shall not be less than an average of (650,000) pounds sterling per year.
  - The Company has the right to consider these amounts as an advance payment for the agreement payments that are due from the Company after it completes its obligations in accordance with the agreement.
  - The undertaking in paragraph (a) shall be fulfilled by the Sheikh receiving the following:<sup>(lviii)</sup>-

**Firstly:** Qatar income tax for the year.

**secondly:** Agreement payments for that year.

**Third:** The value of the difference between the sum of (A-B) and the value of 50% of the oil profits for that year, which is called the settlement payment, and this amount will be paid in pounds sterling in the manner stipulated.

- In this and subsequent articles of this Agreement, the following expressions will have the meanings shown opposite them as follows:<sup>(lix)</sup>-

**First:** Oil profit: means the profit generated in Qatar from the exported oil, asphalt, ozokerite, and natural gas produced by the company in the concession area, net of water, and exported from Qatar.

**secondly:** Profit in Qatar from exported oil: means, for the initial period and for each year thereafter, the difference between the border value per ton of exported oil in that period or year and the costs per ton of such oil multiplied by the number of tons exported as determined by this Agreement.

It is clear from this that the ruler of Qatar succeeded in granting the oil concession to the Dutch company, a few days after the American company decided to withdraw from the concession, despite the offers submitted by some American companies to benefit from the concession in the submerged waters. However, the ruler of Qatar preferred Shell, explaining that the latter is a British company due to the joint capital in it, and granting it the concession would not raise disputes with the British authorities, in addition to providing facilities and maritime maps to both the British policy and Qatar Petroleum Limited, the owner of the onshore concession for the offshore company. Despite the financial returns that Qatar obtained from the concession, the agreement remains unfair to Qatar and its oil rights.

## THE SECOND AXIS: OIL REVENUES AND THEIR IMPACT ON INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS IN QATAR:

The first concession contracts granted by Qatar before World War II were unequal and were in favor of the oil companies operating in Qatar. The reason for this was due to the dominance of these companies in the economic, political and technical aspects, and Qatar lacked the will to undertake such important projects. It was not possible to carry out exploration and production operations except by resorting to foreign companies, which exercised a complete monopoly controlling the stages of the oil industry. However, the picture soon changed after the war, as a result of the global demand for oil, in addition to the technical development of production and transportation methods. Competition by companies for Gulf oil intensified to an unprecedented extent.<sup>(lx)</sup>

At a time when competition between foreign companies for Gulf oil intensified, which prompted the Gulf Arab countries to demand amendments to the terms of concession contracts, in addition to the growth of national and political awareness, it encouraged the ruling regimes to enter into negotiations with the companies, until it ultimately resulted in the foreign monopoly companies being forced to give up many of the rights guaranteed to them by the first concessions, so they adopted the principle of equal sharing of profits.<sup>(lxi)</sup> There are factors that helped Qatar move towards demanding the application of the principle of profit sharing, similar to the pioneering Arab countries in this field, and these factors include the following:<sup>(lxii)</sup>-

- 1- The terms of the concessions were characterized by being exaggerated and unfair to the sheikhdoms, as the companies were able to obtain large areas, and sometimes the concession included the entire emirate for many years, and the returns were small in relation to the profits obtained by the companies.
- 2- The large-scale production of oil and the emergence of American interests in the region had an impact on changing British policy in the region. It became concerned with its economic colonial role, rather than its naval role. This coincided with its wars in India. It also changed its policy towards the growing American interests. It could not exclude them, but rather worked to impose conditions on any oil company operating in the region, by concluding political agreements with oil companies, which gave its authority control over oil affairs in the region.



3- The Qatari government's desire to increase oil revenues in order to work on completing infrastructure projects.

The idea of equal sharing of profits between oil companies and oil-producing countries in Venezuela began with the issuance of a law in 1949 stipulating the equal sharing of oil profits. On that basis, the government implemented the law that later became known as the profit-sharing system.<sup>(lxiii)</sup> In light of this, the Venezuelan government sent a delegation to the Arabian Gulf region in 1950 to clarify the true meaning of the new tax system. The aim was to explain the system and support their position, so that the oil companies could not take any controversial measures against them that would undermine what their government had undertaken.<sup>(lxiv)</sup>

Due to the intense competition between foreign countries for Arabian Gulf oil and the increased demand for it after the end of World War II, which made the Gulf governments dissatisfied with the oil agreements during that period, they therefore began to exert pressure on oil companies to obtain greater returns.<sup>(lxv)</sup>

Iran was the first country in the region to begin its demand for the implementation of the principle of profit-sharing, but it failed due to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company's refusal. However, after the arrival of Mohammad Mossaddegh To the Iranian Parliament in 1950, which formed a committee on the possibility of nationalizing oil, which led the above company to express its desire to discuss a new agreement on a profit-sharing basis with the Iranian government.<sup>(lxvi)</sup> However, the company's presentation of the offer came late due to Mossaddegh's announcement of a proposal to nationalize the oil companies before the Iranian Parliamentary Oil Committee, which played a major role in announcing the nationalization of Iranian oil by Mossaddegh's government on March 8, 1951, and had a clear impact on the companies' entry into the principle of profit-sharing with the region's rulers. .<sup>(lxvii)</sup> Saudi Arabia had the opportunity to demand increased financial returns from oil rents after the declaration of the principle of equal distribution in Venezuela, as well as the beginning of the movement led by Mossaddegh to nationalize oil and his government's refusal to share profits with British companies. Aramco sought to reach an agreement with the Saudi government on the basis of equal distribution of profits, and in 1951 the principle of equal distribution of profits was implemented with Aramco.<sup>(lxviii)</sup>

Therefore, in the last months of 1951, Bahrain sought to negotiate with BAPCO to sign a new contract on sharing the profits of oil revenues equally with the company. Based on that, the ruler of Bahrain issued Decree No. (8) on December 6, 1952. On behalf of the income tax system,<sup>(lxix)</sup> The Iraqi government and the Iraq Petroleum Company also reached a principle of equal profit sharing and implemented it in 1952 after popular demonstrations against the company.<sup>(lxx)</sup> Oil extraction operations from Qatari lands were among the most profitable commercial operations, as the profits of the concessionary company reached (130%) according to expert statistics. This is what made the oil companies remain for a long time in control of this wealth, exploiting the system of concession contracts. However, the Arab countries, including the Emirate of Qatar, began negotiations between the ruler of Qatar and representatives of the oil company after the Sheikh submitted a request to increase the concession fees, which raised doubts in the company about the consequences of this request, so the latter proceeded to win over the ruler of Qatar, by agreeing to a small increase in the concession fees.<sup>(lxxi)</sup> The latter rejected the company's offer and insisted on continuing negotiations to find a solution, especially with the significant increase in oil revenues. The companies realized through the negotiations that he was insisting on his position, which ultimately led the company to submit to the reality and reach an agreement with the ruler of Qatar that stipulated the division of oil revenues between the company and the Qatari government 50% on September 1, 1952. They agreed that the money would be delivered to the ruler in British pounds, instead of Indian rupees from the above date. Qatari revenues jumped from \$1,000,000 in 1949 to \$10,000,000 in 1952 due to the application of the principle of equal profit sharing.<sup>(lxxii)</sup>

It appears from the above that the Qatari government has succeeded in entering into a series of negotiations with oil companies, against their monopolistic measures and their continued imaginary profits in exchange for the low costs of extracting and producing crude oil, and their practice of monopolistic behavior in production and marketing, which made the ruler of Qatar insist on equality with his peers from the state close to him, which reached, through its demands from the oil companies, the principle of equal profits. It is worth noting that the oil companies in Qatar presented some offers such as: increasing oil fees and the ruler's financial allocations, in exchange for not applying the principle of profit sharing, but the latter succeeded in that, in order to increase his access to financial returns and their major role in developing the Emirate of Qatar in all its aspects.

The oil exploration concessions imposed new administrative conditions that were not known before, whether due to British interests in Qatar or due to internal factors by the ruler to keep up with the times, as new governmental institutions were established that were not known before. When the ruler of Qatar, Abdullah Al Thani, remained committed to his opposition to the appointment of a British officer or political agent in his country, the British authorities in the region resorted to another method. They seized the opportunity of the establishment of Al Rumaila Hospital in 1946 by the oil company in cooperation with the Arab American mission in Bahrain. They made the hospital doctor, Astorm, a hidden political agent, who, along with his job, played the role of the British political agent in Qatar

unofficially.<sup>(lxxiii)</sup>

Britain dealt with a cautious policy in its relations with the Arabian Gulf region, especially after World War II, after it realized that there were powers greater than it, which had entered the region under the pretext of oil companies within their rights under the open-door policy. After India revolted against Britain and gained its independence in 1947, it was forced, after the liquidation of the Indian government, to transfer its weight to the British Political Residency and its agency in the Arabian Gulf.<sup>(lxxiv)</sup> Then, to its government in London, mainly, it became particularly dependent on the skill of its political employees more than it relied on treaties. After the discovery of oil in commercial quantities, Britain sought in 1948 to appoint a representative in the Emirate of Qatar as a preliminary step.<sup>(lxxv)</sup> He was accompanied by assistants who worked as advisors to assist him in managing the government and the country and maintaining security. The British Resident in Qatar carried out the duties of the British Political Agent, managed the emirate's foreign relations, followed the instructions of the Colonial Office, and handled the affairs of the sector and what concerned European, Indian and Pakistani nationals, and looked after the interests of English merchants.<sup>(lxxvi)</sup>

After the death of Sheikh Hamad bin Abdullah, Crown Prince and Ruler of Qatar, on May 25, 1948, the emirate witnessed several disturbances among members of the Al Thani family, which reached the point of an exchange of gunfire in the streets of Doha. During this, a car transporting American nurses was hit on its way from Doha to the west coast, but it did not suffer an accident. It appears that the clashes occurred due to the ruler of Qatar's refusal to divide oil revenues with his relatives from the Al Thani family, after the International Offshore Oil Company offered financial incentives and sought to provide an initial payment to the ruler of Qatar, Abdullah bin Qassim, for its concession rights in the submerged waters and islands surrounding Qatar. This money was the main cause of the dispute in the first phase of the disturbance, which was limited to the Al Thani family. Other disturbances occurred when shopkeepers and large landowners demonstrated against the Al Darwish family, exploiting the differences within the ruling family, explaining that the Al Darwish family were the ruler's agents and the main merchants in Qatar, and thanks to their position, they enjoyed numerous economic privileges, some of which were illegal.<sup>(lxxvii)</sup>

Internal protests led the ruler of Qatar to respond to the demands of his family, the Al Thani family, and pledged to give them a share of the oil revenues, and to pay a monthly sum of 110 rupees to those under the age of 12, 500 rupees to the unmarried, and 1,000 rupees to the married. Regarding the issue of the crown prince, he chose his eldest son, Sheikh Ali, to be his crown prince.<sup>(lxxviii)</sup> Then, immediately after the death of his son Hamad, he sent a letter to the Political Agent in Bahrain, Cornelius James Bailey, in July 1948, informing him of his desire to appoint a crown prince for him. His son, Sheikh Ali, was chosen, and he asked the Political Agent in Bahrain for his approval and the approval of the British government for this appointment.<sup>(lxxix)</sup> The ruler of Qatar, Abdullah, gathered the senior members of the Al Thani family and the leaders of the Qatari tribes and nominated his son, Sheikh Ali, as Crown Prince. He then prepared a report on the nomination process, which was signed by those present in agreement. He then sent a letter by Saleh Al Manea, the representative of the ruler, Abdullah, to the political agent in Bahrain, informing him of what had been agreed upon on November 30, 1948. After receiving the letter from the political agent in Bahrain, he headed to Qatar on December 8, 1948, to review its situation, especially after the wave of unrest within the emirate. In addition, he obtained written approval from the ruler of Qatar and his new crown prince to implement the suspended clauses of the previous treaty.<sup>(lxxx)</sup>

It seems that the British government was expecting during that period that the ruler of Qatar would abdicate power to his crown prince, Sheikh Ali, due to internal problems and his inability to manage the government within his emirate and find appropriate solutions for them, in addition to the concession in the submerged waters for the benefit of American companies that were not wanted by Britain to enter Qatari lands, which made the latter think about changing him, so it rushed to obtain his approval to activate the suspended provisions of the 1916 Treaty, which had not yet been implemented in the protection agreement in 1935. The ruler of Qatar renewed his request for recognition from Britain, but the latter linked its recognition of the new crown prince to his approval to implement Articles (7, 8 and 9) of the 1916 Treaty.<sup>(lxxxi)</sup> which stipulated that a British representative be appointed in Qatar and that there be mixed courts to adjudicate cases under British patronage. The new Crown Prince, Sheikh Ali bin Abdullah Al Thani, agreed to implement these articles, and thus British recognition of him was achieved.<sup>(lxxxii)</sup>

On August 7, 1949, the ruler of Qatar sent a letter to the Political Agent in Bahrain informing him of his desire to abdicate in favor of his Crown Prince, Sheikh Ali, citing his old age and inability to carry out the duties of government. The British government responded with a letter addressed to the ruler of Qatar through the Political Agent in Bahrain, informing him of its agreement to his abdication in favor of his son, Sheikh Ali, provided that he adheres to all previous treaties signed with his father. In response, the latter sent a letter to the Political Agent in Bahrain informing him of his commitment to all treaties signed between the ruler of Qatar and the British government.<sup>(lxxxiii)</sup>

On this basis, the ruler of Qatar asked the British Political Agent in Bahrain to come to Qatar on August 20, 2049, for the purpose of abdicating power in favor of his son, Wali. Thus, the latter was installed, and Sheikh Ali was

officially installed as ruler of the country on that day, in the presence of fifty dignitaries of the ruling family, and in the presence of the British Political Resident in the Gulf, Sir William Hay. William Hay) <sup>(bxxiv)</sup> On the same day, the ruler of Qatar, Abdullah, decided to abdicate the rule permanently, in favor of his new crown prince, in light of his worsening illness and the many troubles placed on his shoulders by some members of his family, especially their demands regarding their allocations from the proceeds of privileges. Oil, and the succession with British politicians after granting the submerged water concession to American companies, as well as the internal problems that prompted him to take this decision <sup>(bxxv)</sup> It is important to note that the arrangements under which Sheikh Abdullah abdicated in August 1949 were not acceptable to a section of the Al Thani family, and did not take the Qatari people into consideration. These arrangements were also unclear and open to various interpretations, which sparked sharp disagreements between the ruler and some members of his family. Official letters were exchanged between the ruler of Qatar and the British authorities, the purpose of which was a smooth transfer of power from father to son. Meanwhile, the British Acting Political Resident in the Gulf recognized Sheikh Ali bin Abdullah Al Thani as ruler of Qatar. <sup>(bxxvi)</sup>

It is clear from the above that despite the objections to the arrangements by which the ruler of Qatar, Abdullah, abdicated the rule to his son, Sheikh Ali, which were not approved by members of the Al Thani family, especially the sons of Ahmed bin Mohammed Al Thani, they also confirmed that the Political Agent did not take the opinion of the people of Qatar regarding the abdication. This contradicts what Sheikh Abdullah stated in his letter to the Political Agent in Bahrain, that he had obtained approval for his son's pledge of allegiance to the rule from the elders of the Al Thani family and the leaders of the Qatari tribes. It appears from this that what Sheikh Abdullah did when he took the opinion of the elders of the Al Thani family and the leaders of the Qatari tribes was correct. If this action was devoid of truth, the British Agent would have known about it when he came to Qatar. Moreover, the British government was keen on the security of Qatar in order to obtain its oil without problems from the Al Thani family and the people of Qatar.

A group of Qataris gathered in the afternoon in the courtyard of a palace in Doha, in the presence of the British Political Agent in Bahrain. The sailors of the British warship stood as an honor guard for the British Resident in the Gulf, the Political Agent in Bahrain, and the new ruler. The British warship (Flamingo), anchored in the port of Doha, fired several artillery salutes in celebration of the inauguration of Sheikh Ali bin Abdullah as the new ruler of the country, which it considered a national occasion for Qatar. After that, the British warship left the coast of Qatar to be replaced by another warship guarding the Qatari coast. <sup>(bxxvii)</sup> To ensure that no problems were raised within his emirate, especially from the sons of his son Hamad, Sheikh Abdullah gave a written promise to Sheikh Khalifa bin Hamad bin Abdullah Al Thani. <sup>(bxxviii)</sup> To take over the rule after his uncle, Sheikh Ali, the ruler of Qatar. Sheikh Abdullah continued to support this written promise until his death. Despite Sheikh Abdullah's abdication, he continued to supervise his son, whom he met daily. He refused to make any important decisions without his father's approval. <sup>(bxxix)</sup>

It is clear from this that the main reason for Sheikh Abdullah Al Thani's abdication was his disagreement with the British authorities after he granted the oil concession to the American company Superior. This was because the British government considered Qatar to be its own protectorate and foreign companies were not allowed to enter it. In addition, there were many internal problems with the Al Thani family due to oil revenues, and because of the great competition from American companies, Britain sought to install a new ruler who would meet its desires and implement all the terms of the previous treaties.

The new ruler, immediately after his installation, requested the appointment of a British political representative in Qatar. He then signed his recognition of all the agreements concluded by his father with the British government and the oil company. He also signed a letter in 1949 requesting the appointment of a British advisor. The British government appointed Mr. Ronald Cochrane (Ronald Cochrane) <sup>(xc)</sup> He was responsible for security in Qatar, receiving his instructions from the Political Agent in Bahrain until the British government could choose the right person to be appointed as a political representative, in addition to an advisor to the ruler of Qatar. In the same year, the British government asked Cochrane to form a local police force to undertake the task of maintaining security in Qatar and to train it according to modern military methods. He succeeded in doing so, and most of the local guards present in the oil company camps were replaced by men from these trained forces. Meanwhile, the British government continued its efforts to search for a suitable person to be appointed as a political representative, because the British government realized at that time that a political representative must be appointed to be entrusted with establishing an advanced administration in Qatar, especially after the American company obtained the oil concession. <sup>(xci)</sup>

The British government appointed Officer John Wilton (John Wilton) <sup>(xcii)</sup> He was appointed political representative in Qatar three days after the inauguration of the new ruler. The Political Representative made Doha the headquarters of the British Agency and the supervision of its interests in Qatar, and prevented new American companies from entering into competition with British companies operating in the emirate. <sup>(xciii)</sup> At the end of the 1940s, the ruler of Qatar took British advice and began by establishing the nucleus of a government administration under the supervision of a British advisor. The goal was to establish an administration similar to the one established by Advisor Belgrave in

Bahrain. The first task of that administration would be to prepare a special budget for the emirate for each year, separating the ruler's private treasury from the general treasury of the government, whose accounts would be signed by the advisor alongside the ruler's signature. The proceeds from oil revenues and concessions represented a major resource for the Qatari treasury, which allowed the country to make steady progress on the economic side.<sup>(xciv)</sup>.

In 1949, the ruler of Qatar submitted a request to the Political Agent in Bahrain stating his desire to appoint an advisor to help him in running the country. The British government, which was seeking to achieve this request in order to organize the new public administration, improve its work in this regard, and supervise the armed forces, began the task of searching for someone to advise the ruler and be like Advisor Belgrave in Bahrain. However, the British faced some difficulties in filling this position, and agreed that he should be experienced, fluent in reading and writing Arabic, put British interests first, have a strong enough personality to impose himself in Doha, be strong enough to withstand opposition from the ruler of Qatar, and be able to assume full power if necessary. However, at the end of the same year, Britain entrusted the task to Sir Philip Blunt and Rapid. Phillip Plant Rapid<sup>(xcv)</sup> To be an advisor to the ruler of Qatar, with the appointment of a group of scribes to accompany him. Britain assured the ruler of Qatar of allocating (2000) rupees as a monthly salary to be paid from the Qatari budget to the advisor, in addition to providing a house and a car.<sup>(xcvi)</sup>.

## CONCLUSION

The oil industry contributed to the development of the economic situation after Qatar had been directly dependent on pearl diving, fishing and shipbuilding. However, after the discovery of oil and its export abroad, American companies competed with the British company operating within Qatari territory. After the principle of the continental shelf was approved for countries close to territorial waters and the acquisition of territorial waters by countries, Qatar benefited from this decision by granting the American company a concession in the submerged waters. The features of the economic situation of Qatar changed after the export of oil and the abundance of financial returns that the ruler of Qatar obtained from concession contracts and the quantities of oil exported abroad, which he considered his sole property, which made a section of the members of the Al Thani family demand their share of the financial oil revenues from Sheikh Abdullah bin Qassim, the ruler of Qatar. This led to disagreements and, as a result, the ruler of Qatar abdicated in favor of his son, Sheikh Ali, who responded to the demands of the members of the Al Thani family in order to please them. The latter appointed a commander to organize the Qatari forces, and in order to establish a unified budget for the country, a British advisor was appointed to the ruler of Qatar. For the purpose of improving the economic situation, including industry, trade and agriculture, as well as improving social conditions, such as health and education.

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- (xvi) Moza Sultan Al Jaber, the previous source, p. 114.
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- (xlv) (FO, 371/98431, 1952, File code EA 15311, Withdrawal of Superior Oil from the oil operations in the Gulf due to

- the unreasonable content of Al-Shayukh, and withdrawal of the privilege of Qatar Marine Oil Company before International Marine Oil companies, p87.
- (xlvi)FO 1016/188, 1952, Oil concessions in the Gulf of Qatar, p20.
- (xlvii)Royal Dutch Shell plc: Founded in 1897 by businessman Marcus SamuelRoyal Dutch Shell is a US-based multinational oil and gas company of Anglo-Dutch origin, one of the largest oil companies in the world, headquartered in Houston, Texas, USA. It is one of the largest producers of oil and natural gas, marketers of natural gas, marketers of gasoline, and manufacturers of petrochemicals in the United States. The company was renamed Royal Dutch Shell in 1912 and is one of the joint oil companies in the Iraq Petroleum Company, which is part of the Seven Sisters group. It has obtained several concessions in the Middle East, the most important of which are the oil of Iraq and Qatar. For more, see: Muhammad Khitawi, *Multinational Oil Companies and Their Impact on International Relations*, Dar Raslan Foundation, Damascus, 2010, p. 129; Hisham Ali Obaid Al-Jabri, *The Development of the Oil Industry in Bahrain 1925-1971*, DardaysFor Publishing and Distribution, Baghdad, 2024, p. 70.
- (xlvi)Muhammad Nasr Mahna, *The Arabian Gulf: Modern and Contemporary Development*, University Youth Foundation, Alexandria, 1996, pp. 461-462.
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- (liv)(FO, 1016/175,1952, Agreement between the Ruler of Qatar and the Oil Exploitation Company (in Qatar) Limited, especially the oil revenues, p34.
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- (lxii)FO 1016/175, 1952, Agreement between the Ruler of Qatar and the Oil Exploitation Company (in Qatar) Limited, especially the oil revenues, p30. For more information, see Appendix No. (3)
- (lxiii)Hisham Ali Obaid Al-Jabri, the previous source, p. 131.
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- (lxv)Asmaa Jawad Kazim Haddad, *The United States' Position on OPEC Oil Policies 1977-1988*, Unpublished Master's Thesis, College of Education for Humanities, University of Basra, 2019, p. 21.
- (lxvi)Widad Jaber Ghazi, *The Nationalization of Iranian Oil and Its Repercussions on International Relations 1951-1953*, Al-Mustansiriya Center for Arab and International Studies, Al-Mustansiriya University, 2013, p. 8.
- (lxvii)Hussein Abdul-Kazem Ajja, *The Experience of Nationalizing Iranian Oil 1951-1953 Between Internal Challenges and External Pressures*, A Study of the Documents of the Iraqi Royal Court, Ark Journal of Philosophy, Linguistics and Social Sciences, College of Arts, University of Wasit, Issue (9), 2012, p. 218.
- (lxviii)(FRUS 1951, *The Near East, South Asia, and Africa*, Vol. V, *The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Childs) to the Secretary of State confidential*, Jidda, 13, June 1951, p.57.

(lix)Hisham Ali Obaid Al-Jabri, the previous source, p. 133.

(lxx)(FO 371/168680,1952 Ruler's royalties improved from half the year. For the ruler, his judgment is seen in these, relationships 1952,P.140.

(lxxi)(FO,1016\175,1952,.Agreement between the Ruler of Qatar and the Petroleum Investment Company (Qatar) Limited regarding oil revenues

(lxxii)(FO 1016/175,1952, Agreement between the Ruler of Qatar and the Oil Exploitation Company (in Qatar) Limited, especially the oil revenues, p35.

(lxxiii)Abdullah Al-Hussaini, the previous source, p. 185.

(lxxiv)Mu'ayyad Baqir Muhammad Al-Araji, American Petroleum Concessions in the Arabian Gulf, Journal of the Islamic University College, Volume (9), Issue (34), 2015, p. 574.

(lxxv)Muhammad Suhail Taqush, Modern and Contemporary History of the Arabian Peninsula, Dar Al-Nafayes for Publishing and Distribution, Beirut, 2020, p. 454.

(lxxvi)Ibrahim Muhammad Suleiman, the previous source, p. 288.

(lxxvii)Hamed Abdel Hamid Mashhour, the previous source, p. 213.

(lxxviii)(IOR/R/15/2/609, "The Caliphate in Qatar" (102/67),P34.

(lxxix)Muhammad Nasr Mahna, Qatar: History, Politics, and Modernization, Modern University Office, Alexandria, 2001, p. 96. (3) IOR/R/15/2/609, The Caliphate in Qatar, (102/67),P36.

(1) FO 8143/33, Text of Treaty, and ratified between His Majesty's Government and Sheikh, p3.

(lxxxii)Muhammad Suhail Taqush, the previous source, p. 454.

(lxxxiii)Muhammad Nasr Mahna, the previous source, p. 97.

(lxxxiv)William Hay (1893-1962) was an officer and administrator in the British Indian Army in British India, who served as Chief Commissioner.BalochistanDuring the colonial periodHay was educated at Bradfield.and Oxford University, commissioned into the Dorsetshire Regiment in 1914,And served duringWorld War I inMesopotamian Campaignand go toIndian ArmyHe joined the 24th Division and was appointed its commander in 1916, and was promoted to the rank of lieutenant in 1918. He was seconded to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Political Affairs in 1920 and appointed in 1924. He was the Political Agent inSouth Waziristan 1928-1934, Assistant Commissioner inMardan1928-1931, Political Agent inWaziristan1940-1941,And residing in the Arabian Gulf1941-1942 Judicial Commissioner of Revenue, Agent to the Governor-General, Resident and Chief Commissioner inBalochistan1942-1946 He became Political Resident in the Arabian Gulf from 1946-1953 until he retired from service and returned to England. For more see: Sir WilliamRobert Hay, The Arab Gulf States, translated by Youssef Al-Shawi, Supreme Council of Culture, Cairo, 2004.

(lxxxv)Hamed Abdel Hamid Mashhour, previous source,fromp. 214.

(lxxxvi)IOR/R/15/2/609, The Caliphate in Qatar, (102/67),P38.

(lxxxvii)Abdul Qader Hamoud Abdul Aziz Al-Qahtani, Studies in the History of the Modern and Contemporary Arabian Gulf, National Council for Culture, Arts and Heritage, Doha, 2008, p. 58.

(lxxxviii)Sheikh Khalifa bin Hamad Al Thani (1932-2016) Sheikh Khalifa bin Hamad Al Thani was born in Al Rayyan in 1932. He completed his primary and secondary education in Doha and held several ministerial positions, including the Ministry of Education, then the Ministry of Finance and Petroleum. In 1960, he was appointed Crown Prince during the reign of Sheikh Ahmed bin Ali Al Thani. On February 22, 1972, he assumed power after carrying out a coup known to Qataris as the Corrective Movement. During his reign, Qatar joined the Arab League and contributed to the establishment of the Gulf Cooperation Council. Qatar witnessed many developments during his reign. He abdicated in favor of his son, Sheikh Hamad, in 1995. He left Qatar and did not return until 2004. For more, see: Amin Islam, Al Thani: The Rulers of Qatar: Their History and Lineage, Emiri Diwan, Doha, 2015, p. 5.

(lxxxix)Youssef Ibrahim Al-Abdullah, Sheikh Khalifa bin Hamad Al Thani and the Modern Development of Qatar before he assumed power until 1995, Center for Historical Research and Studies, Historical Facts Magazine, Issue (2), 2019, p. 377.

(xc)Ronald Cochrane (1899-1978) was of British origin and came to Qatar from Bahrain in 1949. He worked as a policeman



and joined the service of Sheikh Ali bin Abdullah, converted to Islam, took the name (Muhammad Mahdi) and became commander of the Qatari security forces in 1960, in addition to his position as deputy British advisor who carried out the duties of the Director General of State Departments: Ibrahim Abu Nab, Qatar: The Story of State Building, Doha, 1998, pp. 20-21.

(<sup>xci</sup>Mufid Kassed Al-Zaidi, *Contemporary History of Qatar*, Dar Al-Manahj for Publishing and Distribution, Baghdad, 2010, p. 71.

(<sup>xcii</sup>John Wilton (1921–2011) was a British diplomat who was educated at Wanstead High School and won an open scholarship to St. John's College, Oxford in 1940. He served with the Irish Brigade in North Africa, Italy, and Austria between 1943 and 1946. He became the British Resident in Qatar from 23 August 1949 to June 1952. He was the first Political Resident in Qatar, reporting directly to the Colonial Office. He was the only foreign representative in Qatar, and his duties were primarily limited to managing Qatar's foreign affairs and representing the interests of the British government in Qatar. He also handled judicial duties related to the trial of foreigners. Wilton became Director of the Middle East Centre for Arabic Studies in Lebanon from 1960 to 1965, then Deputy High Commissioner in Aden from 1966 to 1967, after which he was appointed Ambassador to Kuwait from 1970 to 1974, and then Assistant Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. 1974-1976, then became ambassador to Saudi Arabia 1976-1979, died at the age of 90. For more, see: Ahmed Zakaria Al-Shalq and others, *Qatar's Political Development from its Establishment to the State's Independence*, Doha, 2005, pp. 163-164.

(<sup>xciii</sup>Abdul Qader Hamoud Abdul Aziz Al-Qahtani, the previous source, p. 59.

(<sup>xciv</sup>Mufid Kasid Al-Zaidi, the previous source, p. 72.

(<sup>xcv</sup>Philip Blunt and Rapid (1896-1979) Blunt was 54 years old at the time of his appointment and not the young man anyone would have preferred, but he had a wealth of experience. He had fought in the First World War in the Royal Irish Rifles and then in the Royal Air Force. After the war, he learned Arabic at the School of Oriental and African Studies in London, then served as a pilot, intelligence officer, and commander in Egypt, Palestine, and Iraq. During the Second World War, he became a senior intelligence officer, finishing the war in the Intelligence Section at Headquarters. As a Group Commander, Blunt outshone everyone in the British Foreign Service in the Gulf. This certainly irked the Political Agents in the Gulf, who expected to be giving orders to a man of much lower rank. For more, see:

Richard Fletcher, *Advisor to Sheikh Philip Blunt and Rapid Modernization in Qatar 1949-1952*, Academy Letters, 2020.

(<sup>xcvi</sup>(FO, 1016/62, 1949 – 1950, The appointment of the British advisor to Sheikh Ali bin Abdullah Al-Thani, the ruler of Qatar, p. 35.